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PREFACE 
 
Two overriding influences inform this study. The first is a set of stories 
that narrate the Gonzales family history, my mother’s side of the family. The 
second is a number of jokes that my father regularly told at social gatherings. 
Both are brief examples of a Mexican American expressive culture “in relation to 
its socially dominated condition.”1 Taken together, they constitute a “social 
heuristic, a real construction of identity for navigating a chaotic social world.” In 
this particular instance, these performances illustrate Mexicano families 
interpreting their past in the face of Anglo domination. Hopefully, these “texts” 
achieve what Ramón Saldívar claims for the “pedagogy of conjunto” and that is 
they “instruct us while they delight.”2 
Often at the urging of my mother, my grandmother would entertain us 
around her kitchen table with countless stories of past generations of Gonzales, on 
occasion referring to events as far back as the Spanish colonial period. Most of 
                                                 
1 José Limón, Dancing with the Devil: Society and Cultural Poetics in Mexican-American South 
Texas (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1994): 7. 
2 Ramón Saldívar, “Transnational Migrations and Border Identities: Immigration and Postmodern 
Culture,” South Atlantic Quarterly 98: 1/2 (Winter/Spring 1999): 220; 230. 
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these accounts revolved around the family’s ancestral home, a large adobe house 
that at one time served as the county seat for El Paso.3 One of the most prominent 
sketches, if only because it was my favorite, narrated the defiance and leading 
role of Francisco “Chico” Barela during what came to be known as the San 
Elizario Salt War in 1877. In this clash between organized Mexicanos from San 
Elizario, Ysleta and Socorro and Anglos a company of Texas Rangers were 
defeated and captured as Mexicanos resisted Anglo attempts to enclose communal 
spaces. Barela, designated as “the leader” of the uprising by Anglo authorities and 
later by historians, no doubt preoccupied the Gonzales clan and its patriarch José 
María “Chema” Gonzales. The retribution directed at Barela was likely to impact 
the Gonzales since the two families were united through marriage.4  
The rebellion affected great numbers of people. Many innocent families, 
for example, were forced to fend for themselves during the conflict. Immediately 
following the Mexicano victory, Anglos reorganized themselves and terrorized the 
communities of the lower valley, summarily executing and raping innocent 
Mexicano victims who had no role in the rebellion. in the wake of brutal Anglo 
reprisals. Brutal Anglo reprisals continued until Buffalo soldiers were able to 
intervene. The aftermath of the “war” posed a challenge as well. José María, for 
example, successfully negotiated Anglo legal efforts to punish close to one 
                                                 
3 See, J. Morgan Broaddus, The Legal Heritage of El Paso (El Paso: Texas Western College Press, 
1963): 124. 
4 Antonia Barela, the daughter of Francisco Barela, was married to Francisco Gonzales, the son of 
Jose Maria Gonzales and a prominent freighter. 
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hundred and fifty alleged perpetrators by excusing himself from his civic duty as 
a grand juror in order to keep peace in his own household.  
The dramatic telling of the Salt War, however, was not the only tale of 
conflict shared by my family around my grandmother’s kitchen table. There were 
also tales of “everyday” struggles, including adventures in freighting to Las 
Vegas, New Mexico, responding to raids by “marauding” Apaches, as well as less 
prominent struggles of meeting the demands and obligations of a diverse frontier 
community. The vital role of women in sustaining the Gonzales home, for 
example, while considerably less dramatic than the Salt War, were no less 
compelling especially given the myriad of vital tasks they performed. Ultimately, 
the range of stories reflected the complex, diverse, if at times, contradictory life of 
rancheros and the Mexicano community whose political and economic power 
slowly dissipated during the last half of the nineteenth century.5 
In a less serious, but no less compelling contribution, my father 
occasionally could be found telling a favorite joke, which went as follows: An 
Anglo and Mexicano, both standing at opposite shores of the Rio Grande, 
simultaneously shoot at a passing duck overhead. Each wades to the middle of the 
                                                 
5 Rancheros were small self-sufficient ranchers and farmers who depended on networks of 
extended family for labor. The ranchero also played a central role in maintaining the stability of 
the community in the number of artisanal tasks he performed as well as through his access to 
larger markets. For a brief discussion of the ranchero, see Jane-Dale Lloyd, “Rancheros and 
Rebellion: The Case of Northwestern Chihuahua, 1905-1909,” in Daniel Nugent, ed., Rural Revolt 
in Mexico: U.S. Intervention and the Domain of Subaltern Politics (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1998): 108-109. See also Armando C. Alonzo, Tejano Legacy: Rancheros and Settlers in 
South Texas, 1734-1900 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998). 
 viii
river to retrieve the fallen bird. After a period of grappling over the prize, the 
Mexicano proposes a test of strength to determine who should possess the duck. 
The Anglo, at a loss for a solution, defers to his opponent, who suggests that the 
prize should be awarded to the one who is best able to endure a formidable test of 
strength. The Anglo acquiesces to his opponent’s suggestion so they move to 
shore in order to properly settle the dispute. The Mexicano explains that they 
should take turns striking the other with all the force they each can muster until 
the more formidable of the two remains standing. The Anglo dismissively 
commands the Mexicano, whom he believes to be his social inferior, to make the 
initial strike. Hesitant at first, the Mexicano assents, and just as quickly strikes the 
Anglo with great precision and force. His blow lands on the Anglo’s genitals, 
dropping him to the ground writhing in pain. After his tortured spasms have 
passed, the Anglo picks himself up and dusts himself off. Composed, he orders 
his adversary to stand ready to receive what he plans will be a devastating blow. 
At which moment, the Mexicano replies, “Take the duck….”6 
                                                 
6 The joke conforms to the genre of joke or anecdote that, according to Américo Paredes, 
expresses a veiled hostility “expressed in an escapist type of jest featuring dream situations in 
which the Mexican bests the Anglo-American.” Paredes identified a taxonomy of jokes or jests 
that reflected Mexican attitudes towards Anglos “since the period of the first armed clashes in the 
1830s down to the present.” The open hostility of the first stage gives way to the veiled hostility of 
the second, culminating in the third stage of self satire. It should be noted that these stages are not 
“strictly confined to a definite historical period.” See, Américo Paredes, “The Anglo American in 
Mexican Folklore,” in Ray Browne, Donald Winkelman and Allen Hayman, eds., New Voices in 
American Studies (Purdue University Studies, 1966): 113-127. See also, José Limón, “Agringado 
Joking in Texas Mexican Society: Folklore and Differential Identity,” in New Directions in 
Chicano Scholarship, Ricardo Romo and Raymund Paredes, eds., (San Diego: University of 
California at San Diego Press, 1978); José Limón, “Carne, Carnales, and the Carnivalesque: 
Bakhtinian Batos, Disorder, and Narrative Discourses,” American Ethnologist 16:3 (August 1989). 
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The stories of my family’s past and the jokes of Anglo-Mexican conflict 
inform the perceptions of resistance and domination that animate this study. In 
one way, this dissertation is part of an effort to document and analyze Mexicano 
resistance during the late nineteenth century. However, it also seeks to do more 
than re-narrate episodes of conflict and resistance. This study attempts to fulfill 
the tasks of subaltern studies suggested by José Rabasa. “For if subalternity 
partakes of hegemony and consensus,” argues Rabasa, “it is no less urgent to 
examine how subaltern subjects are constituted through dominance and coercion. 
War, in this regard, would not be an exceptional state of affairs, but the course of 
the world.”7 Each cultural practice, the sharing of family history and the telling of 
jokes conveys a tension between domination and resistance, pointing to a rich and 
complicated history of struggle. The resistance narrated in the oral history of my 
family and the popular memory of struggle is much more subtle than what has 
usually been celebrated as Mexicano resistance undertaken “with his pistol in his 
hand.”8 While less dramatic than more overt acts of defiance, these examples of 
expressive culture do indicate the contradictions and conflicts that result from a 
position of social domination.  
                                                 
7 José Rabasa, “Of Zapatismo: Reflections on the Folkloric and the Impossible in a Subaltern 
Insurrection,” in Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, eds., The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of 
Capital (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997): 405. 
8 Here I am invoking Americo Paredes’ seminal text With His Pistol in His Hand: A Border 
Ballad and Its Hero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988). I will argue that Paredes’ work 
does in fact point us in the direction of a more subtle reading of Mexicano resistance. 
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On an immediate level, this cultural repertoire shares a common source in 
that both my mother and father were raised in West Texas and, as a consequence, 
their own symbolic investment in the narrative conveys their personal struggles as 
Mexican Americans from Ysleta. In a broader sense, resistance is manifest in the 
dogged efforts to retain the fragile memory of a family’s triumphs and tragedies.9  
Brief Statement On Terms 
In what follows I offer a brief statement about my use of terms identifying 
frontier settlers in the border region. In this essay, I will use borderlands and 
Southwest interchangeably to refer to the geographic region Oscar Martínez refers 
to as the “greater borderlands.” Martínez defines the greater borderlands as “the 
U.S. and Mexican border states –Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California on 
the American side and Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora, 
and Baja California on the Mexican side.”10 The important aspect to be noted here 
is the interdependence and ultimately the coherence of the region. 
I have chosen to use the broader category of Mexicanos to signify persons 
of Mexican descent without regard to citizenship or place of residence. Where 
necessary, I indicate, if the documents describing key events allow, the citizenship 
                                                 
9 Even the place of telling, both the stories and the jokes, establishes a site where resistance is 
shared. The site and performance also suggests the specific enactment of a set of hidden 
transcripts. See, James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, Hidden Transcripts (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
10 Oscar Martínez, Border People: Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1994), pp. 40-41. Cf. Américo Paredes concept of “Greater Mexico” 
which “refers to all the areas inhabited by people of Mexican culture –not only within the present 
limits of the Republic of Mexico but in the United States as well—in a cultural rather than a 
 xi
of Mexicanos as either residents in Texas or from one of the northern Mexican 
states of Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. I avoid 
using the term Tejano to identify ethnic Mexicans who remained in Texas 
immediately following the war or who later crossed and claimed United States 
citizenship. Although Mexicanos who chose to reside in Texas would later claim, 
to varying degress, a distinct identity as Tejanos, the references that settlers, 
military officers, and local leaders made were more often to “Mexicans,” and 
almost always disparagingly.11 
On the other hand, I use the inclusive and generic term Anglos to label a 
variety of non-Mexican residents, especially referring to US leaders in general 
and Texas in particular. I recognize the limitation of this strategy, denying the 
significant diversity within the non-Mexican population. I use the term Anglo, 
however, for the simple reason that most settlers who migrated into Texas were 
able to claim important privileges based on their racial identity, and as a 
consequence they were able to accrue the rights and responsibilities of citizenship 
quiet easily.12 Indeed, what made frontier defense such a crucial racial project 
throughout the late nineteenth century were the benefits made possible by 
                                                                                                                                     
political sense.” Américo Paredes, A Texas-Mexican Cancionero: Folksongs of the Lower Border 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976): xiv. 
11 For an important study on Tejano identity, see Raul A. Ramos, “From Norteño to Tejano: The 
Roots of a Borderlands Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Political Identity in Bexar, 1811-1861” (Ph D. 
diss., Yale University, 1999).  
12 David R. Roediger has argued persuasively that the white working class enjoys a psychological 
wage in addition to whatever struggles they may have with elites over wages. “The problem,” 
Roediger explains, “is not just that the white working class is at critical junctures manipulated into 
 xii
identifying with an emergent national project. At the same time, the “imagined 
community” produced by the material, symbolic and structural violence of 
frontier defense limited Mexicanos’ inclusion in the “deep, horizontal 
comradeship.”13 Thus, the establishment of racial and ethnic boundaries and 
privileges indicated the success of a US settler colonial project in south and west 
Texas. 
                                                                                                                                     
racism, but that it comes to think of itself and interests as white.” David R. Roediger, The Wages 
of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (New York: Verso, 1991): 12. 
13 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983): 7. 
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INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL WAR IN THE GREATER 
BORDERLANDS 
And this, not out of a speculative choice or theoretical preference, but because in fact it is 
one of the essential traits of Western societies that the force relationships which for a 
long time had found expression in war, in every form of warfare, gradually became 
invested in the order of political power.1 
Michel Foucault 
 
Una herida abierta2 
When representatives of Mexico and the United States signed the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, they did not put to rest hostilities 
between the peoples of the two nations.3 Anglo resentments for the battles of the 
Alamo and Goliad (March 1836) and the disaster that befell the remnants of the 
Somervell expedition at Mier (December 1842), continued long after the US-
Mexican War. Conflict consistently spilled over the recently established border, 
with much of the hostility originating within Texas. Both Mexican and US 
officials contended with cross border violence. Although much of the violence 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, vol. 1, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990): 102. 
2 Despite recent economic and political interdependence the region remains, as Gloria Anzaldúa 
has famously remarked, “an open wound.” “The US-Mexico border,” Anzaldúa argues “es una 
herida abierta where the Third World grates against the first [sic] and bleeds. And before a scar 
forms it hemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two worlds merging to form a third country -a border 
culture.” Gloria Anzaldua, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Meztiza (San Francisco: aunt lute 
books, 1987): 3. The cycle of violence and the racism that sustains it persists with an intensity 
recently demonstrated in anti-immigrant legislation and increased militarization along the US-
Mexico Border. Mexicanos have endured so much repression that Guillermo Gomez Peña argues a 
“Second US-Mexico War” is currently underway. Guillermo Gómez-Peña, Dangerous Border 
Crossers, The Artist Talks Back (London: Routledge, 2000): 52. 
3 The United States and Mexico signed the treaty on February 2, 1848 and exchanged ratifications 
on May 30, 1848. For a discussion of the treaty, see Richard Griswold del Castillo, The Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo: A legacy of Conflict, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990): 43-54. 
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was perpetrated by lawless elements, there was a great deal of military and 
paramilitary activity, much of it responding to subaltern resistance throughout the 
region. The persistent cross border hostility made the region surrounding the 
newly established border a sight of intense political conflict. 
Anglo violence against Mexicanos continued well after the conclusion of 
the US-Mexico War. Anglos systematically violated the provisions and 
obligations of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, politically and economically 
displacing Mexicanos through a combination of legal chicanery and physical 
violence.4 The violence immediately following the war produced a system of 
racial and class inequality that some argue persists to the present day.5 US 
territorial aggrandizement from 1836 to 1848 inspired a profound bitterness in 
Mexicanos. Losing over half of Mexico’s territory to the US, Mexicanos remained 
deeply suspicious of imminent appropriations long after the war. As a result, 
hostility between Mexicanos and Anglos persisted for most of the second half of 
the nineteenth century. 
Border conflict was not limited to Mexicanos and Anglos but claimed an 
array of agents, including people indigenous to the region as well as Buffalo 
                                                 
4 Works that examine the despoiling of Chicano communities include Leonard Pitt, The Decline of 
the Californios: A Social History of the Spanish-Speaking Californians, 1846-1890 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966); Albert Camarillo, Chicanos in a Changing Society: From 
Mexican Pueblos to American Barrios in Santa Barbara and Southern California, 1848-1930 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
5 See Mario Barerra, Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); Rodolfo Acuña, Occupied America: A History of 
Chicanos (New York: Longman, 2000). 
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Soldiers. Although embattled with one another, Mexicanos and Anglos also 
confronted several First Nations peoples, especially Comanche, Apaches, Kiowa, 
and Kickapoos, to name just a few. Both Mexicano and Anglo settler colonial 
projects attempted to pacify earlier inhabitants, executing a series of campaigns 
that occasionally achieved intense levels of mobilization equal to war, as, for 
example, during the Comanche War (1854) and the Red River War (1874-1875). 
Anglos resumed the business of occupying and expanding beyond already settled 
regions with greater intensity after the US Civil War.6 
In this chapter I examine approaches to violence in the Greater 
Borderlands. Treatments of violence on the nation’s frontier have been 
ambivalent. This lack of specificity has made distinguishing the many histories of 
violence in the US-Mexico Borderlands difficult. In order to set the foundation for 
more closely interrogating violence in the US-Mexico Borderlands, I review early 
approaches to conflict in the region. I also reconsider the category of war, 
especially its ideological function, in order to better illustrate the racial bias 
regarding Anglo-Mexican and Anglo-Indian conflict. The final section of the 
chapter briefly outlines the chapters that follow. 
                                                 
6 While Indian Wars as a whole have received considerable attention, specific wars subsumed in 
this catchall category are less well known. See also William Dean Carrigan, “Between South and 
West: Race, Violence, and Power in Central Texas, 1836-1916” (Ph. D. diss., Emory University, 
1999). 
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A great deal of scholarly attention has been focused on the major conflicts 
or “formal” wars of the region. Conflicts such as the US-Mexican War, or the 
American War of Intervention as it is known in Mexico, the US Civil War and the 
“Indian Wars” bracketed the struggle between races and nations.7 Mexico also 
endured a series of conflicts in the persistent uprisings and catastrophic civil wars 
that severely undermined its national project. Largely overlooked by Anglo 
scholars, Mexico suffered civil strife during the War of the Reform (1855-1858), 
the Civil War (1858-1861), the French Intervention (1861-1867) and the Restored 
Republic (1867-1876). As more formal conflicts, these were noted for major field 
battles with set field pieces. Orchestrated episodes of prolonged violence to 
satisfy national interests, they were begun and terminated through a series of 
protocols, depending on the “cooperation” of the opponents.8 Ultimately, all these 
conflicts profoundly influenced the development of the region. 
                                                 
7 The popular and scholarly work on the US Civil War has by far overshadowed interest in the 
US-Mexican War. For recent literature on the US-Mexican War, see Richard V. Francaviglia and 
Douglas W. Richmond, eds., Dueling Eagles: Reinterpreting the U.S.-Mexican War, 1846-1848 
(Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 2000). 
8 Inga Clendenen, for example, argues that “wars” require some degree of cultural exchange and 
cooperation. “But if combat is not quite as cultural as cricket,” Clendenen explains, “its brutalities 
are nonetheless rule bound. Like cricket, it requires sustained act of cooperation, with each side 
constructing the conditions in which both will operate, and so, where the struggle is between 
strangers, obliging mutual ‘transmission of culture’ of the shotgun variety. And because of its high 
intensities it promises to expose how one’s own and other ways of acting and meaning are 
understood and responded to in crisis conditions, and what lessons about the other and about 
oneself can be learned in that intimate, involuntary, and most consequential communication.” The 
category of war, when limited to specific policy initiatives executed by a nation-state for example, 
obscures the intensity and duration of conflict generally, but more importantly, it veils the 
relations of power operating in specific contexts. Inga Clendinnen, “‘Fierce amd Unnatural 
Cruelty’: Cortés and the Conquest of Mexico,” Stephen Greenblatt, ed., New World Encounters 
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Mexicanos and Anglos also clashed in a series of often overlooked less 
formal, but no less significant, irregular or “brushfire wars.” While the region 
experienced larger more formal wars of conquest, it also knew “brushfire wars” 
such as the Merchants War, Cortina War, Las Cuevas War and the San Elizario 
Salt War. When they have been discussed they are often viewed as 
uncomplicated, sporadic and unorganized resistance, a by-product of inevitable 
processes of political consolidation and capitalist incorporation. Probing episodes 
that precipitated the crossing of US troops across the international boundary, 
Clarence Clendenen argues that “brushfire wars” erupted on the border long 
before better-known interventions, such as the noted hunt for Mexican General 
Francisco Villa in 1916.9 The Columbus raid, and the dramatic chase that 
followed, have overwhelmingly commanded the attention of both popular and 
scholarly audiences, often obscuring earlier equally important small-scale 
conflicts that precipitated cross border crossings. Often no more than small battles 
or skirmishes, in most cases they did not warrant the status that comes with the 
label of “war” nor the formality and glory attendant to it. However, their intensity 
                                                                                                                                     
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993): 24. I am grateful to Daniel Castro for reminding 
me about this essay. 
9 Clarence Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars 
(London: The Macmillan Company, 1969). Clendenen is responsible for the term “brushfire 
wars.” See also, J. Fred Rippy, “Some Precedents of the Pershing Expedition into Mexico,” 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 24:4 (April 1921): 292-316. 
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and frequency contributed significantly to the racial tension of the region, making 
them a litmus of the degree of racial turmoil. 
In addition to the disruptions of warfare, Mexico defended against a 
number of filibusters that originated from US soil. These invasions often had the 
clandestine support of leading US officials and other organized merchant 
interests, insuring that many of these incursions were well organized and well 
funded. The participants who rode into Mexico could hail from either the US or 
Mexico, and in some cases from other parts of the world as well. The most 
notable filibuster that falls within the regional scope and time period of this study 
was led by José María Carvajal, later referred to as the Merchants War. 
Proclaiming El Plan de la Loba, Carvajal challenged the authority of the Mexican 
government between 1851 and 1855. The participation of a substantial number of 
Anglo mercenaries, many of them ex-rangers under the leadership of John Ford, 
put into doubt the legitimacy of Carvajal’s political ambitions. The political 
dueling between Carvajal and General Avalos, over suspension or reduction of 
trade duties, further undermined the political legitimacy of Carvajal’s and Ford’s 
shared goal of establishing the Republic of the Sierra Madre, an independent 
political entity that many believed would minimize cross border violence and 
facilitate the integration of Northern Mexico into the US economic orbit.10  
                                                 
10 Joseph Stout, Schemers and Dreamers: Filibustering in Mexico, 1848-1921 (Fort Worth: Texas 
Christian University Press, 2002): 18. See also, Ernest Shearer, “The Carvajal Disturbances,” 
 7
Alongside “wars” and filibusters, the region experienced persistent 
depredations, ranging from simple thefts to more elaborate efforts that victimized 
whole communities, both Anglo and Mexicano. Depredations, or organized 
attacks on settled communities for the purposes of revenge and plunder, have 
semantically been associated with Indigenous peoples. In some instances, locals 
believed Mexicanos to be responsible for or part of depredations, confirming for 
many that Mexicanos were equally debased as Indigenous peoples. The 
association between Indigenous peoples and Mexicanos has even prompted some 
scholars to uncritically represent the entire region as dominated by a culture of 
smuggling and theft.11 In many instances, the motivation for depredations 
organized by Indigenous groups was the destitute condition they endured due to 
the unfulfilled treaty obligations that left many of those groups that treated with 
the US destitute.12 
The violence of this period also resulted from a number of insurgencies, 
organized acts of resistance against Anglo political, social and economic 
domination. In labeling resistance as an insurgency I am following the lead of 
Ranajit Guha. My purpose is to contrast the leadership, organization, and 
                                                                                                                                     
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 55: 2 (October 1951): 201-230; Harbert Davenport, “General 
Jose Maria Jesus Carabajal,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 55: 4 (April 1952): 475-483. 
11 For a recent example of such a conflation, see James F. Brooks, “Served Well by Plunder: La 
Gran Ladronería and Producers of History Astride the Río Grande” American Quarterly 5:1 
(March 2000): 23-58. 
12 Unfortunately, the failures of the reservation system and the full-scale effort of the US 
government to police Indigenous peoples are beyond the scope of this study. 
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objectives of those defying Anglo rule to the strategies of representations by 
hegemonic forces that defined and demeaned the events as an émeute, jacquerie, 
riot, revolt, uprising, or mob action. Challenging the limited notion of spontaneity, 
Guha stresses that insurgencies possessed “conscious leadership,” implying two 
antagonistic consciousnesses that “met for a decisive trial of strength.” However, 
these rebellions, like the other species of violence mentioned above, exhibited 
racial and class porousness. Despite the fact that Mexicanos were on both sides of 
the conflict, these insurgencies were orchestrated and deliberate acts of resistance 
executed in opposition to the abuses and arrogance associated with Anglos.13 In 
other words, these struggles were expressed in opposition to larger processes of 
social and material enclosure and articulated through race. 
Insurgencies also included the number of revolts or “revolutions” 
throughout northern Mexico against local and national leadership. Often 
organized on the US side of the border, this type of insurgency occurred well into 
the early twentieth century. These revolts were in some cases successful, as in the 
case of Porfirio Diaz who caused US officials, including diplomats, military 
officers, and local law enforcement, a great deal of consternation. The US 
regularly decried the violation of neutrality laws by expeditions departing from 
the US side of the border. On one hand, the US was bound by treaty to remain 
                                                 
13 Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1999): 4. 
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neutral in the political affairs of Mexico. On the other hand it resented the turmoil 
that revolts organized in US border cities caused in the region. However, on 
occasion the US did favor one faction over another, despite their claims to 
neutrality. Needless to say, the violence produced along the frontier benefited the 
US border region economically through the sale of arms and material.  
In conjunction with all species of violence along the border, i.e. “wars,” 
filibusters, “depredations,” and insurgencies, was the production of a 
representational machine that made it possible for Anglos to name and narrate 
conflict. The frequency and intensity of border clashes during the second half of 
the nineteenth century prompted a series of investigations and inquiries conducted 
by both the US and Mexican governments at both the state and federal level. 
These investigations ultimately consolidated the documentation such as 
newspaper accounts, line officer’s reports, local officials’ pleas and testimonies of 
leading citizens regarding violent events, making available a “prose of counter 
insurgency.”14 A form of “colonialist knowledge,” the “prose of counter 
insurgency” enabled Anglos to discursively appropriate frontier defense, 
criminalizing and infantalizing Indigenous peoples and Mexicanos along the way. 
As a result, Anglos successfully erased the investments Indigenous peoples and 
                                                 
14 Guha has distinguished this historiographical production by identifying the categories of 
representation: primary, secondary and tertiary discourses. Ranajit Guha, “The Prose of Counter-
Insurgency,” in Nicholas Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry Ortner, eds., Culture/Power/History: A 
Reader in Contemporary Social Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 
 10
Mexicanos had in the region as well as masked the contributions they made to the 
Anglo settler colonial project from popular consciousness. Thus, in every way the 
investigative apparatus developed by the US supported the ideological work 
required of settler colonialism, producing specific statements regarding territorial 
expansion and control, and making frontier defense a critical racial project.15 
Officials subsumed the violence of this period under the heading of 
“Mexican Border Troubles.” In their more sober moments, officials concurred 
that there was not one “trouble,” but many. The animosity between the races, the 
differences between distinct cultures, the disputes of one nation against the other, 
the ambitions of the elite over those with access to fewer resources, the violations 
of those outside the law, and the petty personal feuds of local residents, all 
combined to form an “economy of violence” that defined the “everyday” lives of 
inhabitants.16 Part of the motivation for the number of fact-finding missions was 
the consistent stream of complaints from frontier denizens who expected federal 
assistance in thwarting the violence perpetrated by Indian “savages” and Mexican 
“bandits.” Indeed, it was the belief of many inhabitants, including people of some 
prominence, that life was cheap and residents were likely to be affected by 
                                                 
15 I am using statement here to suggest a discursive event, q.v. Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, 
Method, and Epistemology, vol. 2 of The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, James D. 
Faubion, ed. (New York: The New Press, 1998): 308. 
16 Malcolm Greenshields defines an “economy of violence” as an “endless round of provocations 
and retaliations, of affronts and private, violent justice, this ‘economy’ could be a matter of 
individual quarrels or of massive, collective uprisings.” Malcolm Greenshields, An Economy of 
Violence in Early Modern France: Crime and Justice in the Haute Avergne, 1587-1664 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State Press, 1994): 12. 
 11
violence in some way. However, closer examination of the material violence of 
this period reveals that perpetrators and defenders were rarely entirely from one 
group or another. 
The material violence more commonly associated with the region enabled 
Anglos to appropriate land, dominate the political process, and discipline a 
foreign neighbor. However, it was the strategies and processes of representing 
violence, or symbolic violence, facilitated chiefly by a series of investigations that 
allowed Anglos to claim the heroic exploits of frontier settlement and defense as 
their exclusive legacy. The US settler colonial project relied on a representational 
machine that essentially “wrote violence,” making available an aesthetic, ethics 
and ultimately epistemology of frontier violence.17 The process of writing 
violence in Greater Mexico relied on what Foucault theorized as an “archive,” a 
discursive formation that justified Anglo investments in frontier defense as actors 
and narrators.18 A nation’s attitude to its legacy of violence reveals a great deal 
about its racial past given that some moments of violence have been ignored 
while others are celebrated. 
                                                 
17 José Rabasa, “Of Zapatismo: Reflections on the Folkloric and the Impossible in a Subaltern 
Insurrection,” in Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, eds., The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of 
Capital (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997): 423. I address this theme throughout the 
dissertation. I discuss it in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
18 “I shall call an archive, not the totality of texts that have been preserved by a civilization or the 
set of traces that could be salvaged from its downfall, but the series of rules which determine in a 
culture the appearance and disappearance of statements, their retention and their destruction, their 
paradoxical existence as events and things. Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, p. 
309. 
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In unpacking the border conflict during this period, I argue the social war 
reflected not one history of violence, i.e. Anglo manifest destiny, but rather 
multiple histories including those in which Mexicanos and Indigenous peoples are 
protagonists and not simply cast as perpetrators or victims. Mexicanos and 
Indigenous peoples not only engaged in frontier defense, but that they also 
possessed their own visions and investments in settlement and security. I suggest 
that rather than limit social war to either a telos of accommodation or resistance, 
attention to a multifaceted and multiple histories of conflict underscore the 
Mexicano struggle for dignity in Greater Mexico. 
Previous approaches investigating conflict in the greater borderlands have 
overlooked critical discursive dimensions to social war. The very definition of 
conflict, including official and popular statements and representations, was an 
enduring aspect of social war. One means of claiming victory in the social war 
that dominates the US-Mexico Borderlands is the capacity to define conflict, 
including designating the magnitude, scope, and frequency of “war,” filibusters, 
“depredations,” and insurgencies. In unraveling the ideological entanglements 
regarding the “common sense” views about the variety of violence in South and 
West Texas, for example, this study provides a closer examination of the 
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discursive formations that permitted elites to narrate violence as legitimate or 
illegitimate.19  
The problem of violence on the frontier 
The US-Mexico Borderlands has generated a keen interest in Indian 
warriors, “bandits,” rangers, US cavalry, gunfighters and vigilantes at both the 
popular and scholarly levels. Represented as a particularly violent place, images 
of the region reinforced representations of Mexicanos and Indigenous people, as 
frontier groups peculiarly disposed to violence as “bandits” and “savages.”20 
Violence defined Greater Mexico during the time from the US-Mexican War to 
the Porfiriato. Although recognized by scholars as especially and overtly violent 
period, studies of the region remain undeveloped, relying on casual explanations 
of violence between three prominent groups: Indigenous peoples, Mexicanos, and 
Anglos. Scholars have been content to accept episodes of violence as though they 
                                                 
19 My use of “common sense” is borrowed from Antonio Gramsci. “Every social stratum has its 
own ‘common sense’ and its own ‘good sense,’ which are basically the most widespread 
conception of life and man. Every philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of 
‘common sense’: this is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, 
enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary 
life. ‘Common sense’ is the folklore of philosophy, and is always half-way between folklore 
properly speaking and the philosophy, science, and economics of the specialists. Common sense 
creates the folklore of the future, that is as a relatively rigid phase of popular knowledge at a given 
place and time.” Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 
eds., Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey W. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1989): 197; 323-
343. 
20 The image of Mexicanos as peculiarly violent persists in mainstream media with Mexicanos 
overly represented, for example, as “gang bangers” and “drug lords.” 
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were the result of natural forces.21 The danger posed by “bandits” and “savages” 
has been understood as an unavoidable consequence of expansion, relegating 
“depredations” and “brushfire wars” to natural phenomenon peculiar to the 
region, catastrophic events to be endured like bad weather. The violence of the 
Texas frontier during the second half of the nineteenth century has been treated 
like violence in other frontier regions as an “opaque historical artifact,” often 
resisting further historical inquiry and obscuring complexity.22  
Those who celebrated the region’s violent past as well as those who 
contested such a legacy have relied on a single explanation of conflict and 
accepted frontier expansion as a naturally violent enterprise. However, a single 
explanation for the region’s violence prohibits distinguishing between various 
types of violence. Such a lack of specificity regarding the complexity of violence 
reinforces the ideological entanglements that privileged Anglos and demeaned 
Mexicanos and Indigenous peoples. In order to make the violence of this period 
and region less opaque it is necessary to acknowledge the material, symbolic and 
structural dimensions of conflict.  
Material violence during this period included “wars,” filibusters, 
“depredations,” and insurgencies. Symbolic violence operated through the 
                                                 
21 Here, I am following the lead of Ranajit Guha who argues that peasant resistance is often 
represented as a natural phenomenon. See Guha, “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency,” p.337. 
22 Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski, “Dismembering and Remembering the Nation: The 
Semantics of Political Violence in Venezuela,” Comparative Studies of Society and History 33:2 
(April 1991): 333. 
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concomitant processes of naming and narrating the unfolding of material violence 
by elites. The social and material disadvantages suffered by Mexicanos as a result 
of Anglo political and economic dominance defines the structural violence much 
of which takes place well after the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Especially relevant to this study has been work that investigates how people 
experience violence, including how witnesses and survivors interpret it. 
Examining the social relations between perpetrators and victims during and after 
violent events provides valuable insights on the role and impact of violence on 
communities as they construct systems of meaning following conflict. Recent 
studies in anthropology have called for a more rigorous analytical framework that 
not only distinguishes between specific kinds of violence, but also highlights “that 
violence enacted is but a small part of violence lived.” It is as much through 
violence and terror that historically contingent and contested identities emerge.23 
Americans have been remarkably ambivalent regarding the violence in our 
nation’s past. Although we reject violence “as a part of the American value 
system,” according to Richard Brown, it has been such an integral part of our 
                                                 
23 Recent scholarship in anthropology invites us to regard violence more critically by interrogating 
at the outset what is generally accepted as violence. By taking seriously what is defined, 
acknowledged, and interpreted as violence we broaden the scope of research, making violence a 
much more precise investigative tool for social encounters. See Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius 
Robben, Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995); Veena Das, ed., Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots 
and Survivors in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992); Allen Feldman, Formations 
of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1991); Kay Warren, ed., The Violence Within: Cultural and Political 
Opposition in Divided Nations (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993). 
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shared history that it forms “part of our unacknowledged (or underground) value 
structure.” Violence sutures key events, creating “a seamless web with some of 
the most positive events of U.S. history.”24 Americans have been consistent in 
viewing violence in a national framework that, according to Howard Zinn, 
exhibits “two failures of vision.” Most Americans imagine themselves as a 
“peculiarly nonviolent nation, with a special dispensation for achieving social 
change through peaceful parliamentary reform.” America’s self image as a 
peaceful nation downplays the physical violence directed at “nationalities and 
races other than our own.” Ultimately, Americans have been unable “to recognize 
the place of violence –both overt and hidden—in American social progress.” 
Guilty of a “double standard,” American views of violence conceal a gradually 
achieved consensus through stages of development “which either destroyed, 
expelled, or incorporated a dissident group.”25 As an alternative Zinn proposes “a 
single-standard ethic of violence.” His revised schematic exposes the physical 
                                                 
24 Richard M. Brown, Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1975): 36. These events include: “independence 
(revolutionary violence), the freeing of the slaves and the preservation of the Union (Civil War 
violence), the occupation of the land (Indian wars), the stabilization of frontier society (vigilante 
violence), the elevation of the farmer and the laborer (agrarian and labor violence), and the 
preservation of law and order (police violence).” 
25 Howard Zinn, “Violence and Social Change in American History,” in Thomas Rose, ed., 
Violence in America, A Historical and Contemporary Reader (New York: Random House, 1969): 
70; 77; 78. Another student of American violence who also recognizes its “repressive” character 
concurs, “the great bulk of it was used by dominant groups defending their positions of privilege.” 
Michael Wallace, “The Uses of Violence in American History,” in Roger Lane and John Turner, 
eds., Riot, Rout, and Tumult: Readings in American Social and Political Violence (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1978): 22. 
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clashes that have accompanied major moments of social change in our national 
past, revealing the suffering of groups marginal to the “national-racial group.”26  
Yet, “Western violence,” according to Brown, “nearly defies interpretation 
as one struggles to make sense of the almost countless episodes and events that 
have made the West such a turbulent region.”27 Less typical have been authors 
who present the frontier as relatively free from violence, suggesting, for example, 
that Eastern urban centers experienced as much or a greater degree of violence. 
Frontier conditions, in this argument, led to a comparatively crime free 
environment, noted for its swift and deliberate execution of justice.28 Scholars 
critical of approaches to violence in the west, such as Richard White, recognize 
that both scholarly and popular conceptions of violence in regions such as the 
west have tended to emphasize “individual violence,” resulting in “a West of 
                                                 
26 Zinn’s ethic of violence, in brief, includes: “1) All forms of pain and abuse –whether overt, 
concentrated, and physical, or psychological, hidden, and attenuated—should be placed on the 
same scale of destructive actions…. 2) It follows from this that we pay a price for superficial 
social peace which represses and hides subsurface violence…. 3) Official violence should be 
granted no special privileges over private violence…. 4) Violence done by others should be 
weighed equally with violence done by ourselves;… 5) We should assume that all victims are 
created equal, that violence done to men of other races or other political beliefs is not thereby 
given special dispensation… 6) Violence to property should not be equated with violence to 
people…. 7) We should be constantly aware of our disposition to accept violence on the basis of 
symbolic arguments… 8) Finally, we should be aware of Jeremy Bentham’s criterion, in his 
utilitarian scheme, of fecundity: that not only should we measure immediate results of actions, but 
that we should also consider proliferating effects –of excessive action in the dispensation of overt 
violence, and of inaction in the toleration of subsurface violence.” Zinn, “Violence and Social 
Change in American History,” pp. 78-80. 
27 Richard Brown, “Western Violence: Structure, Values, Myth” Western Historical Quarterly 24 
(February 1993): 5. Also see, Richard White, “Its Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A New 
History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
28 For a useful overview of the literature on violence in the West, see Roger McGrath, 
Gunfighters, Highwaymen & Vigilantes: Violence on the Frontier (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), especially chapter thirteen, “The Heritage of the Trans-Sierra Frontier.” 
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rugged and armed individualists -gunfighters, outlaws and sheriffs.” Americans, 
according to White, focus on “personal violence” because “it allows them to 
escape asking uncomfortable questions about social conflict.” Social conflict, 
White admits, “is a mixed story.”29 
Scholars interrogating America’s heritage of westward expansion exhibit a 
marked ambivalence regarding violence, framing violence as episodic and 
epiphenomenal in one instance and unable to account for it as endemic in another 
and as a consequence as a structural force.30 Depending on what side of the debate 
one falls on, the west can confirm one’s claims about a nation steeped in violence 
or a nation that has transcended its more barbaric roots. Nowhere has a casual 
attitude regarding violence been more pronounced than in its relation to the 
nation’s western frontier. The dominant view of western violence represents 
conflict as a consequence of frontier conditions which included the lack of legal 
authority, disregard of judicial procedure, and the danger posed by outlaws, 
                                                 
29 White, “Its Your Misfortune and None of My Own,” pp. 328-329; 343.  
30 E. P. Thompson warns against the “spasmodic view of popular history.” Thompson’s 
intervention draws attention to approaches in which “the common people can scarcely be taken as 
historical agents before the French Revolution.” E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the 
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” in Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional 
Popular Culture (New York: The New Press, 1993): 185. Approaches can also fall into the trap of 
what Gerald Sider labels the “hydraulic model of popular involvement in social change -press 
people down in one domain of their lives and they will pop up in another with even more force- 
but this perspective is primarily invoked to explain episodic upheavals, where the drama of events 
conceals the lifelessness of the model.” The model denies people from participating in “the 
routine, but far more powerful and pervasive, transformation of their social world.” Gerald M. 
Sider, Culture and Class in Anthropology and History, A Newfoundland Illustration (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989): 4. 
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“marauding Indians” and “treacherous Mexicans.”31 Interpretations of violence 
that celebrate the frontier experience confirm Silvio Duncan Baretta’s and John 
Markoff’s assertion, that “the tradition of violence in New World frontiers is 
usually simply taken for granted.”32  
Early political histories of the region identified raids, skirmishes and 
filibusters as the by-products of predictable international tensions. The failure to 
physically control the international boundary incited a number of diplomatic 
disputes that focused on the settlement of the U.S.-Mexican boundary; the 
crossing of armed forces by both Mexico and the US; extradition of criminals; the 
development of a potential route between the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and the 
elimination of the Zona Libre; and protection of the property of foreign residents. 
Notably, US officials often linked the integrity of the newly formed border with 
US opposition to trade barriers and the unfair competition they claimed resulted 
from the Zona Libre.33  
                                                 
31 C. C. Rister, “Outlaws and Vigilantes of the Southern Plains, 1865-1885” The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 19 (March 1933): 537-554; W. C. Holden, “Law and Lawlessness on the 
Texas Frontier, 1875-1890” Southwesternn Historical Quarterly 44 (October 1940): 188-203; Joe 
B. Frantz, “The Frontier Tradition: An Invitation to Violence” in Violence in America: Historical 
and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Bantam Books, 1969). 
32 Silvio R. Duncan Baretta and John Markoff, “Civilization and Barbarism: Cattle Frontiers in 
Latin America,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 20 (October 1978): 587. 
33 The Zona Libre was first established in Tamaulipas in 1858. Sanctioned at the federal level in 
1861, the free trade zone was expanded to include the entire border region as late as 1885. 
Throughout the late nineteenth century the abolishment of the Zona Libre remained a pressing US 
concern. See Samuel E. Bell and James M. Smallwood, The Zona Libre, 1858-1905: A Problem in 
American Diplomacy (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1982). 
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Although Anglos consistently worried in nervous anticipation of an 
invasion and subsequent war with Mexico, the possibilities of Mexican aggression 
towards the US were indeed slim. On the other hand, many prominent spokesmen 
could barely hide their war mongering. US officials and local luminaries 
consistently railed against Mexico’s inability to police its northern boundary. 
Diplomatic disputes exposed the cultural apparatus that demeaned and 
dehumanized Mexico as a people and a nation. Each international dispute exposed 
Anglos disparaging view of Mexico, believing the Mexican people incapable of 
fulfilling the promise of republican government. There was no clearer expression 
of this than the political opportunism of the US representing Mexico as possessing 
a proclivity for revolutions and a unique enthusiasm for pronuncimientos. Despite 
their dependence on Mexicanos in frontier communities, Anglo settlers interpreted 
Mexican political instability as confirmation of Mexicanos as lazy, shiftless, and 
vulnerable to the wicked designs of strong leaders. 
Mexican officials continually argued that US officials tacitly, or in some 
cases overtly, supported filibusters, and depredations hoping to benefit from the 
turmoil as a pretext to incorporate portions of the Mexican north into the United 
States. 34 Indemnity for damages from smuggling and depredations originating in 
each country fueled diplomatic haggling and motivated a number of commissions.  
                                                 
34 Two notable efforts that sought to incorporate Mexico’s northern frontier were the Republic of 
the Rio Grande and the Republic of the Sierra Madre. Diplomatic disputes eventually gave way to 
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Those authors who concern themselves with the political consolidation of 
the border region, suggest that the political and economic consolidation of the 
region was only possible by the successful arrival of the military, the opening of 
markets, and the political success of Porfirio Diaz. Robert Gregg, for example, 
makes special note of the issue of race in his examination of cattle raids, 
smuggling, raiding, filibustering and “Indian forays.” Mexican and Anglo 
relations, according to Gregg, were tarred with the brush of “border lawlessness in 
which white and red adventurers played their parts.” However, Gregg’s interest in 
“a growing spirit of cooperation,” betrays a cultural bias that assumes the 
dynamic expansion of US capitalism and the necessity of Mexico to become fully 
available to US political and economic interests. Gregg narrates the demise of 
border violence as “bound up with rapid settlement, with railroad building, with 
the increased stability of Díaz in Mexico, and with a growing spirit of cooperation 
between the two countries.” Border troubles end, in Gregg’s account, when Anglo 
American progress, symbolized by the railroad and Mexico’s political 
subservience, are fully in place.35 
                                                                                                                                     
the cooperation established between Porfirio Diaz once the US recognized his presidency, a 
gesture that helped produce the Porfiriato. 
35 Robert D. Gregg, The Influence of Border Troubles on Relations Between the United States and 
Mexico, 1876-1910 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937): 11, 184. For a study that takes a 
similar approach see, Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and 
the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). 
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Mexican scholars, usually overlooked in debates regarding American 
violence, have consistently stressed the importance of examining the region as a 
transborder and transnational territory. Quick to acknowledge that westward 
expansion and pacification of the border have received the most attention from 
American scholars, Daniel Cosío Villegas urged a more complicated approach to 
the study of border conflict by identifying specific areas of study, including 
westward movement; the official boundary; the role of the border in Juarez’s 
restoration of the Republic (War of the Intervention); border cooperation against 
Indian depredations, cattle raids, revolutionary activity; and cultural 
confrontation. The state of research forced Cosío Villegas to conclude “neither 
North Americans nor Mexicans have accustomed themselves in their studies to 
regard as a unique, or at least common, history, the one that takes place in a wide 
strip of land south of the United States and north of Mexico.”36  
Relying heavily on the earlier work of Cosío Villegas, Manuel Ceballos-
Ramírez and Oscar Martínez stress ambivalence as the defining characteristic of 
conflict between two nations “because both Mexico and the United States were 
simultaneously victors and vanquished.” Ceballos-Ramírez and Martínez proffer a 
periodization they argue demonstrates a gradual accommodation. They begin with 
the immediate postwar period to the Porfiriato, an era defined primarily by 
                                                 
36 Daniel Cosío Villegas, “Border Troubles in Mexican-United States Relations,” Southwest 
Historical Quarterly 72:1 (July 1968): 38-39. 
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boundary disputes, filibustering, and Indian raiding. Lesser issues during this 
period include bilateral relations regarding trade and racial discrimination. The 
second period coincides entirely with the Porfiriato and can be further divided 
into the period of Diaz’s recognition 1876-1884, political consolidation and 
success 1884-1905, and dissolution of the Porfiriato 1905-1910. The political 
successes of the Porfiriato sustained a “climate of cordial understanding.” 
Although, Ceballos-Ramírez and Martínez’s analysis introduces both ambivalence 
and accommodation, “it was the latter that proved to be enduring.”37 
Scholars who have interrogated the dominant theme of “American 
exceptionalism” have been critical of America’s violent past by linking it to a 
history of imperialism in the West. Reginald Horsman, for example, challenges 
the celebratory interpretations of violence by examining the contradictions that 
manifest destiny produced.38 Richard Drinnon and Richard Slotkin have more 
explicitly linked American expansion to a legacy of race hatred. Drinnon posits 
US westward expansion as a complicated expression of an ideology of hatred 
connecting racism and progress. For Drinnon the American expansionist ethos 
associated with westward movement reveals a dual interdependent project: nation 
                                                 
37 Manuel Ceballos-Ramírez and Oscar Martínez, “Conflict and Accomodation on the U.S.-
Mexico Border, 1848-1911,” in Jaime E. Rodríguez O. and Kathryn Vincent, eds., Myths, 
Misdeeds, and Misunderstandings: The Roots of Conflict in U.S.-Mexican Relations (Wilmington: 
SR Books, 1997): 135, 149, 147, 157. 
38 Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-
Saxonism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981): 5; 236. 
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building and native hating.39 Slotkin’s regeneration through violence thesis 
reveals the “historical development” and “mythic representation” of American 
violence through the trope of “savage war” and its stages: regression, redemption, 
and regeneration. “The premise of ‘savage war,’” Slotkin explains, “is that 
ineluctable political and social differences –rooted in some combination of 
‘blood’and culture –make coexistence between primitive natives and civilized 
Europeans impossible on any basis other that of subjugation.”40 
New Western Historians have attempted to account for those groups 
traditionally excluded from the master narrative of American expansion.41 
Increasingly uncomfortable with master narratives that deny diversity in 
America’s western saga, New West historians deliberately moved beyond 
                                                 
39 Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire Building 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997): 464. 
40 Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth Century America 
(New York: Harper Perennial, 1992): 12-13. Also see other works by Richard Slotkin, including, 
Richard Slotkin, “Buffalo Bill’s ‘Wild West’ and the Mythologization of the American Empire” in 
Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, eds., Cultures of United States Imperialism (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1993): 164-181; Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the 
American Frontier, 1600-1860 (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1973); Richard Slotkin, 
The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800-1890 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1985). 
41 For general works on Frederick Jackson Turner, see Jackson Putnam, “The Turner Thesis and 
the Westward Movement: A Reappraisal” Western Historical Quarterly 7 (October 1976): 377-
404; William Cronon, “Revisiting the Vanishing Frontier: The Legacy of Frederick Jackson 
Turner” Western Historical Quarterly 18 (April 1987): 157-176; John Mack Faragher, ‘“A Nation 
Thrown Back Upon Itself:’ Frederick Jackson Turner and the Frontier,” in Rereading Frederick 
Jackson Turner “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” and Other Essays, (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co.: 1995).  
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“cowboys and Indians” history.42 Engaging the nation’s “legacy of conquest,” 
scholars such as Patricia Limerick, have begun to view the West as a place 
“undergoing conquest and never fully escaping its consequences,” making the 
West, a “meeting ground” between “diverse groups” struggling for legitimacy.43  
Despite the renewed interest in processes of exclusion, David Gutiérrez 
rightfully reminds us that the multiculturalism gestured to by Limerick and others, 
has occupied Mexican Americans for some time. “It has become fashionable,” 
David Gutiérrez asserts,  
to pose questions about the contributions and significance of various 
groups of minority people to the pluralistic culture of the United States. 
While most of the institutions sponsoring such observances appear to be 
well-intentioned, too few seem to recognize that framing these questions 
in this manner (once again) encourages a reproduction of modes of 
analysis which virtually guarantee that the categories minority and 
majority -and the asymmetrical relationships of power that they imply- 
will continue to persist, and be reinforced.44 
 
Gutierrez adds, “at some level we accept the premise that the significance of one 
group of people must be explained with reference to some other group.” Efforts to 
document the significance and contribution of ethnic Mexicans must “begin with 
                                                 
42 See for example, William Cronon, George Miles and Jay Gitlin, eds., Under an Open Sky: 
Rethinking America’s Past (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992); Patricia N. Limerick, Clyde 
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43 Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest, pp. 26-27. 
44 David Gutierrez, “Significant to Whom: Mexican Americans and the History of the American 
West,” in A New Significance: Re-envisioning the History of the American West edited by Clyde 
A. Milner, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 67. 
 26
an acknowledgement of how American ideologies of expansion have powerfully 
influenced historical representations of and about ‘Mexicans’ (and other subject 
groups) after the United States acquired the region.” There can be little doubt that 
ethnic Mexicans “have been involved in a protracted struggle to prove their 
importance, to prove themselves significant in American society.”45 
Inspired by third world struggles, many Chicano scholars were initially 
seduced by the internal colonial model as an explanatory tool to more fully 
explain political, social and economic subordination.46 Despite its early appeal 
many quickly questioned the model’s ability to account for internal class 
differentiation, the interdependence between shifting race and class positions, the 
limitations of politics of victimization, and the narrow success of civil rights 
struggles. Eschewing any attempt to conflate the Chicano experience to other 
“colonized minorities,” Tomás Almaguer noted that internal colonialism was 
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“unduly influenced by the nationalistic sentiment that informed the initial 
development of Chicano research.”47 
Conscious of the detrimental influence of cultural nationalism, many 
Chicano scholars sought an alternative to the internal colonial model. These new 
approaches emphasized class and social subordination that resulted from global 
processes of capitalist transformation. Chicano historians provided fresh insights 
into the complexities of social change, analyzing Anglo-Mexican class conflict 
through “racial fault lines” and “race situations.”48 Montejano’s “relaxed class 
analysis,” for example, argues that both class and race situations are determined 
by the larger class structure and are articulated differently in specific “local 
societies.”49 
In an effort to move away from a romanticized representation of the 
frontier, Chicano scholars tackled racial violence head on. Chicano scholars have 
generally accepted the view that Anglos, especially with the aid of the Texas 
Rangers, visited substantial violence against Mexicanos. Yet, much of the 
explanation for conflict remains under theorized. David Montejano, for example, 
claimed the period following the US-Mexico war amounted to “a state of virtual 
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warfare” between “a mobilized Mexican element matching arms with the local 
constabulary and the Texas Rangers.” The Texas Rangers, according to 
Montejano, were quite simply “a military police of occupation, waging sporadic 
warfare whenever the need arose.” Montejano also notes that it was the 
“uninvolved civilian population, who bore the brunt of escalating and 
indiscriminate retaliation and counter retaliation.”50  
Surprisingly, Montejano abandons the emphasis on “sporadic” and 
“virtual” war carried out by a paramilitary force arguing the post war situation 
witnessed the development of a “peace structure,” or a “general postwar 
arrangement” made it possible for “the victors to maintain law and order without 
the constant use of force.” The repercussions of violent episodes produced the 
“fear that perhaps motivated the practice of benevolent patronismo on their 
[Anglos] part.” Thus, elites who comprised “a clique of Anglo merchants, military 
officers, and lawyer politicians,” became “a self-conscious foreign enclave” who 
were able to maintain order “without the constant use of force.” The peace 
structure of south Texas was characterized by two fundamental characteristics: 
“the subordination of Mexicans to Anglos in matters of politics and authority,” 
and “the accommodation between new and old elites.” Thus, Montejano’s 
accommodation thesis stresses that the most intense and overt period of conflict 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 32-34. 
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passed before the region fully became incorporated into the circuits of US 
capitalist production.51  
José Limón takes a decidedly different tack than Montejano. “Since the 
1830’s,” Limón argues, “the Mexicans of south Texas have been in a state of 
social war with the ‘Anglo’ dominant Other and their class allies. This has been at 
times a war of overt massive proportions; at others covert and sporadic; at still 
other moments, repressed and internalized as a war within the psyche, but always 
conditioned by an ongoing social struggle fought out of different battlefields.”52 
Limón makes a critical point suggesting that social war against Anglos is also a 
war directed inwards. However, the elements of the social war identified by 
Limón: the persistent struggle between Anglos and Mexicans, fought on different 
fronts, and with an internal dimension, do not fully explain the permanent nature 
of social struggle between these groups. Although Limón initially embraces the 
pervasiveness of Anglo-Mexican conflict, he too quickly abandons the emphasis 
on its enduring aspects for Montejano’s teleological accommodationist model. 
The social war of the US-Mexico Borderlands during the second half of the 
nineteenth century included a wide variety of violences, fluctuating between 
“depredations” and punitive expeditions, sometimes erupting into more intense 
conflicts that achieved the status of war. Social war betrays mixed motives by 
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combatants, with Mexicanos, Anglos, and Indigenous peoples fighting on all sides 
and driven by a variety of alliances. It also exposes the constant negotiation of 
Mexicano identities and strategic claims to citizenship in the context of the social, 
political and economic spaces they had traditionally dominated and only recently, 
if reluctantly, were forced to concede. The social war was not only simply a 
manichaean racial struggle, rather it was complicated by Mexicanos who, 
wittingly or unwittingly, conspired with Anglo merchants and others, including 
rangers. 
The role of capitalism in creating the context for violence has received 
only cursory treatment. Brown situates Western violence as part of a 
“conservative, consolidating authority of modern capitalist forces.” The first and 
most violent period (1850-1920) of the Western Civil War of Incorporation saw 
gunfighters as mercenaries in service of the “commanders of incorporation” 
-powerful men who orchestrated capitalist expansion “from afar with policy and 
strategy that often resulted, sometimes by design, in violence.” Brown includes 
the US-Mexico Borderlands in his analytical framework by simply designating 
the region as part of the “North Mexican Civil War of Incorporation.” Brown’s 
effort to explain violence by linking it to larger processes of capitalist 
transformation produces troubling contradictions, as, for example, when Brown 
claims that “more often than not the nonviolent means of legislation, 
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administration, court rulings, and the impersonal trends of economics and culture 
accounted for incorporation in the West.” “The American Southwest is linked –
decidedly more so than the northern west,” opines William Robbins, “to traditions 
of violence and cultural and ethnic oppression, circumstances that still persist.” 
Robbins easily accepts capitalism as the critical element in the transformation of 
the region but does not go further in examining the complicated role of violence 
in processes of “conquest, continued economic domination, and cultural and racial 
oppression.”53 
The problem in fully linking capitalist expansion to more complex 
approaches to violence has resulted from a narrow view of colonialism. Generally 
overlooked has been a more precise notion of the type of colonialism in the US 
west. “For all the homage paid to heterogeneity and difference,” suggests Patrick 
Wolfe, “the bulk of ‘post’-colonial theorizing is disabled by an oddly monolithic, 
and surprisingly unexamined, notion of colonialism.” The struggle produced by 
settler colonialism was not limited to violent physical encounters only, but 
included the mechanisms that represented the depredations, punitive raids or wars 
as legitimate or illegitimate. The ideological exigencies of invasion and settlement 
demanded that Anglos reserve for themselves the prestige and honor of frontier 
defense. “The colonizers,” Wolfe argues, “come to stay –invasion is a structure 
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not an event.” Thus, settler colonialism required an ideological apparatus when 
expanding into already occupied lands. According to Wolfe, “in the settler-
colonial economy, it is not the colonist but the native who is superfluous.” 
However, settler colonialism was overwhelmed by an inherent contradiction –that 
is the reliance on indigenous labor as guides, interpreters, protectors, and laborers. 
Given that settler societies depended on indigenous peoples for survival (and 
labor), the strategies of domination practiced by the colonist were necessarily also 
ideological. “In settler-colonial formations, in other words, ideology has a higher 
systemic weighting –it looms larger, as it were– than in other colonial 
formations.”54  
When too much emphasis is placed on capitalist transformation and state 
formation, resistance gives way to accommodations gradually imposed by market 
forces. The critical developments of capitalist transformation: the arrival of the 
railroad, the subjugation of the Apache, and the consolidation of the Porfiriato, 
imply that the imposition of capitalist social relations were a singular moment. As 
a more or less external and one-dimensional teleological process occurring in a 
single moment, capitalist transformation generates only short-lived resistance. 
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However, processes of material and social enclosure unfold rather slowly, relying 
on daily violence or the threat of it.55  
Ideological complications of war 
Early studies of racial superiority inherent in the project of manifest 
destiny, do not fully explore the implications of persistent racial ideologies within 
the context of a permanent and primitive social war. Amy Kaplan offers an 
important critique in her interrogation US historiography’s “paradigm of denial.” 
She introduces culture as a key analytical concept to study US expansion. 
According to Kaplan, scholars have omitted empire from the study of American 
culture; culture from the history of US imperialism; and the US from postcolonial 
studies of imperialism. Specifically, Kaplan urges a “multicultural critique of 
American ethnocentrism” that investigates the manner in which “diverse identities 
cohere, fragment, and change in relation to one another and to ideologies of 
nationhood through the crucible of international power relations, and how, 
imperialism is a political or economic process abroad as inseparable from the 
social relations and cultural discourses of race, gender, ethnicity, and class at 
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home.” Thus, imperialism is as much about “consolidating domestic cultures” as 
it is about international relations and economic expansion.56 
While all species of material violence lent themselves to the discursive 
practice of subjugating Indigenous peoples and Mexicanos, war especially was 
important in developing national narratives. The very process of naming wars 
maintains racial, class and gendered boundaries. “Wars,” Kaplan suggests, 
“generate and accumulate symbolic value by reenacting, reinterpreting, and 
transposing the cultural meaning of prior wars.” Kaplan argues that the Spanish 
American War, for example, “continued the Civil War in an imperial national 
discourse” that, in turn, offered the opportunity to address the tensions of 
domestic race relations that remained unresolved after Reconstruction. If wars, as 
Kaplan argues, “continue each other,” it should be of little surprise that some wars 
generate more symbolic capital than others.57 Attention to wars can also reinforce 
already accepted negative representations. 
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Thus, the social war that dominated the landscape of the US-Mexico 
Borderlands during the late nineteenth century reveals much about the struggle for 
national meaning and identity. This process of naming and narrating war, on the 
other hand, underscores how Indigenous peoples and Mexicanos have been 
excluded from Anglo “invented traditions.” The glories and sacrifices of war, and 
the accolades of the “progress” that it ushered in, were only available to those 
select few who could claim them.58 Episodes of conflict, once selected, are put to 
specific ideological uses -most notably in the maintenance of a national 
imaginary. Thus, war, much like print culture, contributed significantly to 
constructing the cultural artifact of the nation. Representations of war provided 
the ideological material essential for the development of the nation. Indeed, 
claims made about war in a broader context of border conflict facilitated the 
“deep horizontal comradeship” that sustained what Benedict Anderson referred to 
as the “imagined community.”59  
There is a great deal of conceptual and analytical ambiguity in 
determining the type of war as well as intensity of warfare along the Indian 
frontier. “We hear only of ‘Indian wars,’” Ward Churchill explains, “never of 
‘settler wars.’” “It is as if the native, always ‘warlike’ and ‘aggressive,’ had 
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invaded and laid waste to London and Castile rather than engaging in desperate 
and always futile efforts to repel the hordes of ‘pioneers’ and ‘peaceful settlers’ 
overrunning their homelands –often quite illegally, even in their own terms—
from sea to shining sea.” 60 The ambiguity that resulted from the US Indian policy 
permitted some engagements to be designated as “wars” while other operations 
fell loosely under the rubric of police actions or simply engagements.61 The 
criteria by which such conflict achieves the status of war, skirmish or police 
action remains undisclosed, leaving Indian warfare as a category of war treated all 
too casually.62 “The formless and intermittent character of Indian warfare, and its 
peculiar status as a rebellion of a dependent nation within the territory of the 
United States,” according to Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage, “no doubt 
encouraged the informality with which Indians were treated.”63 However, despite 
the status of “domestic dependent nations,” explain Wormuth and Firmage, all 
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three branches of governments described the “incalculable” conflicts with Indians 
as war.64  
Recently, scholars have begun to apply the concept of “total war,” a form 
of modern warfare developed during the US Civil War, to the Anglo-Indian 
context. Initiated by generals under president Abraham Lincoln, total war initially 
meant destroying the enemy’s ability to wage war and completely undermining 
their capacity to resist.65 The redeployment of the Grand Army of the Republic to 
assist in Westward expansion after the Civil War allowed Generals William 
Sherman and Philip Sheridan to apply doctrines and tactics articulated earlier to 
combat against Indigenous peoples on the plains. “There is no question,” John 
Waghelstein asserts, “that the United States had occasionally conducted total war 
against Indians in the past.” It was the Civil War that created “a set of leaders who 
saw all forms of war as total requiring the application of all force and technology 
available.”66 Thomas Smith concurs: “Although not a nineteenth century military 
term the modern definition of a strategy of attrition more aptly describes U.S. 
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Army frontier operations over three decades in Texas: a slow grinding down of 
Indian combat power, a willingness to trade man for man until ultimately the side 
with the greatest number of reserves win.” There was no clearer example of total 
war than the strategy of winter campaigning.67 Scholars such as Waghelstein and 
Smith agree that it was in the context of western expansion that the nation’s 
military leaders radically revised their strategies for future wars, replacing long 
held strategy of “wars of movement and posts.” “War,” Waghelstein concludes 
“in which the capture of the enemy’s cities was replaced by the destruction and 
total submission of the enemy.”68 But the war against America’s indigenous 
peoples was not fully a “total war.” Rather, the orchestrated subjugation of 
Indigenous peoples throughout the plains betrayed a combination of older forms 
of warfare in addition to the devastating innovations developed during the US 
Civil War.  
Historians have also taken to describing the conflicts between Indigenous 
peoples and Anglos, including both federal forces and state volunteers, as 
guerrilla warfare. Often when scholars apply guerrilla warfare to the region they 
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conflate it with irregular warfare, leaving both concepts undefined.69 Waghelstein 
argues that the US Army had a long history of engaging in guerrilla or irregular 
warfare, especially against Indigenous peoples. Despite this experience, the US 
Army continued to prepare for wars following nineteenth century European “set-
piece battle” doctrines.70 An equally problematic category that has been applied to 
Anglo-Indian conflict during the nineteenth century has been low intensity 
conflict.71  
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Ultimately, scholars such as Waghelstein have conflated guerrilla, 
irregular and low intensity warfare, using the concepts interchangeably and 
undermining their analytical utility. Recent studies have been quick to apply 
“guerrilla war” or “low intensity war” as analytical concepts in an attempt to 
better describe the intensity, persistence and uniqueness of the campaigns US 
military forces were forced to manage during the period. Ultimately such 
approaches subsume a variety of events, such as raids, skirmishes, punitive 
expeditions, and scouts (or patrols) between Anglos, Mexicanos and Indigenous 
peoples into one rubric of conflict. However, these concepts taken out of 
historical context lack analytical specificity given that both are more accurately 
linked to specific political formations and policy objectives that did not yet exist. 
More importantly, irregular and guerrilla warfare have been denied the symbolic 
freight that other wars, notably the US-Mexican War and US Civil War, have 
claimed in the region. 
Part of the conceptual murkiness regarding war and warfare in the US-
Mexico Borderlands can be explained by the very lack of analytical rigor of war 
as a category of analysis. Karl Clausewitz’s widely accepted nineteenth century 
framework, for instance, presents war as a discrete, disciplined, and organized 
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project fulfilling the clearly defined political exigencies of nation building. 
Clausewitz’s rigid definition emphasizes, “that war is not a mere act of policy but 
a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.” 
“What remains peculiar to war,” Clausewitz adds, “is simply the peculiar nature 
of its means.”72 Clausewitz’s definition of warfare implies an orchestrated series 
of engagements between two or more opposing forces on a field with set battle 
pieces. Clausewitz’s emphasis on the political nature of war also meant he 
advocated for the bureaucratization of warfare that easily lent itself to state 
formation.  
Michel Foucault, on the other hand, posits a radically different definition 
of war and warfare suggesting that politics is in fact war. In his examination of 
power relations Foucault radically revived war as a category of analysis. 
According to Colin Gordon, Foucault made available “the idea that the notion of 
war or struggle could serve as the tool par excellence of political analysis.” Most 
importantly, Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz’s famous aphorism presents war as 
pervasive and constant. War does not only continue politics by other means; 
rather, as Foucault argues, politics, or more accurately, power relations, is war. 
“Isn’t power,” Foucault asks, “a sort of generalized war that, at particular 
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moments, assumes the forms of peace and the state?” “Peace would then be a 
form of war, and the state,” he concludes, “a means of waging it.”73 
Foucault radically departs from Clausewitz by distinguishing between 
historico-political discourse and philosophical-juridical discourses. In order to 
conduct historical analysis of power relations one must abandon the juridical 
notion of sovereignty and its preoccupation with a fully constituted subject. “The 
model,” Foucault warns, “presupposes the individual as a subject of natural rights 
or original powers; it aims to account for the ideal genesis of the state; and it 
makes law the fundamental manifestation of power.” Historico-political 
discourse, on the other hand, “undertakes not to measure history, unjust 
governments, abuses, and acts of violence with the ideal principle of reason or a 
law but, rather, to awaken, beneath the form of institutions or laws, the forgotten 
past of real struggles, masked victories or defeats, the dried blood in the codes.” 
“Awakening ourselves to the real world of power relations,” Gordon reminds us, 
“is awakening ourselves to a world of endemic struggle.” Historical-political 
discourse “makes war the permanent basis of all institutions of power.”74  
Abandoning Clausewitz’s more widely accepted definition of war and 
embracing the less well known approach by Foucault, allows for an interpretion 
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of conflict that privileges neither formal wars or irregular warfare. Foucault’s 
analytical departure emphases “that war can be regarded as the point of maximum 
tension, or as force relations laid bare.” Emphasizing relations of power, 
Foucault’s approach to war draws attention to an accompanying apparatus or 
representational machine that ensured social and political subordination. The 
material violence, in the episodes of the actual fighting, and the symbolic 
violence, in the process of naming and narrating, are necessarily intertwined. War, 
once articulated through a representational machine, enabled Anglos to claim 
frontier defense for themselves and to mask a settler colonial project that was 
otherwise brutal. It is an approach that invites the analyst of power relations 
between Anglos, Indigenous peoples, Mexicanos to look “beneath the calm order 
of subordinations in order to discover a sort of primitive and persistent war.”75 
A comment on the less than cautious application of Antonio Gramsci’s 
concept of war of maneuver and war of position common in studies by Chicano 
authors is necessary. The application of Gramsci’s notions of war of maneuver 
and war of position do not fully explain conflict in the US-Mexico Borderlands as 
endemic. For instance, it privileges the war of position as the dominant operation. 
While Gramsci’s distinction between maneuver and position have been useful in 
exposing more subtle processes of “hegemony,” the separation between the two 
                                                 
75 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” Lectures at the Collége de France, 1975-76 
trans. David Macey, (New York: Picador, 2003): 46-47. 
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and emphasis on position runs the risk of representing conflict as episodic and not 
a fundamental and persistent part of larger processes of transformation and, in 
keeping with a Gramscian framework, hegemony.76 In addition, Gramsci did not 
limit his analysis to either position or maneuver but distinguished between three 
types of warfare: maneuver, position, and underground. His inclusion of 
underground warfare insists on accounting for the historical and political 
conditions of colonial domination. Moreover, it is clear that all three types of 
warfare are in tension at any given moment.77 
In chapter one I examine representative figures as agents of violence. 
Scrutiny of these frontier figures brings to light the complicated role 
historiography played in romanticizing the role of the ranger and criminalizing the 
Mexicano as either a bandit or ranchero. Renewed attention to these dominant 
figures also introduces how frontier defense emerged as a race project. 
                                                 
76 Hegemony has too often been allowed to mean domination despite Gramsci’s stress on the 
cultural leadership of a class exercised through cultural legitimacy and consensus. It has been used 
as a “highly abstract concept” that, Jorge González warns us, “happens at the macro-scale of the 
nation-state or the world system: all social classes fall under the command of a certain block of 
dominants.” As an alternative to emphasizing the dominance of any one class or group, hegemony 
is more productively understood as “not a direct stimulation of thought or action but a framing of 
competing definitions of reality to fit within the dominant class’s range.” “Every situated 
hegemony is always subject to a variety of symbolic struggles in which various social agents –
corporations, institutions, classes, groups—invest mightily in the hard work of discursive 
elaboration of possible links and commonalities.” Jorge González, “Cultural Fronts: Towards a 
Dialogical Understanding of Contemporary Cultures,” in James Lull, ed. Culture in the 
Communication Age (New York: Routledge, 2001): 107; 112 
77 Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, eds., Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey W. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1989): 229-238. It is useful to 
keep in mind Gramsci’s warning that his analogy of war should not, in specific instances, be 
applied so literally. 
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In the chapters that follow I investigate various instances of the border 
war. Chapter two examines representative samples of depredations. Depredations 
could be carried out under the cloak of legality such as when Richard King 
severely persecuted an entire Mexicano community and hanged an innocent man, 
all as part of a search for a thief. Of course, Indigenous bands did attack settler 
parties as when Martin Amador’s freighting parties were forced to defend 
themselves in 1864. The response to depredations, often carried out by 
combinations of Anglos, Mexicanos and Indigenous groups, were swift. Such a 
case was the rapid retaliation on behalf of Ward Blanchard in 1872. Raids could 
be directed at a whole community that was otherwise targeted for its mistreatment 
of Mexicanos or Indigenous peoples. The raid on Laredo in 1875 is clear example 
of the complex nature of retaliatory raids during this period. Attacks could easily 
paralyze an entire community for days as, for example, when Laredo suffered the 
violence of a mixed group of forty raiders in 1878. 
I complicate the category of depredations by investigating the Merchants 
War, Callahan Expedition, the Cart War and the Las Cuevas War in chapter three. 
These events have resisted easy categorization although they have been largely 
relegated to “brushfire” and Indian wars for convenience sake. The episodes 
examined in this chapter, including James Callahan’s burning of Piedras Negras 
in 1855 and Leander McNelly’s attack on Las Cuevas in 1875, conform more to 
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depredations than anything else despite being carried out under the cloak of legal 
justice. Under closer examination the Cart War resembles more an act of highway 
robbery as Anglo freighters and their allies made every effort to eliminate the 
successful competition of Mexicano cart men. The Las Cuevas War, on the other 
hand, completely fails to achieve the status of “war.” Appearing more as an 
unprovoked raid, McNelly’s persistent efforts to punish Mexico resembled the 
invasion executed by John Ford during the Cortina War, a racially motivated 
personal vendetta operating under the guise of formal warfare. 
In chapters four through six I examine two prominent insurgencies: the 
Cortina War 1859-1860 and the San Elizario Salt War 1877. The Cortina War and 
the San Elizario Salt War have long been accepted as primary examples of 
Mexicano resistance to Anglo dominance. However, the celebration of these 
defiant moments, largely by Chicano scholars, has obscured a number of 
complications. Mexicanos played decisive roles on both sides of the battles, 
confirming racial antagonism that did not easily conform to racial boundaries. The 
enthusiasm of recuperating Mexicano resistance often meant uncomfortable 
contradictions were overlooked. As Ranajit Guha warns: “Blinded by the glare of 
perfect and immaculate consciousness the historian sees nothing, for instance, but 
solidarity in rebel behavior and fails to notice its Other, namely, betrayal.”78 
Despite this complication, or more accurately because of it, these episodes remain 
                                                 
78 Guha, “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency,” p. 365. 
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critical to understanding the role violence played in defining the region. Although 
these insurgencies had, for the most part, limited political and social goals, they 
did attempt to avenge Anglo injustice and restore previous social, economic and 
political relations. The Cortina and Salt Wars were insurgencies executed by a 
diverse but organized portion of the Mexicano community, a population that has 
been rendered mostly invisible in the multiple and competing interpretations of 
frontier defense, articulated through race. 
In chapter seven I investigate the series of investigations that followed 
major episodes of conflict and produced significant collections of documents. 
Initially, investigations simply collated relevant documents that had circulated 
during a specific moment of turmoil. However, the sophistication and quality of 
investigations increased over time. Gradually, each investigation began to rely on 
the achievement of the previous effort. The result was an authoritative narrative of 
frontier conflict. One of the most important investigations, “Depredations on the 
Frontiers of Texas,” also known as the Robb Commission, reflected a specific 
effort by Congress. In response to the formation of the 1872 Robb commission, 
Mexico had “the matter investigated on its side, and as impartially as possible, for 
it felt the necessity of being prepared against the plots of some malicious 
claimants and other ambitious private parties in this country.” On October 2, 
1872, the Mexican Congress appointed Ignacio Galindo, Antonio García Carrillo 
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and Augustin Siliceo to investigate a portion of the border that totaled close to 
four hundred fifty miles. The Committee attacked public archives and interviewed 
scores of witnesses. They completed and published their work in December 1873 
with a translated edition circulated in the US two years later. Unlike the American 
investigations that preceded and followed it, the Mexican Committee more 
analytical approach breaks down frontier conflict into its most significant 
elements, allowing the Mexican investigation to be notably less accusatory and 
one of the most sophisticated investigations.79 
In the final chapter I conclude the study with a brief summary of the major 
issues raised by persistent violence that plagued the region. I also propose an 
analytic or heuristic device of four historical contexts in order to sustain the 
argument regarding the permanent nature of border warfare.  
                                                 
79 U.S. House, Depredations on the Texas Frontier, 44th Cong. 1st Sess., Misc. Doc. 37. Reports of 
the Committee of Investigation, Sent in 1873 By the Mexican Government to the Frontier of Texas, 
translated from the Official Edition Made in Mexico, (New York: Baker and Godwin, Printers, 
1875): iii-iv. 
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1. TEXAS THREE CORNERED CONFLICT 
“In actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in 
short, force, play the greatest part.” 
Karl Marx1 
“Most Texas historians,” T. R. Fehrenbach remarks, “have depicted the 
essential story of Texas as one of enduring racial and cultural conflict and war.”2 
Fehrenbach, and the scores of Texas scholars who have followed the rutted trails 
of Texas historiography, have tended to interpret US-Mexico Border conflict 
during the late nineteenth century as a “race war.” Relying on race war as an 
interpretive framework celebrates Anglo’s singular ability to adapt and change to 
the exigencies of westward expansion, making shootings, lynchings, raids, 
filibusters, and punitive expeditions a necessary by-product of taming the frontier. 
For most Anglo scholars conflict was inevitable, making the US-Mexico 
Borderlands the site of a bloody clash of cultures as America fulfilled her 
“manifest destiny” to expand across a continent already inhabited by Indigenous 
peoples and Mexicanos.  
Walter P. Webb, the most prominent of Texas historians who examined 
conflict, presented the saga of Texas as a “three cornered conflict” between the 
Indian Brave, the Mexican Vaquero, and the Texas Ranger. “The Americans,” 
                                                 
1 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, Ben Fowkes, trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1977): 874. 
2 T. R. Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans, From Prehistory to the Present 
(Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2000): 465. 
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according to Webb, “slow, powerful, inexorable, made their way westward, 
coming at length into conflict with the Mexicans along the Rio Grande and with 
the Indians of the Plains.” Webb’s race war implies the transformation of the 
Texan, the Texas Ranger borrowing from the experience and skill of his 
predecessors: Indigenous peoples and Mexicanos. Out of the “cultural triangle” 
emerged the Texan, “a transplanted American, an outrunner [sic] of the American 
frontier.”3 Webb’s crude social Darwinism reduced race to a one-dimensional 
static category, presenting conflict as an inevitable process of a superior race 
overwhelming lesser ones. Moreover, Webb’s racial essentialism simply echoes 
long held views of political elites who expected inferior peoples would simply 
recede or disappear altogether as Anglos trekked westward. Webb’s “three 
cornered conflict” thesis presents the Texas Ranger as the quintessential frontier 
fighting force and the primary civilizing agent for an expanding frontier. The 
Texas Ranger defeated Indigenous peoples and Mexicanos and forced them to 
conform to an Anglo way of life. The “three cornered conflict” thesis gained a 
great deal of currency in subsequent political histories that celebrated prominent 
men and noteworthy institutions forged out of the turmoil below, as Webb was 
fond of saying, “the tamale line.”4  
                                                 
3 Walter P. Webb, The Texas Ranger: A Century of Frontier Defense (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1989): 9;14. 
4 Llerena B. Friend, “W.P. Webb’s Texas Rangers,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 74: 3 
(January 1971): 303. 
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Scholars have paid too little attention to crucial discursive processes of 
Texas’ “racial and cultural conflict,” depicting race in the most essentialist of 
terms and presenting racial conflict as naturalized. In this chapter I first review the 
critical opposition of Americo Paredes to the Texas Legend. As one of the early 
critics of the celebratory historical interpretation of the Texas Rangers, Paredes 
drew attention to the discursive dimensions of Anglo-Mexican conflict. I take up 
Paredes’ discursive intervention by pointing to operations of frontier defense as a 
race project making reference to the prose of counterinsurgency and the 
production of a representational machine. I explore these elements in more detail 
in chapter seven through an examination of the series of investigations organized 
following major episodes of physical violence. Here, I briefly investigate three 
central agents in the saga of frontier violence: the Texas Ranger, the “bandit,” and 
the ranchero. Specifically, I place the discussion of Mexicanos in the context of 
resistance in order to more fully appreciate the conflation of rancheros and 
“bandits.”  
Frontier Defense as a Racial Project 
Over a generation ago Americo Paredes challenged the currency of the 
“Texas legend,” asking whether it was fact, folklore or “something else?” “The 
records of frontier life after 1848,” Paredes informs his readers, “are full of 
instances of cruelty and inhumanity.” “By far the majority of the acts of cruelty,” 
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Paredes explains, “are ascribed by American writers themselves to men of their 
own race. The victims, on the other hand, were very often Mexicans.”5 Paredes’ 
initial critique targeted authors who “have lent their prestige to the legend.” 
Paredes’ path breaking work exposed the racial biases that undermined the 
scholarly integrity of the research produced by scholars such as Webb. According 
to Paredes, Texas scholars simply parroted the disparaging images, attitudes and 
beliefs about Mexicanos that had originated as war propaganda in 1846. Texas 
men of letters refused to abandon the stock of wartime themes, having little of a 
literary tradition to distract them once the war was over. Paredes defiantly 
summarizes the number of disparaging claims that constituted the Texas legend: 
1. The Mexican is cruel by nature. The Texan must in self-defense treat 
the Mexican cruelly, since that is the only treatment the Mexican 
understands. 2. The Mexican is cowardly and treacherous, and no match 
for the Texan. He can get the better of the Texan only by stabbing him in 
the back or by ganging up on him with a crowd of accomplices. 3. 
Thievery is second nature in the Mexican, especially horse and cattle 
rustling, and on the whole he is about as degenerate a specimen of 
humanity as may be found anywhere. 4. The degeneracy of the Mexican is 
due to his mixed blood, though the elements in the mixture were inferior 
to begin with. He is descended from the Spaniard, a second-rate type of 
European, and from the equally substandard Indian of Mexico, who must 
not be confused with the noble savages of North America. 5. The Mexican 
has always recognized the Texan as his superior and thinks of him as 
belonging to a race separate from other Americans. 6. The Texan has no 
equal anywhere, but within Texas itself there developed a special breed of 
                                                 
5 Américo Paredes, With His Pistol in His Hand, A Border Ballad and Its Hero, (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1958): 16-18. 
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men, the Texas Rangers, in whom the Texan’s qualities reached their 
culmination.6 
 
Paredes was one of the earliest scholars to link a discursive formation in the form 
of the Texas Legend to the repression that Anglos, especially through the Texas 
Ranger, directed against Mexicanos. Ultimately, Paredes argued their biased 
attitudes towards Mexicanos allowed them to justify preemptory and retaliatory 
killings and a system of racialized terror throughout the region. 
Paredes indicted authors who indulged racial biases and Texas chauvinism 
by pointing to how they turned legend into formal historiography. Paredes’ 
critical project contemplates the collusion between popular cultural producers, 
officials producing legal documents, and scholars who legitimized the commonly 
held views of heroic Anglo exploits, transforming legend into “history.” The 
recognized documentary evidence fueled the myth, despite a number of 
irreconcilable inaccuracies and indiscretions not harshly judged by posterity. 
Judges, lawyers, merchants and local military officials wrote reports for 
newspapers as Paredes astutely points out, but they also took a number of 
depositions, produced countless arrest warrants, summoned grand juries, issued 
writs for extradition, circulated endless pleas to local and federal authorities for 
aid on a regular basis, comprising a substantial archive of Anglo bias. For Paredes 
this process entailed two movements, the first was the control of the historical 
                                                 
6 Américo Paredes, With His Pistol in His Hand, A Border Ballad and Its Hero, (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1958): 16. 
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record by Anglos. The second was to erase Mexicanos as producers of their own 
histories and as a people with a past. Paredes’ challenge to the popularly held 
beliefs as well as the scholarship that supported them had a far-reaching impact 
on the succeeding generation of Chicano academics who also began to dismantle 
the Texas legend.7 Many who first took up the banner unfurled by Paredes sought 
to rectify the one sided historiography by documenting the agency of Mexicanos 
throughout the region. 
As Paredes argued historiography played a critical role in establishing the 
Mexican as a “bandit” and the Indian as depraved, making historical production 
one of the most central and complex aspects of the social war of the Greater 
Borderlands. Ranajit Guha draws special attention to the codes that comprise a 
“prose of counterinsurgency,” warning the codes enjoy a privileged circulation in 
the primary, secondary, and tertiary discourses of historiographies complicit in 
projects of state building and colonial domination. Even radical approaches, part 
                                                 
7 For useful overviews treating Chicano historiography see, Carlos Muñoz “The Quest for 
Paradigm: The Development of Chicano Studies and Intellectuals,” in History, Culture and 
Society: Chicano Studies in the 1980s (Ypsilanti: Bilingual Press, 1983); Yves-Charles Grandjeat, 
“Conflicts and Cohesiveness: The Elusive Quest for a Chicano History” Aztlan 18 (Spring 1989): 
45-58; Tomás Almaguer, “Ideological Distortions in Recent Chicano Historiography: The Internal 
Colonial Model and Chicano Historical Interpretation” Aztlan 18 (Spring 1989): 7-28; David G. 
Gutiérrez, “The Third Generation: Reflections on Recent Chicano Historiography” Mexican 
Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 5 (Summer 1989): 281-296; Alex M. Saragoza, “Recent Chicano 
Historiography: An Interpretive Essay” Aztlan 19 (Fall 1990): 1-77; Ramón A. Gutiérrez, 
“Community, Patriarchy and Individualism: The Politics of Chicano History and the Dream of 
Equality” American Quarterly 45 (March 1993): 44-72. 
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of the tertiary discourses, fail to represent insurgents as possessing their own array 
of motivations, “representing them as instruments of some other will.”8  
In the processes of policing “bandits,” investigating raids and 
“depredations,” extraditing those who fled to Mexico, and compensating victims 
of countless incursions, Anglos produced a “representational machine.” Ricardo 
Salvatore defines representational machines as sophisticated technologies that 
“translate an undifferentiated succession of local, individual, concrete events of 
encounter into larger, more meaningful narratives –narratives that convey 
meaning to formulations of nation, empire, race, or masculinity.”9 
Much of the foundation for a representational machine was established by 
the efforts of civic and military leaders who conducted the series of investigations 
often referred to as “Mexican Border Troubles” or “Texas Troubles.” The 
combined impact of formal investigations amounted to a discursive technology 
that interpreted, represented, and displayed the benefits of colonial expansion, 
sustaining a narrative of frontier conflict that privileged Anglos while defining 
indigenous inhabitants as criminal and therefore threats to Anglo settler 
colonialism. The combination of these investigations consolidated strategies and 
                                                 
8 Ranajit Guha, “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency,” in Nicholas Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry 
Ortner, eds., Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994): 337; 364. 
9 Ricardo Salvatore, “Representational Machines of Empire,” in Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. 
Legrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural 
History of US-Latin American Relations (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998): 72-73. 
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processes of representation that largely excluded Mexicanos and Indigenous 
peoples. Their success made available a historiography and ethnography that 
racialized Mexicanos and Indigenous peoples. The representational machine 
produced as part of US westward expansion erased them as important agents in 
frontier defense and settlement, ultimately criminalizing and infantalizing them.  
The success of the “representational machine” deployed along the US-
Mexico Border during the late nineteenth century was crucial to extending the 
nascent reach of US state and mercantile authority. The “representational 
machine” along the Indian and Mexican frontiers made frontier defense the focus 
for processes that determined national, racial, and gendered belonging on both a 
national and local level, suggesting that violence, much like print culture, 
produced competing “imagined communities” and “deep horizontal 
comradeships” along the border. Thus, the representation and interpretation of 
conflict, especially through the discursive formation of frontier defense, were an 
essential element of social dominance and a critical component of an emergent 
hegemonic order.  
The social war of the late nineteenth century, while at one moment, 
indicates the material violence that plagued the US-Mexico Border, as a 
discursive formation reveals the symbolic violence integral to hegemonic 
processes of a nascent and incomplete political, social and economic order 
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increasingly dominated by Anglos. State discourses, and by extension the 
historiography of dominant groups it made possible, transformed frontier defense 
into a race project that solidified social and economic boundaries. More 
importantly, it concealed the shifting alliances regarding defense, trade and civic 
duty that were negotiated between all inhabitants of the region. 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant, extending the analytical capacity of 
theories of race, have challenged researchers to move beyond “utopian 
frameworks” and “essentialist formulations.” Central to Omi and Winant’s racial 
formation model is the concept of race projects, which is “simultaneously an 
interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to 
reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines.” “Racial 
projects,” Omi and Winant conclude, “connect what race means in a particular 
discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday 
experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning.” Consequently, 
racial projects “are always multiply determined, politically contested, and deeply 
shaped by their historical context.” Operating on the macro level of policy-
making, state activity, and collective action as well as on the micro level of 
everyday experience, race projects are pervasive, oscillating “between the 
discursive or representational means in which race is identified and signified on 
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the one hand, and the institutional and organizational forms in which it is 
routinized and standardized on the other.”10 
Frontier defense as a complex “race project” consolidated domestic and 
international interests. The role of a representational apparatus was also 
dramatically conveyed in the transformation of the Texas Ranger, the 
quintessential frontiersman who evolved from an Indian fighter to a lawman, all 
the while serving as the symbol of Texas’ frontier legacy. The ranger became the 
dominant protagonist in the drama of frontier defense, leaving only subordinate 
roles for the Mexicano. One clear example of how a race project operated was the 
treatment of the ranchero. The discursive formation of frontier defense rendered 
social groups such as rancheros, settlers who played critical roles in earlier 
pacification projects, as invisible or criminal.11 As the antagonists in a heroic 
drama of settlement the Mexicano’s contributions to settler colonialism, Mexican 
and US, have been erased. The discursive processes that minimized the role of 
indigenous groups to the project of settling the region were in every way the 
operations of an on-going “race project.” 
                                                 
10 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, from the 1960s to the 
1990s (New York: Routledge, 1994): 54-61. Cf. Tomás Almaguer, Racial Fault Lines: The 
Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994). 
11 While the entire Mexicano community suffered the process of criminalization, and the 
paramilitary police actions it made possible, women within Mexicano border communities were 
doubly erased. 
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The Texas Rangers 
Probably the most prominent symbol of frontier defense, a figure that 
embodied all the “noble” characteristics of the frontier hero, is the Texas Ranger. 
Studies of the Texas Rangers have generally followed the rutted trail originally 
blazed by Webb, their most zealous and acclaimed researcher. Webb’s portrayal 
of the rangers emphasizes the critical role of leadership and the related attribute of 
daring exemplified by men who were able to adapt to the harshness of the 
frontier.12 Scholars who have trailed behind Webb also highlight what have come 
to be regarded as the essential characteristics of the ranger including unquestioned 
courage, leadership, and daring, embodied in such celebrated rangers as John 
Ford, Leander McNelly and John B. Jones.  
The Texas Ranger, a central protagonist in the saga of frontier defense, 
has, for the most part, been impervious to criticism. Previous scholarship has not 
escaped the trap of either celebrating rangers as key agents for frontier defense or 
vilifying them as villains in a system of racial oppression. Rangers appear on the 
Texas frontier as though immaculately conceived, denying them a history that 
reflects contradiction and complexity. Mustered into service at key turning points 
                                                 
12 Richard White characterizes Webb as an “academic ranger” zealously producing hagiographies 
of frontier lawmen (Texas Rangers) while obscuring “their daily and often brutal job of keeping 
those without white skins in their place.” Richard White, “Race Relations in the American West” 
American Quarterly 38 (1986): 396-416. For a discussion of Webb’s writing of The Texas 
Rangers and his adventures with the celebrated lawmen, see Llerena B. Friend, “W.P. Webb’s 
Texas Rangers,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 74: 3 (January 1971. 
 60
in Texas’ settler colonial project, rangers claimed an exclusive role and 
unmatched contribution in the unfolding of frontier defense.13 Although a 
paramilitary force that played a complicated and decisive role in an unfolding 
social war, rangers were not a monolithic group. An overlooked dimension of the 
rangers has been the number of Mexicanos who were part of the rank and file of 
specific companies, especially musters in outlying areas. The rangers, persistent 
in the actual violence of subjugating the Mexicano, have also come to embody 
discursive processes of law, duty, honor, and protection associated with past and 
present glories of the state. 
Robert Utley, one of the Texas Rangers’ most recent celebrants, identifies 
four distinct qualities of the Ranger. The first was leadership, given that the 
“Texan fighting men could be led but not commanded.” Independent and 
jealously guarding his freedom –Utley suggests the ranger could only follow 
someone who had proven his bravery, further underscoring the frontier ethos or at 
least his vision of what a frontier ethos should be. The personal characteristics of 
the men who made up the rank and file of the ranger companies composed the 
second quality. “Most,” explains Utley, “were young, hardy, physically fit, 
courageous, fearless, bold, endowed with fortitude and endurance and ever ready 
                                                 
13 For a brief discussion of the ranger emerging out of the tradition of the frontiersman such as 
Daniel Boone as well as other key figures including the scout, ranger, mountain man, plainsman 
and cowboy, see Robert Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West 1846-1890 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984): 34. 
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for a fight.” The third quality consisted entirely of “the specialized skills of the 
frontier fighter.” The fourth quality, while not a personal characteristic unique to 
Texans was more his good fortune given that he was able to take advantage of 
Samuel Colt’s revolving pistol. Ultimately, the ranger successfully developed 
“revolutionary combat tactics drawn from a new weapon.”14 Rangers in this view 
fully embodied the highest virtues forged by the frontier: unchallenged courage, a 
sense of duty and honor, inventiveness, and a penchant for progress.  
In the zeal to exult the ranger, individual transgression are often 
overlooked or uncomfortably acknowledged as individual aberrations. More to the 
point, integrity of each individual ranger is buttressed by an emphasis on the 
exploits of the rangers as a whole or, in some cases, an emphasis placed on a 
noteworthy leader. Often overlooked or downplayed in the celebration of the 
Texas Ranger has been the transformation of the institution. Most portrayals of 
the ranger present him as immaculately conceived on the plains. Impervious to 
criticism the ranger does betray a critical element of transformation. Webb 
himself suggests as much by celebrating the ranger for having appropriated the 
unique martial abilities of his foes. The Texas Ranger as the region’s 
                                                 
14 Utley, Lone Star Justice, pp.3-4. These noteworthy characteristics do not depart from those first 
celebrated by Webb. 
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“representative fighting man” could, according to Webb, “ride like a Mexican, 
trail like an Indian, shoot like a Tennessean, and fight like a devil.”15  
Notably, the ranger had antecedents. Early Anglo efforts of frontier 
defense, borrowed heavily from the Mexicano strategies that preceded them. Early 
efforts were primarily organized around volunteer companies of minute men, 
increasingly overtime referred to as “rangers.” Andrés Tijerina argues that 
irregular volunteer forces or rangers developed the concept of the “offensive 
cavalry tactic.” Introduced by Mexicano soldiers it was of such magnitude it was 
imparted to Anglo settlers, including Stephen Austin, at the insistence of Spanish 
and later Mexican officials. The effectiveness of civilian militias flying 
companies would remain foremost in Mexicano strategies of frontier defense. 
Later, the Texas Rangers would make use of the strategy, later claiming a 
minuteman tradition many argue is unique to the American experience. An 
offensive cavalry tactic also served the US army as it slowly adapted to the 
military challenges posed by Indigenous peoples.  
Equally important has been the transformation of the ranger from a 
volunteer force to an organized bureaucratized constabulary. David Smith 
explains “the story that unfolds may be confusing if one searches only for an 
                                                 
15 Walter P. Webb, The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1989): 43. 
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organized body of men called ‘Texas Rangers.’”16 The development of the Texas 
Ranger as an institution resulted from conflicting imperatives of frontier defense, 
including competing strategies of military protection, the subjugation of 
Indigenous peoples, and later, the policing of criminals. 
Not long after the US-Mexico War notable rangers such as John Ford and 
a number of Texas governors insisted that only a permanent force of rangers 
could adequately defend the frontier. However, it was not until after the American 
Civil War that the term Texas Ranger was legally established through the 
legislative act of September 21, 1866 when Governor Throckmorton issued a call 
for a regiment of over one thousand men. On June 13 1870, under the direction of 
Governor Edmund Davis, the legislature mustered twenty companies of Texas 
Rangers for twelve months service. Utley distinguishes between “two 
distinctively different bodies of men.”17 On April 10, 1874 Texas Rangers were 
reorganized from volunteer companies into “a permanent military force that was 
also a permanent law enforcement arm, under state rather than local control.”18 By 
1874 two competing roles for the Texas Ranger were established, defense and law 
enforcement. Thus, rangers evolved from volunteer citizen soldiers to lawmen.  
                                                 
16 David P. Smith, Frontier Defense in the Civil War: Texas’ Rangers and Rebels ( College 
Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1992): xii. 
17 Utley, Lone Star Justice, p. 287. 
18 Ibid., 145. 
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Two competing images of the Texas Ranger persist. According to Utley 
these two images “still war with each other, the one sustaining the bright legend 
of the state’s criminal investigative arm, the other inspiring periodic attempts to 
abolish it altogether.”19 While some scholars have been eager to celebrate rangers 
and their emergence on the plains, others have identified the Texas Rangers as a 
key agent of terror, violence and racial subjugation.  
Utley concedes that the historical record supports neither the celebrated 
Texas Ranger of Webb nor the one disparaged by a score of mostly Chicano 
scholars. “One searches the documents in vain for Webb’s ‘real Ranger,’” 
complains Utley. On the other hand, “primary sources fail to disclose the 
systematic misconduct of which the Rangers are accused.” Utley is too quick to 
dismiss the challenges to the Texas Ranger legacy offered by “border Mexicans.” 
Assuming their critique echoes their strong beliefs, Utley argues the negative 
views of “border Mexicans” depend too much on only a few recorded instances of 
ranger excess. These episodes, Utley insists, occurred primarily in the twentieth 
century. The harsher criticisms, Utley concludes, “do not reflect a pattern 
apparent in the nineteenth century.”20  
Historians have failed to fully note the contributions of Mexicanos and 
Indigenous peoples to frontier defense. In some cases, Mexicanos and Indigenous 
                                                 
19 Utley, Lone Star Justice, pp. 287-294 
20 Ibid. 
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peoples served as rangers. Remarkably, Utley admits “an occasional Indian or 
Mexican turned up on the muster rolls, even on rare occasion entire units of 
Indians or Mexicans.” Although acknowledging the “multiculturalism” of the 
rangers, Utley chooses to stress the uniqueness of the rangers, especially their 
cultural cohesiveness or homogeneity. “Nearly all citizen soldiers,” he concludes, 
“were Anglo Texans who despised Indians and Mexicans.”21 Anglos were unique, 
having “a different concept of justice one hardly shared by their Indian and 
Mexican foes.” In Utley’s assessment ranger justice was only available to Anglos 
in general and Texans more specifically. “But it was justice as understood by the 
Anglo Texans,” he insists, “who dominated the republic and then the state.”22 
Unfortunately, Utley is unable to pursue the deeper significance of the presence of 
non-Anglos in the ranger rank and file, making his begrudging admission more 
than suspect. 
The Texas Rangers as symbol of Anglo progress, icons of manifest 
destiny, fulfilled a “semantic purpose” similar to what Richard Flores has 
identified for the Alamo. Flores argues persuasively that the Alamo is a “master 
symbol” that constructs “historical and social differences between Anglos and 
Mexicans, leading one group to interpret its significance as one of patriotism and 
the other as domination.” The Alamo is such an important symbol it performs “a 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 288. 
22 Ibid., xi. 
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constitutive role in the formation of Anglo-Mexican relations.” Ultimately, the 
Alamo performed “various semantic procedures of the dominant.”23  
Flores study of the symbolic production of the Alamo and its impact on 
social relations not only introduces “the role of the symbolic and its use in the 
production of meaning,” but also identifies two critical dimensions of “symbolic 
analysis”: “first, the need to rethink symbolic production through its historical 
content; and second, the need to reground analysis of symbolic productions 
through the conditions of their own making.”24 Unfortunately, Flores historical 
anthropology does not link his study to any type of material violence. In his 
emphasis on the discursive functions of the Alamo, Flores minimizes the 
pervasive and persistent role of episodes of violence in conjunction with symbolic 
productions.  
Resistance and Mexicano agency 
Scholars initially pursuing a cultural tack turned away from research on 
large-scale rebellions and riots, downplaying overarching ideologies that 
privileged a singular emancipatory movement and a cohesive fully articulated 
class. The topic of resistance attracted renewed interest when a generation of 
British Cultural Marxists intervened in debates regarding rebellion to lend a 
certain dignity and deliberateness to the people responsible for collective action. 
                                                 
23 Richard Flores, Remembering the Alamo: Memory, Modernity, & the Master Symbol (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2002): 11-12. 
24 See note 7, Flores, Remembering the Alamo, p. 164. 
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E.P. Thompson, for instance, recognized a “moral economy,” or guiding principle 
articulated in “riots.” George Rudé identified the “faces in the crowd,” 
acknowledging the motivations and deliberateness of the “mob.” Eric Hobsbawm 
legitimized previously dismissed criminal activity by celebrating “social bandits” 
as important political agents.25  
Expanding their investigative ken to include research on the daily acts of 
oppression, accommodation and struggle, a greater emphasis was placed on the 
resistant possibilities associated with claiming historically and politically 
contingent identities. Many researchers drew inspiration from the “new social 
movements,” mobilizations that were not over determined by larger structural 
forces. Rather than privilege a singular revolt organized at the point of production, 
scholars began to explore opposition informed by issues of identity and social 
marginalization.26 Equally disillusioned by the apparent delay of a definitive 
social transformation, later cadres of researchers prioritized “everyday” or less 
                                                 
25 E.P.Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1966; 
E.P.Thompson, Customs in Common, Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: The 
New Press, 1993); George Rudé, The Crowd in History, A Study of Popular Disturbances in 
France and England, 1730-1848  (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1981), Eric Hobsbawm, 
Primitive Rebels, Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries  
(New York: W. W. Norton  & Co., 1965); Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1981). 
26 The key works for new social movements rely primarily on the contributions of Alberto 
Melucci. Alberto Melucci, “The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach” Social Science 
Information 19:2 (1980): 199-226; Alberto Melucci, “Ten Hypotheses for the Analysis of New 
Movements” in Diana Pinto, ed., Contemporary Italian Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981): 173-194. For an excellent critique of the new social movements in the 
Latin American context, see the introduction in Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo 
Escobar, eds., Cultures of Politics/Politics of Cultures: Re-Visioning Latin American Social 
Movements (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). 
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dramatic forms of resistance. James Scott, a leader in the field, introduced the 
political efficacy of “the weapons of the weak” into debates regarding resistance. 
He further elaborated his own concept by exposing the dialectic tension between 
the “hidden and public transcripts” of domination and resistance.27  
Paredes successfully challenged the Texas Legend by analyzing the 
production and circulation of its cultural repertoire that only Anglos could claim; 
he also advanced a more profound statement on resistance, introducing innovative 
interdisciplinary scholarship on border conflict. Unlike work that only celebrated 
bold acts of defiance, Paredes’ research documents the strategic cultural practices 
by ethnic Mexicans opposing Anglo dominance through corridos, jokes, and other 
folk practices. In many ways, Paredes anticipates James Scott’s formulation of 
hidden and public transcripts. 
However, despite the advances in more rigorous approaches to resistance, 
a number of scholars have recently raised a litany of cautionary notes, further 
complicating research on organized opposition. Making use of Clifford Geertz’s 
notion of thick description, Sherry Ortner sounded an alarm regarding the 
complacency she claims pervades resistance studies. Ortner challenges current 
approaches to resistance calling for the introduction of an ethnographic stance in 
research strategies. “Resistance studies,” Ortner explains, “are thin because they 
                                                 
27 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1985); James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden 
Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
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are ethnographically thin: thin on internal politics of dominated groups, thin on 
cultural richness of these groups, thin on the subjectivity –the intentions, desires, 
fears, projects—of the actors engaged in these dramas.”28 The task of researchers 
who take resistance seriously “would, or should,” Ortner concludes, “reveal the 
ambivalences and ambiguities of resistance itself.”  
This innovative approach to resistance increasingly relies on treating 
power as a more complex analytical category. Probably the most explicit effort to 
examine power has been Lila Abu-Lughod’s admonition that scholars should 
exert more caution in representing resistance so as not to romanticize it, but rather 
to “use resistance as a diagnostic of power.” Abu-lughod argues that in “the rich 
and sometimes contradictory details of resistance the complex workings of social 
power can be traced.”29 Ultimately, the analytical imperatives of a more nuanced 
approach to resistance advocated by Ortner, Abu-Lughod and others require 
recognition of the diversity and complexity of communities responding to 
oppression. 
Abandoning the “definitional concept of class” altogether and insisting 
that “forms of social relations” are not fixed, fully constituted, nor should they be 
fetishized, John Holloway prefers to speak of social antagonism. Holloway offers 
                                                 
28 Sherry B. Ortner, “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal,” Comparative Study of 
Society and History 37:1 (January 1995): 190. 
29 Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through 
Bedouin Women,” American Ethnologist 17:1 (February 1990): 42. 
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dignity as an analytical concept that represents the “struggle against 
subordination.” According to Holloway social antagonism is not a battle between 
two distinct groups in opposition. He argues class conflict is more productively 
understood as  
a conflict between creative social practice and its negation, or, in other 
words, between humanity and its negation, between the transcending of 
limits (creation) and the imposition of limits (definition). The conflict, in 
this interpretation, does not take place after subordination has been 
established, after the fetishised forms of social relations have been 
constituted: rather it is a conflict about the subordination of social 
practice, about the fetishisation of social relations. Class struggle does not 
take place within the constituted forms of capitalist social relations: rather 
the constitution of those forms is class struggle.30 
 
Scholarly treatments of conflict in the US-Mexico Borderlands that have 
denied Mexicanos a “praxis of rebellion,” suffer from the blind spot that afflicts 
peasant resistance in general, that is, these studies too often have relied on, 
according to Ranajit Guha, “an official point of view.” Most often the struggles of 
Mexicanos and Indigenous peoples are subsumed into representations that portray 
rebellions as a natural phenomena, revealing a low state of sophistication and 
resulting from economic and political deprivation.31 In this approach, what E. P. 
Thompson labeled the “spasmodic view of popular history,” the interventions of 
“common people” are viewed not as purposeful events by thoughtful agents but as 
                                                 
30 John Holloway, “Dignity’s Revolt,” in John Holloway and Eloína Peláez, eds. Zapatista! 
Reinventing Revolution in Mexico (London: Pluto Press, 1998): 183-184. 
31 Guha, “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency,” p. 364.  
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“simple responses to economic stimuli.”32 Similarly, Gerald Sider worries about 
the “hydraulic model of popular involvement in social change -press people down 
in one domain of their lives and they will pop up in another with even more force- 
but this perspective is primarily invoked to explain episodic upheavals, where the 
drama of events conceals the lifelessness of the model.” The excessive attention 
to the drama of a violent event represents insurgents as incapable of participating 
in “the routine, but far more powerful and pervasive, transformation of their social 
world.”33 
Unfortunately, scholarly challenges to approaches that exulted Anglo 
achievement on the “frontier” have not fully transcended the brittle culture-
conflict model that overwhelmingly defined previous works. Most approaches to 
conflict in the region rely on an inevitable clash between races as an analytical 
framework, leaving only alienation or accommodation as possible narratives. A 
view of resistance by Mexicanos and Indigenous peoples in a cultural framework 
limits opposition to banditry in direct response to Anglo dominance. 
In an early effort to introduce the contribution of ethnic Mexicans to 
frontier settlement and to document “Chicano” resistance against Anglo 
domination, scholars uncritically portrayed defiant male heroes as “social 
                                                 
32 E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” in 
Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: The New Press, 1993): 
185. 
33 Gerald M. Sider, Culture and Class in Anthropology and History, A Newfoundland Illustration 
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bandits,” noble in comparison to excessively violent and oppressive Texas 
Rangers.  
The overwhelming focus on overt acts of physical acts of resistance also 
meant that most scholars represented opposition against Anglo domination as the 
exclusive agency of men. Studies that emphasize the role of the border caudillo 
and the “social bandit” overshadow the participation of the larger community 
during moments of overt, sustained, and daily conflict. Men, both Mexicano and 
Anglo, constructed their identities through claims to honor. Richard Brown 
attributes conflict in the west to honor as a significant motivating force. “Aside 
from such beliefs as the ideology of vigilantism, the homestead ethic, the ethic of 
individual enterprise, and the incorporating and anti-incorporating attitudes that 
divided the West,” Brown explains, “the key factor in regard to Western violence 
and Western values was Western honor.” Western honor, in Brown’s analytical 
schema, was motivated by the “social and legal doctrine of no duty to retreat.” 
The “hip-pocket ethics” suggested by Brown betrays an ethnocentric vision of 
violence in the west, privileging the gunfighter and vigilantes, racially marking 
them as predominantly, if not exclusively, Anglo.34 
The activities associated with frontier defense were not necessarily a 
heroic narrative of resistance executed only by men. Given the complexity of 
                                                 
34 Richard M. Brown, “Western Violence: Structure, Values, Myth,” Western Historical Quaterly 
24:1 (February 1993): 14. 
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violence, women's roles as victims, survivors and witnesses were crucial to the 
operations of power and resistance in late nineteenth century Texas. Throughout 
women were active in the “brushfire wars” and “raids” not only as victims, as for 
example in the case of rape and captivity, but also as critical agents ensuring that 
the effects of war did not destroy the social fabric of the community.35 The notion 
of “honor” obscures the domestic violence directed towards women –violence that 
maintained social hierarchy and reproduced patriarchical authority inside and 
outside of the household. There are no studies to date that document domestic 
violence as part of the larger conflict regarding frontier defense. Although gender 
reproduced through discourses of honor informed how men would behave in the 
public sphere, the daily interactions of survival in frontier institutions including 
the home remain understudied. 
The “ambivalences and ambiguities” of Mexicano resistance was clearly 
demonstrated by the number of Mexicanos who could be either rangers or rebels. 
When Mexicano opposition to Anglo oppression was successful, as in the capture 
of the Texas Rangers by a Mexicano citizens’ militia from the communities of 
San Elizario, Ysleta and Socorro, victories were often short lived and narrow in 
scope, seeking only minimum retribution and limited reversals against Anglo 
arrogance. The insurgencies between West and South Texas, although marked by 
                                                 
35 A notable exception to this lacunae is Melody Graulich, “Violence Against Women: Power 
Dynamics in Literature of the Western Family,” in Susan Armitage and Elizabeth Jameson, eds., 
The Women’s West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987): 111-126. 
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similar motivations and contexts exhibited notable differences, suggesting 
important regional distinctions as well.36  
Paredes, as Limón has observed, in many ways anticipates the theoretical 
and methodological innovations associated with Cultural Studies that register 
resistance by highlighting the agency of audiences active in transforming cultural 
artifacts for purposes of articulating complex and strategic opposition. Similarly, 
one might also read Paredes’ early work as documenting the hidden and public 
transcripts of domination and resistance presented by James Scott. Mexicanos 
successfully promulgated their history through a variety of methods and in a 
number of venues. The most notable of such cultural formations remains the 
corrido –a critical cultural practice performed in public spaces occupied primarily 
by the “border Mexican.”37 In the corrido Paredes found a rich archive that 
documented specific episodes of resistance against Anglo domination, including 
details regarding the cruel violence of summary executions, arbitrary 
persecutions, systemic discrimination and sexual assaults against Mexicanos. The 
border conflict corrido narrates and analyzes a history of oppression, giving voice 
                                                 
36 See Eric Van Young “Introduction: Are Regions Good to Think?” in Eric Van Young, ed., 
Mexico’s Regions: Comparative History and Development (San Diego: Center for US-Mexican 
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to collective resistance during particularly acute moments of oppression. This 
collective defiance could, at times, simply take the form of the shared experience 
of the performance of the border conflict corrido that celebrated noble victories 
against Texas Rangers.  
Chicano researchers remain concerned with resistance. While not directly 
focusing on resistance, new studies do provide a decidedly more complex optic in 
analyzing domination and oppression, producing a rich body of research on 
identity and community formation.38 Unfortunately, much of the recent 
scholarship privileges struggles in the twentieth century, often de-emphasizing 
overt acts of resistance.  
Anglo violence organized into military or paramilitary actions or as 
punitive raids was understood as an acceptable response to threats posed by 
“savage” and “thieving” opponents who were beyond the constraints of 
civilization. Anglos consistently accused Mexicanos of raiding the US as bandits 
or assisting Indigenous peoples in their depredations against Anglo settlements. 
Mexicanos were also accused of conspiring with Indigenous peoples, further 
justifying Anglos arrogating for themselves the exclusive role of frontier defense. 
                                                 
38 A particularly noteworthy example of this gesture would be David Gutierrez, Walls and 
Mirrors. Gutierrez offers an incisive and provocative overview of immigration and its impact on 
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Anglo violence would be legitimized as organized defensive maneuvers or 
punitive raids, while Mexicano defensive or retaliatory efforts against Indigenous 
peoples were minimized and their collective resistance against Anglos 
criminalized. 
One figure that early one raised the ire of Chicano scholars was “the 
bandit.” It is in the context of land despoliations, political subordination, social 
control, and the dominance of markets in the period following the US-Mexico war 
that Mexicanos were criminalized as bandits.39 Chicano scholars in the counter 
legend framework contested the conflation of Mexicanos as bandits, exposing the 
                                                 
39 Despite its nineteenth century origins, the bandit code and image persist into the twentieth 
century. Its appearance as part of the Frito Lay company’s advertising campaign sparked a 
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portrayals of ethnic Mexican youth as inextricably imbricated in the underworld of gang life. Chon 
A. Noriega, Shot in America: Television, the State, and the Rise of Chicano Cinema (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000): 39. 
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code of bandit as “raced.”40 The consolidation of banditry and the bandit into a 
racial code based on essential traits of ethnic Mexicans contributed significantly 
to naturalizing the violence between the Anglo and Mexicano as an inevitable 
clash between cultures. Aware of the ideological freight it carried, authors such as 
Alfredo Mirandé offer a straight forward justification: “The ‘bandido image’ 
emerged as Chicanos responded to such injustices and to lawlessness on the part 
of the dominant society. If an Anglo took the law into his own hands, he was 
generally labeled a hero or a revolutionary, but a Chicano who engaged in 
lawlessness was somehow a bandit.”41  
Following the early effort to “deconstruct” the bandit code and limit its 
ideological impact, counter legend scholars made use of the social bandit as an 
explanatory device to unravel the tangled skein of Anglo-Mexican conflict.42 As a 
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result of early scholarly activism, many Chicano scholars were easily seduced by 
the category of social bandit in an early effort to more fully validate Chicano 
resistance.43 Even New Western historians have been quick to rely on a version of 
social banditry in an effort to validate Mexicano agency.44  
Robert Rosenbaum, an early example of this trend, made extensive use of 
Eric Hobsbawm’s “primitive rebels” framework.45 Rosenbaum argues Mexicanos, 
“employed violence as one means for retaining some measure of self-
determination in the face of an increasingly oppressive new regime.” Mexicano 
“self-preservation” included individual or collective efforts at physical survival, 
maintenance of a “traditional way of life,” and adaptation to change. The overt 
responses to Anglo domination consisted of border warfare, social banditry, 
community upheavals, long-term skirmishing and coordinated rebellions. 
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The Mexicano response to Anglo domination, in Rosenbaum’s estimation, 
simply “extended their traditional lack of concern to the new authority.” 
Operating in a peasant economy, Mexicanos were prone to an undeveloped sense 
of progress, nationalism and politics; as a result they demonstrated a strong 
identification with Mexico more generally, and their immediate surroundings or 
community more specifically. Mexicano resistance resulted from an “agrarian, 
self-sufficient people clustered in isolated communities doing battle with the 
visible manifestations of a huge nation which they could neither see nor conceive 
of.” Unfortunately, Rosenbaum did not escape the culture-conflict model, 
concluding that the Mexicano encounter with Anglo progress could not be 
anything but “a history of the confrontation between cultures.”46  
The specific histories of individual “social bandits” are so varied that the 
relationship between the community and the social bandit is difficult to establish. 
The variety of cases in which the category is applied are so diverse the examples 
are of little use in constructing a narrative of resistance. “Social bandits” in 
Hobsbawm’s model, are mostly pre-political, lacking ideological coherence and 
sophistication. Consequently, the phenomenon of social banditry in the region of 
the southwestern United States continue to operate as codes that are raced, almost 
exclusively representing Mexicanos, and only occasionally addressing Mexicano 
resistance.  
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Overlooked in discussions of Mexicano resistance or frontier defense has 
been the critical role of the ranchero. Although Anglos recognized the ranchero, 
later scholars have chosen to ignore him despite his presence as defender and 
depredator. The ranchero first received national attention following the decisive 
defeats at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma in May 1846 as the US-Mexico War 
increasingly became a guerrilla conflict. The swift victories of US forces 
relegated the remaining encounters between Anglos and Mexicanos to irregular 
warfare. One scribe concluded “the ‘Guerrilla’ system of old Spain is commenced 
in the new world. The only consolation we have is that at this kind of warfare the 
Texans are equally good with the Rancheros.” The ranchero inspired fear and 
motivated harsh retaliation. When it was reported that four hundred rancheros 
rode into Matamoros in August 1846 “bent on mischief,” the correspondent 
relaying the episode to an eager American audience assured his readers that if the 
rancheros made another appearance, as daring as the previous one, it would be 
“followed by the forcible expulsion of every ‘ochre-colored face’ if not of a war 
of extermination upon the deceitful thieving Rancheros.”47 Josiah Turner, a long 
time resident of Brownsville recalling his service in the Mexican war remembered 
coming face to face with the “mounted Mexican marauders called rancheros” in 
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March of 1846.48 According to Robert Johannsen, “guerrilla warfare was regarded 
as barbaric and uncivilized and orders were issued to deal with it harshly.” The 
presence of the ranchero during the war prompted “outbursts of indiscriminate 
and bloody revenge.”49  
Many Anglos disparaged rancheros as vicious, thieving degenerates, they 
were not above their own martial excesses that resulted from the brutal reprisals 
directed at their enemies. Some military regulars lamented the unprovoked and 
improper conduct of the volunteer Texas forces directed against Mexicanos. On 
July 25, 1846 Ulysses Grant, then a young lieutenant, wrote: 
Since we have been in Matamoros a great many murders have been 
committed, and what is strange there seems to be every week means made 
use of to prevent frequent repetitions. Some of the volunteers and about all 
of the Texans seem to think it perfectly right to impose on the people of a 
conquered city to any extent, and even to murder them where the act can 
covered by dark. And how much they seem to enjoy such acts of violence 
too! I would not pretend to guess the number of murders that have been 
committed upon the persons of poor Mexicans and our soldiers, since we 
have been here, but the number would startle you. 
 
Lieutenant George Mead linked his own criticism to his view of the nation’s 
Indian wars when he remarked that the “[volunteers] act more like a body of 
hostile Indians than civilized Whites.” General Taylor shared the attitudes of 
some of his younger officers. Throughout the campaign he expressed frustration 
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with the poor discipline and criminal behavior of the volunteer forces. “Of the 
infantry,” Taylor explained, “I have had little or no complaint; but the mounted 
men from Texas have scarcely made one expedition without [the] unwarrantable 
killing [of] a Mexican.”50  
Rancheros emerged from a long tradition of defending the frontier. 
“Through nearly three centuries of combat between indigenes and colonists,” Ana 
María Alonso argues, “the Chihuahuan frontier of Mexico became a society 
organized for warfare, with specialists in violence, and a distinct discursive 
regime predicated upon a militarized construction of honor.”51 Earlier Spanish 
and later Mexican efforts to settle the Northern frontier meant constant conflict 
with Indigenous peoples. The autonomous and fiercely independent ethos that 
define the northern region produced a figure with unique qualities. “Among 
them,” Miguel Leon-Portilla suggests, “was his great capacity for adaptation, his 
attitude of resistance to the threat of losing what he regarded as his, and an even 
stronger consciousness of his Mexicanism.”52 As much as the region was marked 
by “the social distribution of the means of force,” it was also characterized by a 
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long tradition of political autonomy as well.53 Although Alonso’s study 
documents the Serrano communities of the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua, 
the role of military defense performed by local citizen soldiers, and the gendered 
implications of their efforts, are equally applicable to the border communities of 
the Lower Rio Grande and far west Texas. 
Rancheros fought Indians, confronted revolutionaries on both sides of the 
river, and struggled to keep their communities vibrant, populating the frontier as 
fierce fighting forces. Jane-Dale Lloyd describes the ranchero of Chihuahua in 
the following manner:  
Rancheros are rural farmers controlling both crops and livestock, small-
scale landowners who engage in agricultural production for local, national, 
and even international markets. Although they adopt technological 
innovations whenever possible, they work and administer their own 
property primarily to increase family resources rather than to accumulate 
capital as such. And while rancheros rarely hire outside labor, they 
frequently recruit from among their poorer relatives. The ranchero, in 
other words, maximizes his productive capacity by maximizing human 
resources through such culturally accepted mechanisms as exercising 
parental authority and mobilizing close and binding ties established by 
religious customs such as baptisms, weddings, first communions, and 
compradrazgo. Rancheros are frequently carpenters or blacksmiths as 
well, as were their fathers and grandfathers before them; but they practice 
these trades only when they do not interfere with agricultural work. 
Rancheros can read, write, and do basic arithmetic. Culturally and socially 
the ranchero is immersed in a range of direct, face-to-face relationships 
with his extended family and the community, participating actively in the 
ceremonial life of his immediate neighbors and the community.54 
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Although Lloyd’s research focuses on rancheros who played an important role in 
the mobilizations during the Mexican Revolution, the essential characteristics she 
notes are consistent with the ranchero who rides through the period of this study. 
It was the ranchero who rode with the Texas Rangers, occupying key 
positions in early ranger companies. Rancheros, men who could supply the 
necessary accoutrements, including and most especially, the required number of 
horses to maintain an effective caballada, filled the companía volante, cortadas, 
and citizen militias that defended the frontier and subdued Indigenous peoples.55 
The ranchero, in his own way, was the counterpart to the Texas Ranger. 
Throughout the period they filled the rank and file of minuteman companies 
including volunteer ranger units that mustered to protect the frontier. Indeed, on 
numerous occasions rancheros defended their communities from depredations by 
“bandits,” incursions that might have been perpetrated by Indigenous peoples, 
Anglos, Mexicanos, or any combination of the three. In many instances 
Mexicanos were the first to fall victims to raiding parties.  
Survival in sparsely inhabited regions required cooperation between the 
races, making frontier defense possible only through interdependence in which 
both Mexicanos and Indigenous allies were essential. The entire project of frontier 
settlement and defense required the consistent assistance of traditional, local 
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knowledge applied in the deliberate negotiation of the delicate ways of living in a 
treacherous and unfamiliar country. Yet despite Anglo dependence on already 
existing communities to advance the settler colonial project, people with prior 
claims to the region experienced a series of radical and violent displacements. In 
this context, Mexicanos struggled to claim the rights afforded to them as US 
citizens.  
Ultimately, the ranchero exhibited an ambivalence in the course of the 
“three cornered conflict,” on some occasions an enemy, at others a vital ally. In 
addition to military service and frontier defense, rancheros carried out a number 
of tasks related to settlement. Mexicano settlers were essential to the pacification 
and settlement of the frontier as farmers, fleteros, muleteers, and vaqueros. 
Mexicanos provided necessary labor for freighting operations, often serving as 
guides for countless expeditions. Moreover Mexicano freighters and laborers 
supplied local military installations, constructed as a result of the frantic and 
occasionally exaggerated pleas for military intervention by local officials and 
citizens.56 In the US-Mexico Borderlands settler colonialism relied on, to a great 
extent, a system of military forts along the Indian and Mexican frontier that not 
only brought protection but also established an important market for local 
supplies. Although many line officers were suspicious of the desperate pleas by 
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local citizens and civic leaders for military protection, forts injected substantial 
financial benefits to frontier communities in addition to providing protection. 
Rancheros did not consistently or deliberately stand in opposition to 
Anglo domination as Americo Paredes remarked, “with his pistol in his hand.” 
“Friendly Mexicans” assisted Anglo settlers against all varieties of raids. Anglos 
were often warned of impending danger by Mexicano neighbors and allies. The 
small population of Anglos in outlying areas already populated by Mexicanos 
could not have defended their homes, protected their communities and 
occasionally brought offenders to justice, without the aid of rancheros from both 
sides of the international boundary. Unfortunately, current research does not allow 
for a more complete explanation of what motivated the ranchero to occasionally 
oppose Anglos, nor does it enable an explanation of why “friendly Mexicans” 
undermined his opposition.  
Despite their contributions, Mexicanos were often victims of Anglo 
violence, occasionally requiring the aid and protection of frontier troops. In 
addition to being victimized by Indigenous peoples and other Mexicanos, during 
the course of raids they suffered at the hands of enraged Anglos who meted out 
reprisals most often to innocent people who paid with their lives for the fortunes 
of their race and the accident of their being at the wrong place at the wrong time. 
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Mexicanos’ role in protecting frontier settlements did not end with the 
extension of U.S. territorial jurisdiction into what was previously Mexican 
territory. Having long established strategies for responding to the incursions of a 
variety of Indigenous peoples, Mexicanos often responded without the aid of 
Anglo militia or US military. Rancheros once considered “specialists in violence” 
would be forced to concede that role and reputation to Anglos who alone became 
renowned for the legitimate exercise of violence. Although rancheros struggled to 
keep their communities vibrant, they could not lay claim to frontier honorifics 
increasingly appropriated by or attributed to the Texas Ranger. By making the 
Mexicano the enemy of the Texan, and by extension the “American,” the 
ranchero could no longer lay claim to his own history as defender of the frontier. 
88 
2. A SANGUINE SPECIES OF BORDER WAR 
Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum. 
Flavius Vegetius Renatus1 
 
On February 7, 1850, Texas Governor Peter Bell conveyed a grave 
resolution from the Texas legislature to the US Congress of the United States. He 
informed Congress that Texas labored under the “multiplied aggressions, repeated 
in rapid succession” of Indigenous peoples under the watchful eye of the federal 
government. Bell requested a more aggressive posture by federal forces towards 
their recently acquired wards, demanding more material support for the state of 
Texas. Bell’s appeal outlined in every respect the science of frontier defense, 
sketching out the inherent tensions between the policies of the federal government 
in relation to local interests and efforts. Texans, for the most part, expected to 
advance their settlements with little to no opposition, fully anticipating that 
Indigenous peoples would be removed (which in the extreme could mean 
extermination) or at least recede. “Nothing but an abiding disposition to respect 
the laws of the State and a wish to act in concert with the policy of the United 
States Government in respect to her Indians,” Bell explained, “have restrained a 
regular and systematic organization with a view to the extermination, if possible, 
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of the offending tribes.” It was also understood that the federal government would 
provide the requisite troops, meeting all expenses for that purpose.2  
In this chapter I briefly examine the complications surrounding 
“depredations.” I first provide a short overview of the political context of cross 
border raiding followed by a cursory summary of approaches to attacks against 
Anglo settlements. The remainder of the chapter investigates case studies of 
“depredations.” Each vignette of border conflict reveals the presence of 
Mexicanos in a variety of capacities, especially as victims and defenders. 
Surprisingly, Anglos were also present or played a part in the incursions that were 
consistently attributed to Indians. In juxtaposing these particular episodes of 
violence I suggest that the discursive boundaries that accepted Indigenous peoples 
as the exclusive authors of “depredations” were constructed in favor of Anglos, a 
frontier group as equally responsible for depredations as the others. 
Initially, Texas state policy refused to provide any portion of land for the 
relocation and settlement of its indigenous inhabitants. This forced native peoples 
into reservations outside of Texas. Indian agents and military officers responsible 
for peace on the “frontier” decried Texas’ policy of appropriating as much land as 
possible and allocating it to settlers. Secretary of War Conrad, a consistent critic 
of Texas’ policy, lamented in 1852 that “it is understood that she acknowledges 
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no right of occupancy in the Indians within her border, but proceeds to lay off her 
territory into counties, and, as fast as it is needed, to sell it, without assigning any 
portion of it to them, or providing in any other mode for their support.”3  
Texas’ ambitious settlement plan produced a great deal of conflict, forcing 
Governor George T. Wood to plea for a line of forts from the Red River to the Rio 
Grande. Aware of Wood’s urgent request, on January 19, 1850 Secretary of War 
George Crawford dismissively reminded the Governor “that if Texas be not now 
properly protected as a State, as a republic she was more inadequately defended.”4  
However, it was not long before state and local leaders became convinced 
that the federal government was indifferent to their settlement and, more to the 
point, their security needs. What locals perceived as federal ambivalence inspired 
local leaders to look to volunteer forces of militia or minute men and, notably, 
ranger companies as solutions. Bell was explicit on this point: 
It is hoped that the General Government will promptly interpose by 
adopting a policy that will require the withdrawal of the Indians, or else 
establish a line of military posts at such intervals as will guarantee peace 
and security to our afflicted frontier. Skillful, energetic mounted troops, in 
sufficient numbers, can alone effect this object. 
 
The struggle between national and local responsibility for frontier defense meant 
the federal government’s fiscal responsibility in compensating the Texas state 
treasury for expenditures incurred in defending the Indian and Mexican frontiers. 
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Governor Bell and the legislature were adamant in their view that “the United 
States must secure her tranquility and provide for her defence [sic] –and if this 
principle be not true the relation is not properly understood.”5 
Although funding and properly supplying the necessary amount of troops 
to deal with hostile neighbors drove Texas’ overriding security concern, the 
federal government’s interests were necessarily much broader. The federal 
frontier defense policy that emerged immediately following the US-Mexico War 
remained changed little for most of the period. General Orders No. 13 issued in 
February 1849 by Brevet Major General William Worth outlined the federal 
position. According to Thomas Smith, “Worth instructed unit commanders to 
protect the lives and property of citizens, to prevent ‘as far as practicable’ Indians 
from the United States crossing to raid in Mexico, and finally to protect non-
hostile Indians against violence and injustice.” “The mission,” Smith concludes, 
“outlined the basic operational task of army troops in Texas for the entire period 
of the Indian wars.”6 Amidst the major crisis of the Civil War, the goals and 
challenges of frontier defense remained the same both during and after the Civil 
War. As David Smith argues the “three major problems of frontier defense” 
persisted through the nation’s crisis. “Their solutions for using regular troops and 
Rangers to combat the Indian and Mexican threats, for easing strained finances, 
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and for answering the constant demand for protection of the frontier counties 
mirrored the situation that faced Texas leaders during the Civil War.”7 
Displaced from hunting grounds and any claims to the land, many 
Indigenous peoples successfully exploited the newly formed international border, 
pursuing a border war against Anglos and Mexicanos on both sides of the river. 
Unexamined in the presentation of Indian wars are the motivations for the border 
warfare of Indigenous nations. Few studies critically examine Indian warfare as 
part of a complicated response to both Anglo and Mexican expansion. Much of 
the literature treats this conflict as nothing more than the accumulation of Indian 
depredations with different degrees of intensity, a process that was as much a 
natural part of the region as the landscape. This approach cannot account for the 
critical role indigenous peoples played in assisting the ranger, militia and federal 
military units during specific campaigns.8 
Bands depredated communities in Mexico and Texas resenting the 
encroachment of settlements. Periodical uprisings or attacks, which have been 
                                                 
7 David P. Smith, Frontier Defense in the Civil War: Texas’ Rangers and Rebels (College Station: 
Texas A & M Press, 1992): 3. 
8 Robert Utley, “A Chained Dog: The Indian-Fighting Army, Military Strategy on the Western 
Frontier,” The American West 10:4 (July 1973); Robert Wooster, “The Army and the Politics of 
Expansion: Texas and the Southwestern Borderlands, 1870-1886” Southwestern Historical 
Quarterly 93 (October 1989): 151-167; Thomas Smith, “US Army Combat Operations in the 
Indian Wars of Texas, 1849-1881” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 99: 4 (April 1996): 501-
531; Robert M. Utley, Frontiersman in Blue: The United State Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967); Frontier Regular: The United States Army and the 
Indian, 1866-1891 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); The Indian Frontier of the 
American West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984). 
 93
described above as guerrilla warfare, undermined settlements, disrupted 
communication and travel, forced expenditures of resources for protection, 
displaced settlers, and sustained an ambiance of fear. The mails, travel and 
transportation of goods, including livestock, were completely disrupted by the 
incursions of small Indigenous bands who crossed borders with impunity. The 
successful depredations of captives, livestock, merchandise as well as the 
disruption of mail and transportation lines created an international crisis that on 
occasion brought the US and Mexico to the brink of war.  
Although control or elimination of Indigenous peoples and the protection 
of settler’s property and their persons along the frontier may be readily accepted 
then, as now, as the fundamental goals of frontier defense, a number of other 
important elements within that equation remain unexamined. First, the project of 
frontier defense was not exclusive to the US or Texas but also occupied the 
Mexican government and local Mexican officials throughout the tier of northern 
states along the newly established international boundary. Mexico had inherited 
the policies and strategies of Spain and while able to claim some early successes 
following independence the young Republic struggled throughout with 
Indigenous resistance. 
Some scholars bristle at the suggestion that the federal policy towards the 
nation’s earliest inhabitants was just short of annihilation. In many ways, federal 
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authorities manifest an ambivalence reflected in the competing concerns of 
protecting settlers from Indigenous peoples and protecting the government’s 
wards from settlers. In spite of the unique challenges of Indian warfare, the 
army’s frontier deployment had a profound impact on its re-organization and 
professionalization. Indeed, the contradictory and conflicted Indian policy of the 
nation transformed the military into more of a constabulary force than into an 
army defending a nation. Unfortunately, the ambivalence of US federal policy and 
the challenges it posed to the frontier army is beyond the scope of this study.9 
The period immediately following the US-Mexico War inaugurated a 
succession of difficulties for maintaining security from “depredations” for both 
governments. Each nation faced the complications Indigenous peoples posed 
crossing the border and taking advantage of lucrative markets. In some instances, 
raiding bands cooperated with one government while taking advantage of the 
other. Efforts to contain highly mobile bands relocated onto a reservation often 
proved ineffective. Those settlements located on the US side were easily lured to 
take advantage of vulnerable Mexican communities just across the border.10 
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Immediately following the War of the American Intervention, the US was 
obligated by treaty to prevent the movement of hostile groups from the US across 
the border into Mexico. The failure by the US to comply with its commitment to 
share the burdens of frontier defense caused a great deal of consternation for 
Mexican officials. Luis de la Rosa, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Mexico to the United States, in 1850 expressed 
a typical concern. He wrote Secretary of State John M. Clayton regarding “the 
religious fulfillment of the obligations contracted by it towards Mexico in the said 
eleventh article of the treaty of peace, with the object of representing the inroads 
which may be made upon that nation by the wild Indigenous peoples now 
inhabiting the territories ceded to the United States.” The US’s ineffectual 
program of control, de la Rosa argued, resulted from a lack of funds and a meager 
force, making it difficult to adequately police the region. He emphasized that the 
atrocities committed by Indians threatened the “amity and commerce between the 
people of the frontiers of Mexico and of the United States which would be so 
advantageous to both republics.” According to de la Rosa the government of 
Mexico desired “that a military force may be kept on the frontier, which it is well 
assured will not be employed in any other way than in repressing the wild 
Indians.” 11 
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Five months later, de la Rosa informed Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
“that it is daily becoming more indispensable that the government of the United 
States should adopt the promptest and most active measures in order to prevent, 
conformably to the provision of the 11th article of the treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, the incursions of the Indian savages of the United States upon the 
population of the Mexican frontier.” De la Rosa believed that the incursions were 
likely, because it was the season “when the Indians make their annual incursions, 
and commit their acts of devastation and atrocity upon the frontier population of 
Mexico.”12 
De la Rosa’s concerns regarding the frontier were not unfounded. 
Secretary of War C. M. Conrad admitted as early as November 1850 “that the 
present military establishment of the country is entirely inadequate to its wants.” 
In his annual report to the President, Conrad requested funds for “increasing the 
army, and particularly of raising one or more regiments of mounted men.” 
Conrad’s request to the president was supported by the intelligence he received 
from officers in the field. Recognizing the consequences of an insufficient force 
in the region, Conrad held the government needed to explore “other means 
besides the terror of our arms.” Not only concerned with the military solution 
necessary to effectively curb depredations, Conrad investigated what might be 
some of the causes for conflict. Conrad believed that Indians were surrounded on 
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all sides by advancing settlements leading to the reduction of their hunting 
grounds which would necessarily “compel them to fall back on our weaker 
neighbors, whom, by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, we are bound to protect 
against their incursions.”13  
These insightful communications reveal that the Mexican government 
viewed the north as the meeting point between two frontiers, one Mexican and the 
other American. It also suggests that the Mexican government had no doubt that 
cooperation and trade could be pursued to the great benefit of both nations if the 
“Indian problem” could be successfully managed by the US fulfilling its treaty 
obligations. Although the United States and Mexico had successfully concluded 
the War of the American Intervention with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
hostility in the region lingered. Both de la Rosa and Clayton knew that in addition 
to the tension between the two nations, each would be faced with maintaining 
peace with the Indigenous nations along the Indian frontier. 
Both governments, at different moments, accused the other of facilitating 
Indigenous peoples hostile activity against the other. In addition to pressuring the 
US government to fulfill its treaty obligations prior to the US Civil War, the 
Mexican government pointed to the illegal commerce as a result of the illicit 
markets for stolen animals and goods obtained from vulnerable Mexican 
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settlements. American traders had supplied Indians with arms and other vital 
supplies, ultimately sustaining them, Mexican officials believed, so that they were 
more effective in terrorizing settlements throughout northern Mexico. 
Colonel Emilio Langberg and the Inspector of Military Colonies, General 
Angel Trias, alerted Major J. Van Horne of the nefarious trading of stock and 
ammunition by Benjamin Leaton with both Apaches and Comanches. Van Horne 
was forced to conclude, “I think there is no doubt but that Leaton deals 
extensively in buying mules and horses stolen by the Indians from the Mexicans, 
and in trading them off.” Of course, for Colonel Langberg the unscrupulous 
industry of Leaton justly deserved intervention by US officials given the 
obligations the one nation had to the other. Leaton “furnishes these Indians, who 
are at war with this country, with the means to carry out the war.” Indeed, 
according to Van Horne, Leaton was not the only one who profited from illicit 
commerce with Indians. “The Torrys and others carry on the same traffic; and the 
Indians are extensively supplied by traders at Santa Fe, San Miguel, &c., with 
arms and ammunition, in exchange for animals, &c. Many of these traders rove 
about among the Indians, and live with them.” The illicit trade reached such 
proportions, Major General George Brooke wrote to Governor Bell in January 
1850 and concluded that “I have, at the same time, no doubt but that all the Indian 
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traders in Texas are more or less engaged in the nefarious, illegal, and injudicious 
traffic complained of in the case of Leaton.”14 
The erasure of Mexicano and Indigenous contribution in defending and 
sustaining settlements on both sides of the border as part of the equation of 
frontier defense underscores how it had become a racial project and a crucial 
vehicle of racial formation. Moreover what constituted a depredation was 
significant in determining what conflicts achieved the status of war. Throughout 
the period, military and political leaders defined a pattern for Mexican and Indian 
depredators. A depredation could begin with a small group, two to five. Anglo 
military and political leaders insisted, in most cases, that depredations originated 
from the Mexican side of the border, arriving at a designated rendezvous point on 
the other side. Once across, the band would gather to form a larger force 
sometimes as close to ten times their original number. Once gathered they 
proceeded to steal cattle or horses driving them back across the river. Once on the 
other side in the interior they sold the cattle to ready markets along the frontier. 
Mexican officials recognized that depredations could originate on their side of the 
border, but they also insisted that expeditions started from the US side as well. 
US officials made a substantial effort to define what constituted a 
depredation. A legal definition of depredations was critical in the adjudications 
for indemnity pursued by the Court of Claims. Larry Skogen’s important study of 
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claims against the federal government for Indian depredations suggests one 
definition. “A depredation, the judges decided, included any theft or destruction 
of property, committed with malicious intent and often attended by violence.”15 
Legal definitions implied cultural values and attitudes. While Indigenous nations 
or bands might be responsible for a depredation, Anglo settlers were not linked 
with depredations except as victims. The codes “raids” and “depredations” were 
attributed primarily to Indians, as in “Indian raids” and “Indian depredations.” 
Raids or depredations were rarely if ever attributed to Anglos. Anglos 
organized punitive expeditions were rarely labeled as depredations even though in 
some cases attacks amounted to the destruction of property and malicious 
violence visited on innocents. Punitive expeditions and scouts operated with the 
legitimacy attributed to police actions or defensive military measures. Such 
claims could also evoke the legitimacy of a national or state project that evoked 
the sanctity of property, the security of political boundaries and a national interest 
of prosperity. On an international scale, the incursions into Mexico by 
paramilitary forces such as the Texas Rangers were on occasion labeled 
filibusters, but even filibusters suggested a specific kind of political legitimacy. 
Anglo violence continued long after the US-Mexico War had ended. An 
example of Anglo impunity took place in January of 1850 when Charles Stillman 
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and associates rode into the Palmito Ranch. Stillman had been robbed earlier and 
he and his men were determined to recover his stolen property and punish the 
culprits. Stillman “got together a force of Americans” from Brownsville and 
rounded up the entire population of the ranch, ordering them tied and whipped 
until they delivered the malefactors. Stillman’s interrogation revealed that the 
guilty party was Juan Chapa Guerra and that he was at Ranchito. Once Stillman’s 
men found the man they believed to be responsible for the theft, he informed them 
that they could “do what they pleased with him.”16 
It was not until after Chapa had been “whipped and then killed” at the 
hands of Stillman’s associates that an investigation not only “disclosed the 
horrible proceedings of the murder” but also uncovered that Stillman and his men 
had incorrectly identified the accused victim. The confusion resulted from a lethal 
cultural barrier. The one guilty of the original theft was allegedly one Juan Chapa 
Garcia, not Juan Chapa Guerra. The outraged family of the wronged Juan Chapa 
Guerra sought legal remedy, but they could find no lawyers in Brownsville 
willing to challenge Stillman.17  
Much later, the 1873 Mexican Committee of Investigation concluded that 
as a notable person of considerable resources Stillman “exercised a controlling 
influence in Brownsville,” explaining, in part, why such a grave miscarriage of 
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justice remained unpunished.18 Stillman could boast of a great deal of influence in 
Brownsville as a result of a number of successful commercial ventures in the 
region. During the US-Mexican War Stillman supplied General Zachary Taylor’s 
army with goods delivered from the Gulf of Mexico up the Rio Grande. 
Following the war, Stillman continued to profit. His success was due, to some 
extent, on the purchase of large tracts of disputed lands made available to him by 
Sabos Cavazos. In Texas courts, Anglos such as Stillman were able to take 
advantage of the diminished legal standing of the Spanish and Mexican legal 
apparatus adjudicating communally held lands. Stillman, for example, profited 
handsomely by establishing the Brownsville Town Company with the land he so 
easily acquired with Cavazos aid. After converting the property into lots, he easily 
disposed of most the tracts for a considerable profit. As a result of his early 
successes, Stillman developed “a trade and manufacturing nexus” throughout 
Northeastern Mexico and South Texas, dominating “large scale trade, finance, 
and landholding in the Rio Grande Valley.” At one point, Stillman and associate 
Richard King hoped to further solidify their investments and holdings by 
supporting Jose Maria Carvajal’s unsuccessful attempt to establish the Republic 
of the Sierra Madre.19 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 John Mason Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico Since the Civil War 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002): 23-24. Later, as Mexican liberals struggled to rid 
themselves of the occupying French forces through a widespread guerrilla war, José María 
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John Hart adds that Stillman and other prominent Anglos such as Richard 
King established their commercial empires through their effective use of 
paramilitary force. “From the 1850s to the mid 1870s,” John Hart explains, “their 
controversial claims to these properties were backed up by the Texas Rangers, the 
U.S. Army, and their own private armies. For years their militias fought the 
Mexicans who confiscated cattle and burned ranches in retaliation for their 
displacement. The titles were still in dispute in Texas courtrooms at the end of the 
twentieth century.”20 
Mexicanos were also linked semantically to criminal activity. The code 
“bandits” was applied almost exclusively to Mexicanos, referring mostly to illicit 
cross border activity. Officials often revealed their cultural bias against 
Mexicanos by suggesting they were no more than sedentary Indians. In addition, 
the common sense attitudes regarding Mexican officials assumed that they 
avariciously colluded with Indians and bandits by providing safe refuge, access to 
markets, and sabotaging legal procedures to extradite or otherwise prosecute 
known offenders. In most cases, this claim was based on the additional common 
sense that Mexicanos and Indigenous peoples lived and worked closely together. 
                                                                                                                                     
Carbajal, as governor of the state of Tamaulipas, used his influence with men like Charles 
Stillman to raise funds to purchase arms. However, much of Carbajal’s fund raising efforts were 
marred by excessively generous terms for bonds and land. See, Hart, Empire and Revolution, pp. 
11-12. 
20 Ibid. 
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The coupling of Indian to depredation or raid and Mexican to bandit, is 
crucial in establishing the discursive strategies that criminalized non-Anglo 
groups. Luigi Bonante has identified similar associations with terrorism. The 
association of a term such as terrorism, according to Bonante, “is more the result 
of a verdict than the establishing of a fact; the formulating of a social judgment 
rather than a description of a set of phenomenon.” The purpose here is to expose 
the manner in which the semantics of depredations, raids, and banditry are 
discursively organized. The criminal activity semantically associated in such a 
manner must, Edward Said warns, “be considered as other historical and social 
phenomena are considered, as something created by human beings in the world of 
human history.” Challenging the “concatenation of assumptions” that link 
“terrorism” with Arabs and Islam, Said points to the “techniques of 
decontextualization and dehistorization” that have operated in colonial and post-
colonial contexts. Indigenous peoples within the US have similarly suffered from 
the process of classification “that quite ignored historical specificity, proportion 
or concrete analysis.”21 
Unfortunately, the literature on Indian Wars never surpasses very basic 
descriptions of Indigenous peoples. “In this clash of cultures,” Smith explains, 
                                                 
21 As quoted in Philip Elliott, Graham Murdock, and Philip Schlesinger, “‘Terrorism’ and the 
State: A Case Study of the Discourses of Television,” in Richard Collins, et. al. Media, Culture, 
and Society: A Critical Reader (London: Sage, 1986): 265, 284. Edward Said, “Identity, Negation 
and Violence,” New Left Review 171 (September/October 1998): 47-48. 
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“Anglos in the West tended to regard Indian society as homogenous and 
monolithic.” Anglos expected Indigenous populations to posses “a policy making 
hierarchy like republican white culture.”22 Especially revealing of the cultural bias 
regarding Indigenous social organization was the narrow view of Indigenous 
society and the disparaging approach to the Indian warrior. One example suffices 
to illustrate the point: “Since an Indian man had no honorable profession except 
that of a warrior, and a great many horses could buy a fine wife, the nearness of a 
rich and oftentimes vulnerable enemy encouraged raiding.”23 The limited 
ethnographic claims support a representation as only predatory. Authors have 
been content to describe Indian styles of warfare, by celebrating their 
horsemanship and conceding a limited notion of honor peculiar to a warrior 
culture. Indeed, indigenous social organization is presented in such a manner as to 
highlight their mobility, reliance on the horse, aversion to sedentary lifestyles. 
These crude sorts of ethnographies simply represented Indigenous peoples as 
inveterate thieves or mindless warriors. 
By January 1858, Robert S. Neighbors, Supervising Agent for Texas 
Indians, complained that the most recent depredations were explained by “the fact 
that the government has entirely failed in making suitable provisions for those 
bands of Indians and placing them under proper control, when the Indians 
                                                 
22 T. Smith, “U.S. Army Combat Operations in the Indian Wars of Texas,” p. 513. 
23 Allen Lee Hamilton, Sentinel of the Southern Plains: Fort Richardson and the Northwest Texas 
Frontier, 1866-1878 (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1988): 18. 
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themselves have repeatedly agreed to the measure, than to any failure on the part 
of the Indian agents of Texas or the military authorities to perform faithfully the 
duties intrusted [sic] to them.” The continued inattention, and more importantly, 
the lack of sufficient funds, Neighbors argued, would lead to the  
continual censure by the citizens of the State, the friendly Indians on the 
reserves brought into jeopardy, and unless measures are adopted at at [sic] 
early date to relieve our frontier from the forays of the depradating bands 
it will be impossible to prevent the people of Texas from making an 
indiscriminate war upon the Indians, that will endanger the peace of our 
whole frontier.24  
 
The failure of a nascent reservation policy meant settlements were 
vulnerable and forced, on some occasions, to attend to their own protection. 
Neighbors painted a picture of state indifference and resources totally insufficient 
to its needs. However, Texas received a greater proportion of military resources, 
including the number of personnel stationed in the West. In fact, Texas boasted 
having over one half of the personnel deployed for frontier protection within its 
state boundaries.25 
The problem of associating depredations exclusively with Indians could 
have legal repercussions for settlers who sought financial compensation from the 
government for their losses. Fanny Harris’ depredation claim, for example, was 
                                                 
24 U.S. House, Protection of the Frontier of Texas, 35th Cong. 2nd Sess., Ex. Doc. 27, p. 11. 
25 U.S. House, Message to the President of the United States, 31st Cong. 2nd Sess., Ex. Doc. 1, p. 
3. See also, George Klos, “‘Out People Could Not Distinguish One Tribe From Another’: The 
1859 Expulsion of the Reserve Indians from Texas,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 97:4 
(April 1994): 599-619. 
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disallowed because Mexicanos participated in the depredation. Harris claimed that 
in May 1866 she lost seven horses. A year later in March 1867 she complained of 
losing four more. In February 1870 she lost another three horses. The following 
year she sustained the largest loss of seventeen horses. In testimony filed before 
the Robb Commission, Harris stated, “since moving to the Pendencia ranch I have 
lost 4 horses. I succeeded in getting back from Mexico 1 horse. I have heard of 
cattle bearing my brand in Mexico. Some were recovered there and sold.” 
Ultimately, Harris proclaimed that over the entire period of her troubles she lost 
1,250 cattle and 11 horses. Assistant Attorney-General John Thompson asserted 
that claims filed by Fanny Harris, and the related cases of Juan Saminago and 
Theodore Terry, “were committed by Mexicans or Mexicans and Indians from the 
Republic of Mexico, for which no recovery can be had under the Indian 
depredation act of March 3, 1891.” Thompson recommended that the petitions of 
Fanny Harris, Juan Saminago, and Theodore Terry be dismissed given “that there 
can be but one deduction drawn from these facts, and that is that all depredations 
committed in Maverick, Dimmit, and other border counties of Texas prior to the 
year 1873 (and possibly subsequent to that date), were committed by Mexicans, or 
Mexicans and Indians, from Mexico.”26 
                                                 
26 Fanny A. Harris, Juan Saminago, Theodore Terry v. The United States and Comanche Indians, 
in the Court of Claims of the United States, Indian Depredations; case folder 7615; Records of the 
U.S. Court of Claims, Record Group 123; National Archives and Records Administration, 
Washington D.C. Hereafter cited as “Indian Depredations, U.S. Court of Claims.” 
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Martin Amador And The Risks Of Mexican Freighters 
Much of the success of merchants and freighters depended on their ability 
to secure government contracts supplying local military posts. Mexicanos 
involved in transport and trade, although initially dominant in the field, lost 
ground to Anglos and other foreign merchants, especially after the 1860s. As 
merchant opportunities were increasingly closed off to Mexicanos, many took up 
less lucrative commercial opportunities by cutting and hauling hay and other 
perishable supplies for local military installations.27 The persistent threat of 
depredations could create substantial, if not debilitating, financial risks. While 
border war usually made commercial success much more precarious, it could also 
create profitable opportunities.  
The business career of Martin Amador illustrates the risks and potential 
profits for Mexicano merchants and freighters. Amador initially subcontracted for 
John Lemon “cutting and hauling hay” for the troops under the command of 
General West at Las Cruces.28 In 1870 Lemon lived in Dona Ana and by the age 
                                                 
27 Darlis Miller, Soldiers and Settlers: Military Supply in the Southwest, 1861-1885 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1989). 
28 “Martin Amador;” case folder 8450; “Indian Depredations, U.S. Court of Claims.” On April 
29th, 1898 Manuel Flores, Notary Public for the county of El Paso, took the deposition of Martin 
Amador in the matter before the US Court of Claims of the regarding two Indian depredations on 
October 25, 1863 and January 22, 1864. In addition to the testimony provided by Amador, Julio 
Mayo, who worked for Amador as a teamster, was also deposed. Later, on May 14th, 1898 Pedro 
Melenudo and on June 18th, 1898 Clemente Montoya, men also employed by Amador, testified on 
Amador’s behalf. Amador’s petition, #8450, was part of an Indian depredation claim. Claims were 
systematically investigated following the reorganization and codification of rules and regulations 
in 1872 and the reorganization of indemnity for Indian “depredations” as a result of the Indian 
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of thirty-eight boasted of $40,000 in personal assets, succeeding as a dry goods 
merchant, wholesaler, and retailer. By comparison, at thirty-three, Amador 
claimed only $14,000 in personal assets the same year. While Amador appears to 
be less successful at the time, both men were important parts of a network of 
freighters and merchants who profited from the Santa Fe and Chihuahua trade and 
linked the region to expanding markets.29 
Amador sued the federal government hoping to receive compensation for 
two depredations in 1864. The first depredation took place on October 25th 1864, 
about twenty-five miles east of Las Cruces at the foot of the Oregon Mountains. 
In the early morning darkness, a group of Mescalero Apaches stole a bell mare, 
nine American mules, and a yoke of oxen from the camp of Amador’s freighting 
outfit. Mescaleros had surrounded the camp, waiting under cover of darkness in 
nearby mesquite bushes. Although designated herders were on watch, they failed 
to awaken the others in camp until it was too late. The Mescalero intruders had 
quietly lead the bell mare away with the mules in tow. “We as teamsters,” Mayo 
explained, “took care of the stock all the time, but as the Indians were such 
scoundrels they took it in front of our very nose.” Once alerted, Amador and his 
                                                                                                                                     
Appropriation Act, March 1885. Later, an act of Congress in March 1891 shifted the jurisdiction 
of cases to the US Court of Claims, In order for claimants to prove indemnity, they were required 
to verify the value of the property, the amount taken or destroyed and that it “was being properly 
guarded and cared for, and that the loss thereof was not occasional by the negligence or 
carelessness of himself [claimant] or employees.” Investigations of claims in the field began in 
1889.  
29 Susan Calafante Boyle, Los Capitalistas, Hispano Merchants and the Santa Fe Trade 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997): 154, 161. 
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men followed the raiding party towards the Sacramento Mountains, chasing the 
band for close to ten miles.30 
On a second occasion, Mescaleros attacked a work party of over forty men 
in the afternoon of January 22nd, 1864. “I had,” Amador recalled, “a big fight with 
the Mescalero Apache Indians while they were trying to carry away my property, 
and they killed three of my men.” Amador’s crew had been cutting grama hay 
when they were caught off guard by a Mescalero attack. During the assault, the 
Mescaleros destroyed or stole all the camp provisions, including flour, rice, beans, 
bacon, sugar and blankets. Despite the risk to their own lives, Amador and some 
of his men chased the raiding party. Overwhelmed by the invasion, Amador was 
not beyond asking for assistance from the army. Amador had pleaded to General 
West for protection for his workforce. “He said,” Amador later recalled, “he did 
not have troops enough to protect himself.”31 
The Apaches were consistent and effective raiders remembered one of 
Amador’s men. “They did not have to be provoked,” Clemente Montoya, who 
was in Amador’s employ at the time and later testified on his behalf, remarked  
“they were around stealing from everybody.” “They used to come and steal horses 
and cows and oxen and everything right out of the corrals,” explained Montoya. 
                                                 
30 “Amador;” “Indian Depredations, U.S. Court of Claims.” 
31 Ibid. 
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“The Indians,” he concluded, “were the only thieves in this country at that time; 
Mexicans and Americans did not steal then; the Indians had a monopoly.”32 
Despite the losses he suffered at the hands of Mescaleros, Amador 
continued to succeed in his business affairs. In the 1870s he successfully 
expanded his freighting operation from local subcontracting to a more substantial 
enterprise, covering points from Santa Fe, Chihuahua, Silver City and Bayard. 
Making Las Cruces the center of his operations, he established a livery stable and 
a hotel, both of which were originally developed to serve freighters that traveled 
through Las Cruces and Mesilla. Later, when freighting as an industry underwent 
a dramatic transformation as a result of the arrival of the railroad, Amador 
invested in a hotel that eventually became the center of social and cultural life. 
Amador translated his business success into political victories as well. He served 
the region as a Deputy United States Marshall and a Probate Judge. As a result of 
his economic and political success Amador and his family played a prominent 
role in the social and cultural life of the region, maintaining important liaisons 
with prominent families in both Mexico and the Southwest.33 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Amador also succeeded as an inventor of agricultural tools. His daughter Emilia attended the 
Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893 in the hope that she might secure the patent for the 
Amador Combination Plow. Not far from the very hall that Frederick Jackson Turner delivered his 
seminal address on the American Frontier, Martin Amador’s daughter represented her father’s 
contribution to the settling of the West. Sandra L. Stephens, “The Women of the Amador Family, 
1860-1940,” in Joan Jensen and Darlis Miller, eds., New Mexico Women: Intercultural 
Perspectives (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986): 259; 260; 263. 
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In spite of Amador’s many successes, the men who had once worked for 
him came to resent him. A great social distance had developed between them. The 
men once in his employ had occasion to testify on behalf of their old employer 
regarding the claims against the government for depredations. In his testimony, 
Montoya revealed the social chasm that had grown between the men. When asked 
if Amador used “the ordinary prudence and care in protecting his stock” that 
would be expected of any man at that time, Montoya responded curiously. “He 
used to be a very good man,” Montoya replied, “he is not so good now because he 
is Americanized.” Montoya added, “I don’t like Americans.” Amador “took the 
oath of allegiance to the United States” in the Doña Ana plaza when the American 
forces gathered residents in 1846. Since that time, Amador, as did so many others 
who took similar oaths, considered himself a citizen. Despite Amador’s assertions 
of his citizenship, he took naturalization papers sometime in the 1860s. 
“Because,” he later claimed, “it was considered to more secure by having 
papers.”34 
The Country Between Tularosa And El Paso Was Treacherous 
Freighters from the El Paso valley had grown accustomed to responding to 
attacks by local Indigenous bands without waiting for the organized efforts of a 
ranger company or federal military force to support them. One example of the 
immediate collective responses to the hardships endured by West Texas settlers 
                                                 
34 “Amador;” “Indian Depredations, U.S. Court of Claims.” 
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and freighters was the depredation visited on Ward Blanchard. As the Blanchard 
case illustrates the burdens of frontier defense were shared by all frontier 
denizens. Blanchard, a successful freighter from Ysletea, had in his employ Inez 
Sais, Perfecto Mendoza, Sebastian Herrera, Gregorio Carrer, Jose Provencio and 
other local residents as teamsters. Benito Ojas and Jose Maria Montoya served as 
mule herders while Rosendo Corlew assisted the wagon master. John Butler lead 
the men and the freight train which delivered lumber to El Paso on six wagons 
with sixty-five mules.35 
All agreed that the country between Tularosa and El Paso was treacherous. 
Many local freighters, such as Ysleta resident Jose Maria Gonzales, often refused 
contracts in the region fearing attack from nearby Indians. Men knowledgeable 
about freighting believed the threat of attack made it unsafe for a train of less than 
ten men and six wagons. The country was not only treacherous but the few 
available watering holes made a freighting outfit especially vulnerable to attack. 
Sais and Butler later testified that the country between Tularosa and El Paso was 
“rough, mountainous and uninhabited,” with only three places for water.  
On May 12, 1872 Blanchard’s outfit left Ysleta for Tularosa arriving eight 
days later. They remained at the Tularosa Mill for two more days before returning 
to Ysleta loaded with valuable lumber. On the night of the 25th of May, Ojas, the 
                                                 
35 The following discussion of Ward Blanchard relies on “Ward Blanchard;” case folder 377; 
“Indian Depredations, U.S. Court of Claims.”. 
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chief herder, discovered raiders attempting to separate some of the mules. Ojas 
fired at them, waking the entire camp and forcing the intruders to flee. Again, on 
the morning of the 28th, Ojas and Montoya notified Butler that Indians “were 
lurking in the vicinity of the train and watching its movements.” Due to the 
scarcity of water, the difficulty of the remaining road and the threat posed by the 
vigilant Indians, the train left the trail and camped near Soledad Springs. The 
party was reluctant to go on since the road ahead had a number of arroyos, 
making them vulnerable to an ambush. Once they camped that evening they took 
“unusual precautions,” posting two squads of guards of three men each, with 
relief shifts scheduled for 11 p.m. and 2 a.m, to watch over the mules.  
Sometime during the changing of the guard, without much difficulty, 
Mescaleros stole twenty-five of the party’s best mules. Butler believed that “the 
best mules” were taken so easily since they were so accessible. According to 
Butler, the best ones “wander more in order to get the best grass and picking.” 
The missing mules were not discovered until 3 a.m. when the entire camp was 
awakened by the alarm. Butler immediately sent one man to notify Blanchard and 
assembled four others, including Sais, Ojas, Herrera and Mendoza to pursue the 
fleeing Mescaleros. The hastily organized scout picked up the “fresh and easily 
followed” trail of footprints, dung, and bloody sticks. At San Augustine Springs 
ten soldiers joined the party. The combined force tracked the thieves through the 
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San Augustine, San Nícolas, and San Andreas mountains until the trail ended at 
the White Mountains. The scout returned to the camp on the evening of the 29th, 
once it appeared hopeless and their animals began to give out. 
When word arrived in Ysleta that Blanchard’s train had been attacked and 
mules stolen, a number of local residents responded without hesitation. Demitrio 
Barela gathered eight of his own mules and an equal number of armed men as a 
volunteer company began to take shape. Blanchard, who had himself just returned 
to Ysleta, assembled more men and hired another eight mules from Jose Maria 
Gonzales. The hastily organized party left on the evening of the 29th and “traveled 
all night as fast as the animals would go. The next day Blanchard, Alderete and 
two Indians from Ysleta, traveled towards Fort Stanton and the Mescalero 
Reservation, “believing that said Indians belonged to that reservation.” They 
trailed their attackers to the White Mountains near the Mescalero Apache Indian 
Reservation where they discovered one of Blanchard’s mules dead on the trail. 
Barela who was left in charge of the base camp at Soledad Springs was 
forced to deal with a band of Mescaleros who harassed him and his men. Despite 
a heavy rain, they crowded the encamped train, occasionally moving nearer 
Barela’s camp until, with each successive step, they came within two hundred 
yards. They were so close to Barela’s camp there was little doubt the enemy was 
able to gauge the strength of the remnants of the freighting party. Alarmed by the 
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Mescaleros provocative actions and suspecting that the scouting party had meant 
a terrible fate, Barela sent an expressman to El Paso. Later Barela discovered that 
the messenger had himself become lost, arriving at El Paso on the same day 
Barela and the rest of the freighting outfit returned. The presence of the vigilant 
Mescaleros prevented the watering of the remaining mules and the sixteen 
additional animals Blanchard had brought with him, forcing a special trip to San 
Augustine Springs to water the stock. Exhausted from the delay, on June 2 the 
train began the return trip to El Paso, arriving late in the evening of the next day.  
Blanchard suffered financially as a result of the depredation. The market 
for “train mules,” usually purchased from Mexico or San Antonio, was poor, 
making it difficult to procure additional wagons or men in order to secure 
freighting contracts. Unable to freight during the months of June, July and August 
Blanchard lost his competitive advantage. Butler estimated that Blanchard had 
“the principal freighting business, particularly for long distance, in the El Paso 
valley,” but was severely hurt by the loss suffered in May. Barela concurred, 
believing that Blanchard “had to a great extent the control of the freighting 
business in the El Paso valley on the American side.” Alderete, who had once 
been Blanchard’s wagon master and claimed to be very familiar with Blanchard’s 
freighting outfit, estimating Blanchard’s outfit at six large wagons pulled by ten 
mules each. He also had two smaller wagons driven by four mules for provisions 
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and “camp outfit.” Sais assessed Blanchard’s twenty-two mules at $150 each 
amounting to a total of $3,300.  
Unable to maintain a full train Blanchard joined his four wagons to the 
freighting operation of Gonzales and to another owned by Mauricio Barela, 
combining their efforts to freight to Fort Davis and Fort Stockton. Despite 
Blanchard’s setback, Sais continued to work for him during September, October, 
and November hauling flour to Forts Davis and Stanton, a trip that usually took 
twenty-for days.  
The Nueces Town Raid  
The aftermath of the US Civil War brought renewed conflict to the border 
region. In discussing the period, most historians have relied on a readily accepted 
narrative of Mexican depravity and, more importantly, political immaturity. The 
result has been the articulation of a number of interdependent themes including 
Mexico’s predisposition for “revolutions;” covetousness of US wealth, especially 
in cattle; the Mexican side of the border dotted with centers for smuggling; and 
the omnipresence of military chieftains in the habit of extorting funds from honest 
businessmen, especially successful Americans. “The post-Civil War period in 
South Texas,” explains William Hager, “witnessed a virtual reign of terror in 
outlawry and brigandage.” The following summary by Hager shares many of the 
assumptions held by most historians of the region:  
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Cattle thieves infested every range between the Nueces River and the Río 
Grande. These ranges were raided so frequently by 1875 a lucrative trade 
in stolen cattle and horses had developed on the Mexican side of the river. 
Not only did raiders herd cattle over the border on the hoof; they also 
engaged in the brutal if less profitable business of stripping the carcasses 
and hauling only the hides to markets across the border. From this 
enterprise in hide skinning, or ‘hide-peeling’ as it was called, it was only a 
step further to the looting and burning of ranch homes, and even the 
murdering of occupants. Along the roads, travelers suffered a similar fate. 
The whole country as far north as the Nueces was being pillaged and 
terrorized.36 
 
Mexicano complicity in the system of theft was also a major issue. “Many 
Mexican-Americans,” argues Hager, “either worked in collusion with raiders 
from across the border, or were so intimidated by them that they remained silent 
even when having knowledge of their whereabouts and activities.”37 
The entrepreneurial landowners of southern Texas promoted trade with 
Mexico, the exploitation of its minerals, and even the occupation of its 
lands. At the same time, these new American elites demanded the 
Mexican government’s protection from the raids. The violence at the 
border, coupled with Lerdo’s hostile attitude toward their troubles, 
frustrated their plans for the development and expansion of mining and 
ranching ventures in northeastern Mexico. The oncoming railroads would 
provide access to Mexican ‘treasures’ and increase American control in 
the area.38 
 
John Hart offers a decidedly different perspective from interpretations that 
stress Mexican underdevelopment and lawlessness. The regime of Mexican 
President Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, according to Hart, faced opposition from 
                                                 
36 William M. Hager, “The Nuecestown Raid of 1875: A Border Incident,” Arizona and the West 
1: 3 (Autumn, 1959): 258-9. 
37 Ibid. 
38 John Mason Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico Since the Civil War 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002): 54. 
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ambitious Americans eager to pursue ranch, mineral and railroad investments in 
Mexico. Substantial Anglo ranchers and merchants in the Lower Rio Grande 
valley perceived Lerdo as an obstacle to their more ambitious schemes. Hart 
argues that, 
in the aftermath of the war between the United States and Mexico they 
[Anglos] had acquired private and public properties that enabled the 
creation of vast landholding on Mexican soil. The Mexicans violently 
contested American ownership of their despoiled lands, and they fought 
back with cattle raids and banditry. The attacks by aggrieved Mexican 
nationals against the Rio Grande Valley landholders had abated during 
Mexico’s war with its French invaders, but in the late 1860s the fighting 
renewed, and it continued during the early 1870s. General Juan Cortina, an 
officer honored by the Mexican government for battlefield heroism, a 
former governor of Tamaulipas, and mayor of Matamoros, led the 
efforts.39 
 
One notable episode of border violence during this period that exposes the 
complexity of violence in the region occurred just twelve miles outside of Corpus 
Christi. Brigadier General C. C. Augur proclaimed it “the most serious raid made 
by Mexicans into our territory for many years.” Governor Richard Coke informed 
the President “a large party of these robbers [foreign desperadoes] penetrated the 
interior as far as within eighteen miles of Corpus Christi, robbing stores and 
ranches, and murdering and capturing citizens, and capturing and destroying 
United States mails.” Coke appealed to President U. S. Grant “to give security to 
the people on the Rio Grande border, in view of the assurance I now give you that 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
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an extreme necessity exists for it.”40 On Friday, March 26, 1875 close to thirty 
armed Mexicanos accompanied by three Americans, all well armed, descended on 
the home of S. H. Page just seven miles outside of Nueces town. After robbing 
and imprisoning Page and his two sons, the band plundered the home of John C. 
McCampbell. On the road, moving from ranch to ranch, they hijacked travelers, 
robbing them and holding them prisoners. Soon afterwards the raiders gathered at 
the store of Fred Frank located on the ranch of Juan Saen only three miles outside 
of town. Elojio Garza, a servant of the Franks for twenty years, confronted the 
marauders. Garza refused to reveal the whereabouts of Frank. Garza allegedly 
recognized one of the thieves, forcing the rogque to quickly dispatch Garza.41  
The raiders released the female prisoners and drove the male captives 
before them. They arrived at Nueces town and descended on the store of Thomas 
Noakes sometime around dusk. Noakes wounded one of the intruders and quickly 
hid to save himself, leaving his wife to confront the brigands. She made every 
effort to extinguish the flames that leapt around her, valiantly struggling to protect 
her home and property. The marauders fled as soon as a posse led by Nuecestown 
Sherriff John McClane made its approach. The McClane posse captured the one 
raider who was shot by Noakes and left behind by his companions. 
                                                 
40 U.S. House, Report and Accompanying Documents of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the 
Relations of the United States with Mexico, 45th Cong. 2nd Sess., Report 701, Appendix B 
“Mexican Border Troubles,” pp. 117-120. 
41 Hager notes that different versions have Garza being hanged. 
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The response to the raid was swift and full of wrath. “The outrages of the 
Mexicans” explains Hager, “were small in comparison with the deeds of Texans 
in the next few months.”42 The man, most likely wounded by Noakes and taken 
prisoner, was hanged just days after the raid. Volunteers were organized into 
“minute companies” in a number of neighboring counties. These organized bands 
“proceeded to outdo by far the brutality of the Mexican raiders.” According to 
Hager the minute companies hunted down “known outlaws,” but also targeted 
“innocent and peaceful Mexican-American ranchers and merchants,” burning and 
looting their property.43 Ignoring the violence meted out by the “minute 
companies,” prominent citizens, military officers, and public servants believed 
that the lower Rio Grande border region was in a state of war marked by the bold 
and organized attacks of Mexican freebooters and further up the Rio Grande by 
the depredations of Indians who either in collusion with Mexicans or simply by 
their own depravity took advantage of the refuge provided by the boundary. 
In the immediate aftermath, Governor Coke sent Adjutant General 
William Steele and Senator Joe Dwyer, who spoke Spanish fluently, to learn more 
about conditions in the region. Steele took the captive raider’s statement before he 
was hung. The information he related formed an important part of Steele’s 
investigation into the affair. Steele learned from the captured Nueces Town raider 
                                                 
42 Hager, “The Nuecestown Raid of 1875,” p. 267. 
43 Hager’s description of the retaliation inflicted by the organized minute companies relies heavily 
on accounts provided by J. Frank Dobie. See, “The Nuecestown Raid of 1875,” pp. 267-8. 
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that small parties departed from La Bolsa and rendezvoused under the cover of 
darkness “about twenty miles form where they commenced their operations.” 
After being joined with another party with fresh horses they concealed themselves 
under the cover of timber for several days, waiting for more men to join them. 
Once it was clear no others were arriving, they proceeded to their first target. The 
condemned prisoner explained that he was recruited for what he believed would 
only be robbery, believing that no one was to be harmed. Steele surmised that 
“there is no question but that expedition was intended to have been of larger 
proportions, and that Corpus Christi was the objective point; but dissensions 
among themselves reduced the numbers so much that they dared not attack so 
large a place.” Steele’s investigation further revealed more details of the prisoner. 
In a happier time he was a citizen of Victoria, Mexico, who later had the fortune 
to marry and work on a ranch not far from Brownsville.44 
The investigation exposed an unsavory truth of border warfare: Anglo 
terror. “Undoubtedly,” Dwyer concluded, “robberies and murders by Mexicans 
from Mexico have almost continually been perpetrated in Texas, but in retaliation 
Americans have committed terrible outrages on citizens of Mexican origin.” 
During their investigation, Dwyer and Steele had learned of one instance that took 
place in Bee County. “We heard of a Mexican,” Dwyer related, “a quiet citizen 
(so reported to be by the presiding justice of the peace of the county, an 
                                                 
44 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report 701, “Mexican Border Troubles,” p. 139. 
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American), who had been brutally murdered a few days before our arrival, by 
several Americans, because (as was stated to General Steele) the Mexican would 
not go and play the fiddle for them.” Dwyer concluded: “This substantiates fully 
General Steele’s report, viz: ‘That there is a considerable element in the country 
bordering on the Nueces and west that think the killing of a Mexican no crime.’”45 
Indeed, Dwyer found the retaliation directed against innocent Mexicans 
for the Nueces raid unjustifiable. “Instead of exterminating the banditti who 
invaded Texas,” Dwyer complained, “the vengeance fell on the poor and 
unfortunate living in the country.”46 As late as May 14, 1875 Inspector General N. 
H. Davis submitted a special report documenting the condition of the Lower Rio 
Grande. Davis explained to Inspector General R. B. Marcy, that rangers in and 
around the region of the Nueces were indiscriminately attacking Mexicans. 
Ironically, Davis concluded: “There is reason to fear that they may, in their rage 
and indignation, injure innocent persons.”47 Despite the evidence made available 
in Dwyer and Steele’s investigation some border denizens refused to acknowledge 
Anglo excess. The permanent committee of the citizens of Brownsville convened 
in April 1875 concluding “a lean minority can never so oppress a preponderating 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 142. 
46 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report 701, “Mexican Border Troubles,” p. 142. 
47 Ibid., 134. 
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majority, and the absurdity of the allegation is proven by the bare presentation of 
the facts.”48  
Steele also discovered that “a party of raiders were arrested at Camargo, 
Mexico.” J. Ulrich, US Consul at Monterrey, later reported that at least ten 
prisoners passed through Monterey under guard, suggesting that Mexican officials 
were not complicit in events but making every effort to capture the remnants of 
the band. Consul Ulrich found other motives than plunder in reading the actions 
of the raiders. “There is no doubt from the conduct of these raiders,” explained 
Ulrich, “but that, although plunder was the main object, retaliation for [Colonel 
Edward] Hatch’s course entered into their plans. The taking of prisoners men and 
women, the marching them along their route, can be explained on no other 
grounds than that they wish to treat Americans as Mexicans from Las Grullas 
were treated by our military authorities.”49 Yet, not all counties suffered from 
cattle theft to the same degree or in the same way. John Vale, Deputy Collector of 
Customs at Roma, took notice of the recent shifts in violence that escalated from 
cattle theft to the looting of stores and murder. While he acknowledged that the 
raiders had “become more bold and daring,” in Starr and surrounding counties the 
targets were typically Anglos. Especially vulnerable were the few Anglos in Rio 
Grande City and Roma. “Starr County,” explained Vale,  
                                                 
48 U.S. House, Texas Frontier Troubles, 44th Cong. 1st Sess., Report no. 343, p. 55. 
49 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report 701, “Mexican Border Troubles,” pp. 120-121. 
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has not suffered much form these outrages, for the reason that outside of 
the towns of Rio Grande City and Roma (the first having about fifty and 
the latter about five Americans) are no Americans to be found. All the 
stock-raisers in this country, excepting two living at Rio Grande City, are 
Mexicans, who keep their stock well in hand and herded, and will 
frequently lose a few head of cattle which run into the stolen herds passing 
through from points farther interior; but I do not think the losses of Starr 
County sum up to over one thousand head for each year.50 
 
On April 12, 1875 General Mejia informed Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
J. M. Lafragua that the raiders may not have been Mexicanos from Mexico, but 
ethnic Mexicans residing in Texas. “By both of these [documents],” began Mejia, 
“you will be pleased to be informed of the recent events which have occurred in 
Texas, and the authors of which are said to be Mexican from our territory, which, 
in my judgment, cannot be the case.” Suggesting a complexity to the causes and 
motivations for the raids that could not be taken for granted, Mejia elaborated 
further based on the evidence that he provided with his telegram to the Minister. 
“Granting that it is correctly stated that some Mexican robbers pass from this side 
to Texas,” Mejia continued, “as also those from that side to this, they only engage 
in the robbery of cattle and horses, and never attack a town, as has occurred in the 
present case.” “For this reason,” concluded the general, “my opinion is that the 
wrongs are committed by individuals resident in Texas itself, who, in 
consequences of local State questions, have risen up as a kind of insurrectionists 
against the government of Texas.” Mejia’s more complex assessment allows for 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 137-138. 
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the strategic claims to citizenship by Mexicanos who took advantage of the 
international boundary. It also suggests an organized response to grievances 
harbored by Mexicanos who remained on the Texas side of the river.51 
Mexicanos were also targets of Anglo cattle thieves. The case of Sabas 
Cavasos is revealing. Dwyer acknowledged that the protection of property was 
often only available for “a select few.” Dwyer described Cavasos as “a good, law-
abiding Mexican citizen.” He was a well known stock raiser for a quarter of a 
century, as well as a neighbor of Richard King. “Well one of [sic] enterprising 
Americans,” explained Dwyer, “living, I believe, in Live Oak County, openly 
claims Cavazos’s brand as his own property, without any sale or transfer from 
Cavazos.” Dwyer put the issue squarely: 
Many of the citizens of Mexican origin complain bitterly that the 
safeguards and protection of the laws of the State are not usually thrown 
around their property as around that of a select few. They complain that 
the extensive beef-packeries [sic] too freely receive and butcher cattle 
bearing Mexican brands. They say that, while reports of cattle or hides, 
with A’s, B’s, and C’s, American brands and ear-marks, giving full 
description thereof, are generally properly made, when it comes to their 
property, their cattle or hides, they are usually reported simply as so many 
cattle or hides with Mexican brands, without any description thereof; 
hence their inability to trace their own property, even when sold without 
their authority.52 
 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 126. 
52 Ibid., 142. 
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The Committee of the People 
On April 29th, 1878 Mayor John M. Moore of Corpus Christi called “a 
well attended meeting of citizens” to order at Market Hall. The purpose of the 
gathering was “to make a proper representation of the condition of affairs on this 
frontier to the State and National authorities.” Local authorities regularly 
convened the community in order to respond to crises such as the one Corpus 
Christi faced that Spring. Often organized citizens would plead for immediate 
assistance usually through a petition to the governor that outlined the threat that 
confronted them.  This particular meeting was notable given that the community 
produced and later distributed a pamphlet that in all respects revealed the 
complexities of frontier defense.53 
The raid began on Sunday, April 14, 1878, when an estimated forty 
“invaders” crossed the Rio Grande near Apache Hill, not far from Fort McIntosh 
and some forty-five miles north of Laredo. The raid lasted a total of six days with 
the raiders covering an estimated three hundred sixty miles, returning to where, it 
was assumed, they began, Santa Rosa, Coahuila, Mexico. The raiding party 
consisted of a combination of Kickapoo, Lipan, and Seminole Indians, Mexicanos 
                                                 
53 The following discussion of the events in and around Corpus Christi are based on An Appeal by 
the People of the State of Texas, of the Territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande, 
prepared by certain Civil Authorities of that District, and Addressed through the Hon. Secretary 
of State of the United States, to the President, to Congress, and to the Country for Protection 
against Incursions of the Savages of the State of Cohahuila, Mexico, and, also, the History of a 
Late Murderous and Devastating Raid, with Affidavits of Eye Witnesses to the Atrocious Crimes 
Committed. (Corpus Christi: Free Press Print, 1878). 
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and an undetermined number of “white” men. The targets of the “predatory party” 
were the number of ranchos or “dwellings and circumjacent [sic] lands.” The 
raiders were indiscriminate in attacking both Mexicanos and Anglos. Some of the 
freighters and rancheros, both Anglo and Mexicano, who encountered the raiders 
lost their lives while others were more fortunate, escaping less horses, saddles, 
and utensils.  
Upon crossing the Rio Grande the band killed two “vaqueros,” then 
making their way southeast along the main road towards Laredo. At dusk they 
arrived on the edge of the rancho of Jorge Garcia, killing him and removing his 
leggings, a saddle, and a number of saddle horses. From Garcia’s rancho the 
“predatory party” shifted to the northeast riding towards the Nueces River. After 
dividing into smaller bands, they attacked “almost all of the ranchos” in the area. 
They successfully looted Henry Spohn’s place. On April 17th, the party left Webb 
and La Salle counties with “a large drove of horses.” Not long afterwards they 
targeted the ranch of William Steele, just fifteen miles from Fort Ewell. At 
Steele’s rancho they killed John Steele, William’s brother, and two of John’s 
boys.  
Steele’s ranch seemed to be a special target given that the entire raiding 
party converged nearby. The reason for the convergence was explained by it 
being “the chief objective points for the concentration of Indians when on frontier 
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raids.” The site served as a transit point. “Their exits,” the pamphlet revealed, “are 
made, generally, from this vicinity, whether they take an upper or a lower line of 
departure.”54 
Captain John Dix began the meeting with a historical overview of “the 
condition of the frontier since 1834.” Dix concluded his brief history by reciting 
the most “recent atrocities” visited upon the outlying ranchos of the region. Dix 
also assessed the federal troops stationed in the area by comparing them to the 
companies of Texans who, according to Dix, exercised considerable 
“discretionary powers.” Dix argued that the Texans were far more effective in 
Indian warfare “than a regiment of regulars.” Moved by the events that Dix 
recounted and after a number of additional presentations, the assembly 
empowered a committee “to draft suitable resolutions” regarding their defense to 
be sent to state and federal representatives.55 
The “Committee of the People,” as it was referred to, met a second time 
on May 22, 1878 in order to appoint a select few “to obtain authentic statements 
of events of the recent raid.” The Committee of the People assembled once more 
on June 4, 1878 to evaluate the affidavits that they had collected. Afterwards, the 
evidence was presented to the rest of the community and a number of notable 
guests, including former Governor E. J. Davis. Following the presentation of 
                                                 
54 An Appeal by the People of the State of Texas, pp. 6-7. 
55 Ibid., 37. 
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official statements, Captain R. Jordan touched upon “the exposure of the families 
of our frontiersman to sudden incursions of the Indians.” He also delivered “a 
heart-moving statement regarding the killing of his son.”56 
From the beginning the committee was aware of the keen interest of the 
city papers to publish their work. The business of the committee concluded, 
Mayor John M. Moore, Captain H. W. Berry, and William Headen were entrusted 
“to prepare a history of the raid from the data before the Committee, in the form 
of a memorial address to the President and Congress of the United States, and 
supported by the affidavits as taken, [and to] have the same published in pamphlet 
form, to be laid before each department of the General Government, upon the 
desk of each member of Congress, and upon the tables of the ‘press’ of the United 
States.”57 
The committee of the people reconvened for a final time on June 13, 1878 
in order that a draft of the memorial might be presented. The final document 
contained an address and a narrative of the events. Affidavits were also included. 
The Committee of the whole approved and “unanimously adopted” the document, 
ordering it to be printed. In addition, all agreed that copies of the pamphlet should 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 39. 
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be sent to “leading journals of the country” as well as state and national elected 
officials.58  
In this document we are presented with the “discourse” of frontier defense, 
a political intervention in the form of an address, a narrative of the event itself, 
and the evidence used to support the statement by the committee. The address and 
the history of “the raid” juxtaposed to the evidence provided exposes the common 
sense attitudes and popular conceptions held at the time. The brief history of the 
actual raid, the portion that comprises the text recounts the tragic events of that 
spring. The entire document reveals a great deal about the representation of 
violence. The plea for the intervention of state and federal forces exposes the 
tension between local and national interests. The relations of power produced in 
the text also rely, to a great extent, on the identities of specific groups which 
themselves fit into proscribed roles of a barely obscured master narrative. 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
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3. THE ACCIDENTS OF WAR AND REVOLUTION 
Boycotts are a form of war of position, strikes of war of movement, the secret preparation 
of weapons and combat troops belongs to underground warfare. A kind of commando 
tactics is also to be found, but it can only be utilized with great circumspection. 
Antonio Gramsci1 
 
The racial conflict between Mexicanos, who refused to surrender, and the 
occupying forces of the American army, including their irregular forces, 
prolonged the war. The cultural biases and resentments Anglos had acquired 
continued long afterward. Much of the hostility and lingering resentment spilled 
over into a series of clashes along the newly established border after the war. This 
chapter examines the Merchants War (1851-52), the Callahan Raid (1855), and 
the Cart War (1857). At the outset, it should be stated each war achieves the status 
of organized warfare in the popular consciousness, but only occasionally in the 
historiography. The US military understood each conflict as part of the ongoing 
“Mexico Border Troubles” that plagued the region. Each of the above mentioned 
conflicts were discrete episodes with only one, the Merchants War, exhibiting 
more formal processes and protocols associated with more formal wars, including 
organized battles with set field pieces. All along, the US military expressed great 
concern over violence on the border, a subject to which we now turn. 
                                                 
1 Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., Selections from the Prison Notebooks of 
Antonio Gramsci (New York: International Publishers, 1989): 229-230. 
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The Frequent Occurrence of Disorders and Outrages 
As early as June 11, 1852, Secretary of State of Daniel Webster reported 
to President Millard Fillmore that, “although there is a great want of official 
information on the subject, there is no doubt of the frequent occurrence of 
disorders and outrages committed on the borders between the US and Mexico.” 
The violence of this early period, not long after the hostilities of the war that 
ended just four years before, consisted of “marauding incursions, and the violent 
seizing of persons to be transported across the line.” Convinced the raids were 
likely to continue in the future, Webster was unsure who specifically was 
responsible for the marauding and seizing. What Webster was certain about was 
that the tension between Mexicanos and Anglos required immediate attention. 
“There seems to be an absolute necessity,” he emphasized, “for the adoption of 
some measures for the preservation of peace and good neighborhood.” 
Unfortunately, Webster was compelled to admit to the president, “unhappily these 
disorders are not confined to the inhabitants on either side.” In addition to 
addressing the machinations of organized bands from Mexico, Webster 
recognized the duty of the US government to “restrain its own citizens from 
hostile incursions into the territories of Mexico.” Remarkably, Webster confided 
that neither government was deliberately responsible for the outrages, since the 
perpetrators had not “received any countenance or encouragement from the 
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officers or agents of either of the government of the United States or of Mexico.” 
“They are the lawless acts of individuals,” Webster summarized, “the suppression 
of which for the future has become quite necessary.” As a consequence, Webster 
pleaded for the gathering of official data.2 
At a loss for a complete remedy for the conflict that consumed the border, 
Webster did not hesitate in recommending necessary steps. “I think it is 
important,” he informed the president, “that the attention of Congress should be 
called to the necessity of some further legal enactments.” Judging the existing 
legislation as inadequate, Webster argued that a new mandate was necessary to 
authorize the military to act in order to “repel lawless incursions of individuals 
into the United States.” Webster clearly saw a need to assist local civil authorities, 
who otherwise might not be able to respond promptly. Indeed, the President’s 
own legal authority, “to call forth the militia to repel invasion from any foreign 
nation or Indian tribe,” did not treat the “existing circumstances.” The legislation 
that the Secretary of State found inadequate provided for the interception of 
military expeditions of foreign powers, but it did not contain remedies for “their 
trial and confiscation.” “These words,” Webster confided, “hardly seem to 
embrace lawless inroads of gangs or masses of individuals.”3 
                                                 
2 U.S. House, Rio Grande Frontier, Message from the President of the United States, 32nd Cong. 
1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 112, p. 1-2. 
3 Ibid. 
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Early students of Border conflict easily recognized the complexity of 
Border warfare. Brevet Major General Persifer F. Smith astutely remarked “there 
is no doubt that, for some years, much disaffection has existed in the adjacent 
Mexican States towards their central government. It was so previous to 1846, and 
it is not less so now.” In his report from the Eighth Military Department of Texas, 
Smith informed the Assistant Adjutant General that “while some of the population 
on the west side of the Rio Grande are ready to overturn their government, for 
motives interesting to themselves, there have been, on our side, many individuals 
ready to begin, or assist, for motives of their own, any such movement. Some 
who, in their own persons, or in those of friends, had suffered from the cruelties 
exercised by the Mexicans in the early contest with Texas, sought, and yet seek, 
to revenge them.” Smith also suggested that many adventurers and merchants 
conducting illegal trade were able to profit when “the country is disordered by 
revolution.”4 
Many at the time understood the troubles as border warfare. This type of 
warfare for them was equally as devastating and cruel as any war might otherwise 
be understood. The Secretary of War concluded that “so long, however, as the 
species of border warfare which has lately been carried on in that region between 
the inhabitants of the two countries continues, it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, with any number of troops, and with the strictest vigilance on the part 
                                                 
4 U.S. House, Report of the Secretary of War, 32nd Cong. 2nd sess., Ex. Doc. 1, p. 15-17. 
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of their officers, to prevent, on so extensive a frontier, a repetition of these 
disorders.” The “species of border warfare” that preoccupied the Secretary of War 
was also peculiar in that “the troops stationed on the frontier may justly be 
considered as in active service –a service, too, in which they are exposed to all the 
hardships and dangers of war without its excitement to stimulate, or its hopes of 
honorable distinction to sustain them.”5  
Merchants War 1850 
Between 1851 and 1855 José María Carvajal’s El Plan de la Loba 
challenged the authority of the Mexican and US governments. Many dismissed 
the revolution as nothing more than a filibuster against Mexico organized and 
launched from the US. The substantial number of mercenaries, many of whom 
were ex-rangers under the leadership of John Ford, fueled the suspicion of 
Carvajal’s political project. The political dueling between Carvajal and General 
Avalos, over suspension or reduction of trade duties, undermined the political 
legitimacy of Carvajal’s revolt. 
Well before the Merchants War, Carvajal’s loyalty had been called into 
question. Carvajal had a long history of engagement with Anglos. With the 
support of a number of Anglos, the young Carvajal learned the leather trades, sold 
bibles, and, surveyed land grants before returning to Texas. Carvajal’s association 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 3-4. 
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with Anglos had a profound effect. Stephen Austin wrote Mary Austin Holley 
informing her that Carvajal’s “own countrymen call him a Norte Americano.”6 
Carvajal first acheived prominence in Texas in May 1833 when he assisted Austin 
to translate the memorial of the Texas Convention to the Mexican government. In 
1839 he and a force of American volunteers battled Mexican forces at Mier, 
during the Federalist War of 1839-1841. Later, Carvajal led forces opposed to 
American incursions during the War of American Intervention.7  
Following the US-Mexico War, Carvajal resumed smuggling activities he 
had established with associates on the border who included, notably, Charles 
Stillman.8 Border smuggling after the war was hardly unusual. However, what 
began as a largely shared project between ambitious men on both sides of the 
river would over time be almost exclusively blamed on Mexicanos. The pejorative 
code of “bandit” would come to be conflated with “Mexicans,” attributing 
smuggling and theft almost exclusively to Mexicanos on both sides of the border. 
Brownsville editor Ovid Johnson preoccupied with the conditions that made 
smuggling a way of life along the border expressed his concern. “It is not to be 
                                                 
6 Harbert Davenport, “General Jose Maria Jesus Carabajal,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 
55:4 (April 1952): 477. 
7 Joseph A. Stout, Jr., Schemers and Dreamers: Filibustering in Mexico, 1848-1921 (Fort Worth: 
Texas Christian University Press, 2002): 17. Davenport, “General Jose Maria Jesus Carbajal,” p. 
481. 
8 Stout, Schemers and Dreamers: Filibustering in Mexico, p. 17. 
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regarded as extraordinary that after the close of the late war with Mexico and the 
disbanding of our forces on that frontier,” Johnson explained,  
a large number of person, were found dispersed along that line, who felt 
little inclination to observe the Law, or to respect the rights of their 
neighboring citizens of Mexico –all wars and commotions, leave behind 
them, a refuse population, of the same description—On both sides of the 
Rio Grande, these persons have stationed themselves, and as a sort of 
waiters on providence, are ready for any enterprize [sic], lawful or 
unlawful, that presents itself to their attention.9 
 
Johnson, something of a realist, accepted that “smuggling is of course, the most 
convenient resource, and we should not feel, in the least degree, surpized [sic], at 
the extent, to which this pursuit is carried, by the citizens or residents, of both 
Nations.”10 
Although Johnson recognized the diversity of the smugglers, he put the 
blame squarely on the Mexican government. “The enforcement of the revenue 
system of Mexico,” he exclaimed, “is of things, the most uncertain and inefficient. 
Neither the officers or citizens, of that Republic, to any great extent, appear to 
have any verry [sic] conscientious scruples of duty, in favour [sic] of its rigid 
execution. Evasions are practised [sic] and winked at, by many of these officers 
and citizens, which seem to our view extraordinary.” Johnson did not avoid the 
obvious, concluding that “American citizens have unquestionably availed 
                                                 
9 Ernest Shearer, “The Carvajal Disturbances,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 55:2 (October 
1951): 205-206. 
10 Ibid. 
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themselves, of oppertunities [sic] offered, to evade these revenue laws, but they 
could have accomplished little, without the aid of Mexican confederates.”11 
Johnson was not always correct in his assessment. On July 20, 1850, for 
instance, the Mexican government revealed a more complex situation when it sent 
“a special guard” to the border to enforce its tariffs. The next day Luis de la Rosa, 
the Mexican minister to the United States, complained to Secretary of State John 
Clayton that smugglers from the US abused Mexican authorities along the border. 
De la Rosa expected that President Zachary Taylor would address the situation 
and eventually make reparations. According to Ernest Shearer, “the minister of 
Mexico hoped that the United States would consider moving the ‘contra 
guerrilleros’ [sic] to some other part of the United States, where ‘feelings of 
rivalship [sic] and conflict do not exist between the inhabitants of Mexico and 
those of the United States.’”12 
It is in this context that Carvajal initiated an ambitious plan to address the 
concerns peculiar to the border region by issuing El Plan de La Loba. The major 
goals of Carvajal’s program were to eliminate prohibitive tariffs, minimize the 
Mexican military presence in the frontier and establish a free trade zone. Most 
importantly, the removal of trade barriers would mean better access to manta or 
coarse cotton. The missionary Abbé Domenech, who tended to the physical and 
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spiritual needs of the people in the region represented the Merchant War as a 
struggle over the trade of “cotton stuff or manta.” The rancheros, Domenech 
explained, “used an enormous quantity of it for inner and light garments and for 
manual purposes.” He added: 
Wishing to protect the branch of national industry, the Mexican 
government had laid such a tax on foreign fabrics, as amounted to 
prohibition. This would have been a deadly blow to the frontier trade of 
Texas, had not smuggling assumed colossal proportions along the line of 
the Rio Grande, very inefficiently watched by about a dozen custom-house 
officers. 
 
The merchants of Brownsville “conspired to excite a popular movement against 
the monopoly, and committed to General Carvajal the task of revolutionising [sic] 
the states of Cohahuila, Tamaulipas, and Nuevo Leon.”13  
Anglos had mixed motives in the Merchants War. However, there is little 
doubt that some were eager to further exploit trade opportunities. Many Anglo 
entrepreneurs along the border resented the tariffs imposed by Mexican 
authorities. Carvajal hoped to take advantage of the shared resentment. Carvajal 
and his supporters hoped to establish the Republic of the Sierra Madre, an 
independent state. Some who supported him entertained the ambition of creating 
an independent republic that could eventually be annexed by the US. Believing 
that Indian sought refuge in Mexico, most insisted depredations could be 
                                                 
13 Abbé Domenech, Missionary Adventures in Texas and Mexico. A Personal Narrative of Six 
Years Sojourn in Those Regions (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 
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eliminated if a substantial portion of Mexico’s northern frontier were under US 
control.  
For much of his border career, Carvajal attracted the support of prominent 
Texans, recruiting a number of them into the rank and file of his small, diverse 
force. Ford, a well-known frontier personage, shared Carvajal’s vision regarding 
the Republic of the Sierra Madre. Ford, as well as many others, intended to 
capture escaped slaves. Frederick Wilkins argues that “he made no apology for 
this, claiming there were an estimated three-thousand slaves who escaped to 
northern Mexico.”14 Ford was so convinced as to the virtues of the plan he 
defended it long after the revolt had failed.  
Initially he enlisted almost three hundred men to serve for three to six 
months provided they were able to supply their own equipment. After each swore 
allegiance to Carvajal they were to earn the same pay as a Texas Ranger.15 On 
September 23, 1851 Ford mustered out the rangers under his command, allowing 
them to quickly join Carvajal in October at Camargo. Ford was given command 
of the auxiliary force made up mostly of Anglos.16 A number of Anglos, some 
recently discharged from the US military, from Roma, Davis, Lampasos, and Paso 
del Aguila also attached themselves to the movement. Eighty men under Captain 
                                                 
14 Frederick Wilkins, Defending the Borders: The Texas Rangers, 1848-1861 (Austin: State House 
Press, 2001): 37. 
15 Stout, Schemers and Dreamers: Filibustering in Mexico, p. 18. 
16 Shearer, “The Carvajal Disturbances,” p. 209. 
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Howell in Corpus Christi, delayed while waiting for an expedition to Cuba, also 
allied themselves with Carvajal.17 
Narrowly escaping capture by Mexican forces, Carvajal fled to Rio 
Grande City where he recruited “American adventurers who had fought in 1846-
7” and “a couple of hundred discontented Mexicans” with the assistance of 
Brownsville merchants.18 On September 20, 1851 Carvajal targeted Camargo and 
briefly occupied the town long enough to make pronouncements against Mexican 
despotism. Intending to move on to Matamoros, Carvajal crossed the border on 
October 9.  
In less than two weeks he was victorious at the Battle of Ceralvo, just 
outside of Matamoros. He fought his way into the city, easily taking Fort Paredes, 
a post originally raised to protect against the encroaching army of General Taylor. 
For ten days Carvajal laid siege to Matamoros, severely straining General Avalos’ 
defenses. Carvajal controlled most of the city with the exception of the city center 
and the main plaza. Despite his initial success, on October 30, 1851 Carvajal 
ended his attack and withdrew his main force. General Avalos’ forces eventually 
overwhelmed Carvajal’s rearguard as he and his men retreated. Afterwards, Ford 
severely criticized Carvajal for allowing the retreat and subsequent defeat.19 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 214. 
18 Domenech, Missionary Adventures in Texas and Mexico, p. 328. 
19 Stout, Schemers and Dreamers: Filibustering in Mexico, pp. 20-21. Shearer, “The Carvajal 
Disturbances,” pp. 211-217. 
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Reduced by desertions and facing a larger force of Mexican regulars, Carvajal’s 
small army abandoned the field near Cerralvo. He fled to Texas and resumed 
preparations to continue the war by recruiting four hundred and thirty eight men, 
which, according to Stout, were overwhelmingly Anglo, only eighty-four being 
Mexican. On February 21, 1852 Colonel Valentín Cruz routed Carvajal just 
outside Camargo following “a fierce battle” which “raged for three hours.” In 
August of 1852 Carvajal was able to rally some two hundred men at the head of 
four artillery pieces to once again cross the border but he was unable to stay long 
enough to confront Mexican forces.20  
At a public gathering in May 1852 Colonel H. L. Kinney invited Carvajal 
to rally those in attendance for men and support. General Hugh McLeod gave 
Carvajal a ringing endorsement. Carvajal’s own pleas against Mexican tyranny 
failed to raise any funds, signaling the eventual demise of the revolt.21 The official 
position of the US government was to prevent any type of filibustering activity. 
General D. E. Twiggs, for example, had explicit orders from President Millard 
Fillmore to enforce neutrality regulations. However, Twiggs was unable to control 
the support that some of his own men gave to Carvajal’s adventures. Publicly, at 
least, it appeared that Carvajal generated a great deal of enthusiasm. Although 
some viewed Carvajal as a “miserable freebooter and rapacious robber,” others 
                                                 
20 Stout, Schemers and Dreamers: Filibustering in Mexico, pp. 21-22. 
21 Shearer, “The Carvajal Disturbances,” pp. 223-224. 
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enthusiastically praised his efforts. Just before his victory in the Battle of Ceralvo, 
one Texas paper celebrated him as “a gallant colonel.”22 Men flocked to his 
banner despite the many defeats he suffered throughout the period of the military 
expedition from 1851 to 1855.  
Carvajal’s mobilization convulsed the region, unleashing renewed 
depredations. In the December 4, 1852 report of the Secretary of War, Conrad 
described the situation created by Carvajal: 
a number of persons of desperate character and fortunes were attracted to 
that frontier by the lawless attempts of Carvajal; and, after his defeat, they 
dispersed through the country, and resorted to plunder for subsistence. On 
the other hand, many of the inhabitants of Mexico either sought to avenge 
themselves for the wrongs inflicted on them by that adventurer and his 
followers, or found in his lawless proceedings a justification for their own, 
and retaliated on the peaceable inhabitants. 
  
Conrad further surmised, “the Indians in that vicinity availed themselves of the 
confusion and alarm consequent upon this state of things to renew their 
depredations.” The Secretary admitted that the “efforts of the department have 
been principally directed to the defence [sic] of our frontiers and those of Mexico 
from the Indian tribes within our borders.”23 
Although the US seemed ambivalent, the Mexican government strenously 
protested that Carvajal be supported to mount attacks. Mexican officials were 
deeply suspicious of the official US position regarding the activities of 
                                                 
22 Stout, Schemers and Dreamers: Filibustering in Mexico, p. 18; 20. 
23 U.S. House, Report of the Secretary of War, 32nd Cong. 2nd sess., Ex. Doc. 1, p. 3. 
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commanders like Carvajal. “To Mexicans,” Stout explains, “it also seemed 
plausible that the United States supported the ventures for economic, political, or 
ethnic reasons.”24 High-ranking Mexican officers and local officials refused to 
accept Carvajal’s banner. Mexican officials consistently alerted their American 
counterparts through official diplomatic channels regarding provocative troop 
mobilizations and activity. Carvajal’s failure to secure substantial support from 
within Mexico doomed the revolt from the beginning. Not surprisingly, the 
Mexican supporters Carvajal was able to gather resented the participation of so 
many Anglos, especially prominent ones such as Ford. 
Efforts by the Mexican government to pressure the US to officially 
respond were unsuccessful until Carvajal and some of his men were detained in 
Corpus Christi for violation of neutrality laws in April of 1853. In January 1854 
Carvajal received sympathetic treatment from a Galveston jury, allowing him to 
resume his recruitment effort for men for another expedition. While mobilizing 
support, a group of unauthorized followers attacked Ciudad Victoria. Mostly 
Anglos, the renegade band held the city until they learned of approaching 
Mexican forces under the command of Colonel José Barrieto. Small forays 
continued throughout the year in which, according to Stout, Carvajal “remained a 
problem for several years.” Later Carvajal reestablished political legitimacy for 
                                                 
24 Stout, Schemers and Dreamers: Filibustering in Mexico, p. xiii. 
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himself in Monterrey eventually gaining the favor of Benito Juárez who appointed 
him governor of Tamaulipas.25 
The phenomenon of filibusters launched from the US into the tier of 
northern Mexican states is well known and has been amply covered by a number 
of scholars. Expeditions such as Carvajal’s have been understood as aggression 
that could take advantage of what was generally believed as Mexico’s inability to 
maintain the integrity of its national boundary. Mexico’s long history of civil 
conflict made government authority tenuous the further away from Mexico City, 
making Mexico’s northern frontier region ripe for filibustering expeditions. The 
Mexican government’s official position following the war saw any expedition 
organized from the US side of the border as a filibuster. The critical point to be 
made here is how designations such as filibuster, and by extension bandit, are 
raced. Filibusters were not always only organized by Anglos with territorial 
ambitions, but in some instances facilitated by Mexicanos with their own local 
political ambitions. Observers also employed race to support the efforts of 
Carvajal even though Carvajal’s own position against the Mexican forces he 
encountered was ambivalent. 
Callahan Raid 
Brevet Major-General Persifor Smith reported to Lieutenant Colonel L. 
Thomas that Lipans had been, “secretly descending along the valleys of the 
                                                 
25 Stout, Schemers and Dreamers: Filibustering in Mexico, p. 23. 
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Cibolo and Medina, and uniting in parties of six or eight.” According to Smith 
they “carried off two hundred horses from farms on the Cibolo and on the 
Medina, and on the San Antonio below the junction of the Medina, down as far as 
the neighborhood of Goliad.” Smith also reported the loss of life, including a 
young boy named McGhee and “a small black girl.” The Lipans appeared to show 
little restraint according to Smith, having killed “a woman and attempted several 
other murders.” Local citizens attempted to pursue the raiding parties. The 
volunteers had only limited success, catching only a small band by surprise.26 
The frequent reports of raids spurred Governor Elisha Pease to muster a 
force of rangers to prevent further depredations. In the fall of 1855 the Governor 
organized a force of rangers to equal the size of a company of the US army. The 
Governor had little choice since his repeated pleas to the District Commander for 
a detachment of regulars or for a volunteer force called up by him went unheeded. 
Moreover, local residents of the region between the Cibolo and the Medina rivers 
and as far south as the Rio Gande increasingly complained of the unchecked raids. 
The brutal loss of life fueled the outrage that frontier residents expressed to Pease. 
On July 5, 1855 Pease empowered James Callahan to raise a company of rangers 
and protect the settlements from “marauding parties of Indians that may be found 
in the neighborhood,” pursuing them “wherever they may found.” On July 20, 
1855 Callahan mustered into service eighty-eight men who would serve for three 
                                                 
26 U.S. Senate, Letter from the Secretary of War, 45th Cong. 2nd Sess., Ex. Doc. 19, pp. 113-114. 
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months. Each man was expected to supply his own equipment, relying “upon the 
justice of the Legislature for reimbursement.”27 
The expedition was racked by controversy. The Company had successfully 
patrolled against incursions during the early Fall. Believing that the source of the 
raids originated across the border and having the Governor’s approval to follow 
the raiders “wherever they might be found,” Callahan and his men set out for 
Mexico. A generation of scholars who unabashedly celebrated ranger exploits had 
few qualms about Callahan and his company. Later, historians of the rangers, 
forced to contend with a tarnished ranger record, acknowledged the raid with 
ambivalence. While uncomfortable with ranger deeds in the fall of 1855, scholars 
have accepted Callahan’s leadership and actions as necessary by-product of 
frontier defense. Indeed, even scholars generally critical of Anglo treatment of 
indigenous populations represent Callahan’s expedition as a punitive raid against 
intractable Indians.28 
Controversy focused on the invasion of “the territory of a friendly nation” 
and the burning of Piedras Negras. There remains a considerable amount of 
debate regarding the motivations and objectives of Callahan and his force. The 
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State of Texas insisted the Callahan expedition was vital to the protection of the 
frontier and, as such, to be funded by the federal government. Governor Pease 
defended the actions and outcome of the invasion. Pease insisted Callahan was 
beyond reproach and that Mexican collusion with marauding bands of Indians 
warranted such dramatic measures. 
While some evidence exists that the force had every intention of crossing 
to chastise Indians, information also surfaced that Callahan hoped to retrieve 
runaway slaves. Ron Tyler suggests that “overwhelming evidence exists to 
support the contention that Callahan’s prime purpose was to recuperate 
runaways.” He argues that slave owners persuaded Callahan “to subordinate the 
purpose of his commission and to try to punish Mexicans for guarding escaped 
slaves and to recover as many renegades as he could.” The chasing of marauding 
Indians, according to Tyler, was nothing more than a ruse for the larger purpose 
of slave retrieval.29  
Callahan originally had arrived in Texas in December 1835 as a volunteer 
from Georgia. After serving Texas throughout the duration of the war, he choose 
to remain in the Republic. Later, Callahan established a reputation as an Indian 
fighter. William Henry joined Callahan’s rangers but not before his small band of 
filibusters generated a great deal of mischief on the other side of the border. 
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Henry had gained something of a reputation for an earlier filibuster into Mexico. 
Earlier he had begged the Governor for a commission reassuring him of his talent 
as an Indian fighter.30 On September 25, the combined forces of Callahan and 
Henry elected officers, securing Callahan’s authority over the expedition.  
Once they reached Eagle Pass, the expedition crossed the Rio Grande just 
three miles below, avoiding possible detection from Fort Duncan. Over one 
hundred men forded the river and started towards San Fernando in search of an 
Indian camp.31 On October 4 at Escondido Creek, just twenty-two miles from 
Piedras Negras, the rangers skirmished with a substantial Mexican force. 
Callahan’s rangers were forced to retreat to Piedras Negras, sending “a demand to 
the Alcalde to surrender the town.” Expecting a large Mexican force to lay siege 
to the beleaguered town, the next day the rangers barricaded the three streets of 
the small village with overturned ox carts they appropriated from the fleteros who 
were the principal occupants of the town. Callahan later justified his delay in 
Piedras Negras claiming that their retreat was impossible due to the unseasonably 
high water of the river. The swollen Rio Grande did in fact prevent an easy 
crossing. While preparing for the siege, Callahan begged for reinforcements from 
Captain Sidney Burbank at Fort Duncan. Burbank was under explicit orders from 
his superiors not to render any aid to Callahan’s party, forcing him to refuse 
                                                 
30 Wilkins, Defending the Borders, pp. 44; 49. 
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Callahan’s request. He did agree to offer limited assistance in protecting the 
ranger’s retreat. Burbank aimed four canons at Piedras Negras in the event that 
the rangers were able to cross.32  
Some rangers were able to leave and began deserting while the remainder 
prepared defenses. On October 6, 1855 upon learning that a substantial force of 
Mexican regular troops was fast approaching the barricaded village, the rangers 
repeated their request for aid from Burbank and Fort Duncan. Callahan gave the 
order to abandon the village sometime around four o’clock in the afternoon. Just 
before he and his men set out for the river, they torched the jacales of the entire 
village. The burning village created a smoke screen sufficient to cover their 
escape, concealing the rangers movements and the plunder that they had taken 
with them. While occupying the town, the rangers helped themselves to sacks of 
beans, flour, corn and produce as well as jewelry, watches and other valuables.33 
When Callahan first arrived, a number of residents of Piedras Negras 
crossed the river seeking protection at Fort Duncan. Others fled to neighboring 
villages. It was not unusual for residents of Piedras Negras to seek aid from the 
Fort. Piedras Negras had substantial commerce with the soldiers of the 
installation, supplying the fort with a variety of goods and services. The small 
village of Piedras Negras, opposite the bank of Fort Duncan and Eagle Pass, was 
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33 Ibid., 442. 
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the home of a number of freighters who provided forage and foodstuffs to the 
muster at Fort Duncan. In fact, the Callahan raid revealed the considerable 
amount of Mexicano and Anglo interdependence. Although small and 
impoverished, the town more than likely had emerged as a result of the exigencies 
of frontier defense, developing in the shadow of the fort.34 
The force that Callahan and the Rangers encountered demonstrated the 
complexity of the conflict along the US-Mexico border. The reports on the size of 
the force the rangers faced, the presence of Seminoles and Lipans, and the amount 
of casualties the rangers inflicted are contradictory. Persifor Smith, for example, 
reported that after having communicating with General Langberg the Rangers 
faced two hundred rancheros “and that eight Lipan Indians were present 
accidentally and took part in the fight.” In his official report Callahan claimed that 
he and his rangers killed “eighty Indians and many Mexicans.” However, reports 
gathered from Langberg confirmed only six fallen from the one hundred ten men 
of the ranger force and four killed and four wounded from the force of two 
hundred rancheros reported to be in the field.35 Not surprisingly, the Seminoles 
that accompanied the force of Mexican regulars who surrounded Piedras Negras 
raised a concern about the potential for future conflict with them. 
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Mexico strongly condemned the Callahan invasion and the burning and 
looting of Piedras Negras. Santiago Vidauri, recently appointed commander of the 
northern frontier, and Emilio Langberg, a commander of the state of Coahuila, 
were both outraged. The shared sense of violation and patriotic fervor briefly 
mended political fences between the two political rivals, both men finding 
common ground due to national pride. Historian Ernest Shearer explains that 
Mexican public opinion ran so high that the U.S. legation under James Gadsden 
suffered the vitriol of Mexican dailies.36 
US public opinion weighed heavily in favor of Callahan and his 
expedition. General Smith expressed doubt that the ranger force would be brought 
to justice, given that sentiment and fear ran high in the region. “They represent the 
whole affair as a brilliant and successful exploit,” complained Smith, “and as 
such, no doubt, the newspapers throughout the country will represent it. They are 
upheld by, with very few exceptions, the whole population; and as the Indians 
who have committed the depredations here are undoubtedly upheld and 
encouraged by the Mexican authorities, it is hard to convince the Texans that 
retaliation on the innocent is not the way to correct the evil.” Smith’s main 
concern, an attitude shared by his superiors, was to prevent any further incursions 
from armed bands of Americans.37 His assessment of the fallout from the 
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Callahan raid in every way reflected the calculus of frontier defense. Anglo 
residents had mostly fear and contempt for Indigenous peoples in the area. 
Moreover, many frontier residents believed that the work of predatory bands was 
made possible by the nefarious interventions of officials across the river. 
People living outside of the region, who knew nothing of “depredations” 
and border warfare were expected to be less sympathetic with the ranger’s 
actions. An anonymous correspondent from Eagle Pass, for example, defended 
their work, providing a justification many found perfectly legitimate. “People 
living in security in the old States, and who happily know nothing of the dangers 
and trials of frontiersman, except what they have gathered from the ‘Adventures 
of Daniel Boone’ and other leather-stocking heroes,” he declared, “will doubtless 
many of them condemn, ab initio, the Texans for their efforts to free themselves 
from Indian barbarities because in there efforts it was necessary to violate the 
territory of a friendly nation.” Most Texans, he added, not only faced Indian 
barbarity but also suffered the wickedness of the Mexican government. In fact, 
many were prepared to blame local Mexican leaders for the debacle. While not 
fully approving “all that has been done by the Texans in this expedition,” our 
correspondent insisted, “the evils that came of it were the results more of Mexican 
imbecility and deceit than any thing else.” The greatest obstacle to peace on the 
frontier was the Mexican government, who, it was believed jealously guarded the 
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sovereignty of her borders steadfastly refusing US officers to cross in pursuit of 
the “red rascals [who] go out on the other side with their booty.” “Our 
government,” declared our correspondent, “owed it to her citizens suffering these 
injuries to demand of the Mexicans the surrender of these enemies of our peace, 
and to enforce the demand if necessary.” Regarding the consequences of the 
invasion there seemed to be little doubt. “These events will produce the greatest 
bitterness between the two sides of the river,” explained our anonymous 
correspondent. The tension was likely to be so great that this anonymous 
correspondent fully expected “the commencement of another Mexican War, 
which must result in the annexation of all Northern Mexico, with Saltillo, 
Monclova, and Chihuahua for frontier stations.”38 
The battle did not end with the successful retreat of Callahan and his men. 
In fact, conflict in the form of payment for reparations raged on for some time. 
Demanding to be reimbursed for their expenses, Texas’ authorities argued that the 
burden for the costs of frontier protection fell on the federal government. In 
addition to the battle between the state government and Congress as to who was 
going to pay the bill for Callahan’s expedition, there was a battle over reparations 
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for the residents of Piedras Negras. Villagers who suffered when Callahan ordered 
the burning of their village sought compensation for their losses.39 
In the course of Texas’ pursuit for reimbursement for the expenses they 
incurred during the raid, an investigation revealed a cabal of Piedras Negras 
residents who attempted to defraud the US government. Many of the conspirators 
at the time of the claim resided in the US. The fraud was not the wicked scheme 
of conniving “Mexican bandits,” but rather a combined effort by local and 
opportunistic Mexicanos and Anglos who sought to bilk the US government out 
of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The US and Mexican Claims Commission, 
established by convention on July 4, 1868, officially reached a settlement 
regarding some of the claims on November 23, 1876. The Commission evaluated 
998 claims on the part of Mexican citizens, dismissing 831. However, the 
Commission did award the remaining 167, of these 150 were related to the 
“Piedras Negras cases” which were treated as one case. The amount Mexican 
citizens received totaled $150,498 in damages.40 
The Cart War 
Images of a frontier full of obstacles to be overcome, including “savage 
Indians” and “treacherous Mexicans,” fueled the numerous proclamations that 
settlers lived in a constant state of terror. Yet, Anglos claimed the state of terror 
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only for themselves, reluctant to admit any victimization to Mexicanos who were 
otherwise represented only as perpetrators. By all accounts Mexicanos were in a 
difficult position. Rancheros who cooperated with Anglo authorities and settlers 
put their lives in danger, exposing themselves to retaliation by embittered 
countryman determined to punish a betrayal or putting themselves at risk for their 
proximity to Anglos.  
One of the groups most vulnerable were fleteros or freighters who were 
consistently open to attacks. Mexicano cart men were the most exposed. Attacks 
were not only carried out by “depredating” Indians, but in some instances by 
Anglos eager to control lucrative markets. One episode of violence that targeted 
fleteros took place in 1857. “En algunos de los condados interiores,” reported the 
Brownsville American Flag, “los habitantes maltratan cruelmente á los pobres 
Mejicanos, aunque reciben el pan que les sirve de sustento de manos de los 
compatriotas de estos.”41 The 1873 Mexican Committee of Investigation 
concluded that documents confirmed “the insecurity under which the Mexican 
population in Texas had labored.” “A large portion of the disturbances which 
occurred between the Bravo and the Nueces rivers,” the Commission concluded, 
“is attributable to the persecutions suffered by the Mexicans residing there; 
persecutions which have engendered the most profound hatred between the 
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races.” The combined competion and violence over freighting came to be known 
as the Cart War.42 
On September 17, Nicanor Valdes testified that just days before close to 
forty men, wearing masks and armed with double barrel shotguns and six 
shooters, attacked his freight train while en route from Lavaca to San Antonio. 
Valdes and twelve colleagues were waylaid almost a league outside of Helena in 
Karnes County. In the course of the attack, Antonio Delgado was fatally shot 
fourteen times. Valdes and his two brothers, Esteban and Martiniano, survived 
despite receiving a number of serious wounds.  
At the inquiry where the Valdes brothers testified, C. G. Edwards provided 
additional evidence of a similar assault that took place earlier that summer. 
According to Edwards sometime close to midnight, he woke from his slumber 
beneath one of the “Mexican carts.” Just seven miles outside of Goliad, Edwards 
and his Mexicano companions were attacked. In the course of the raid Edwards 
and several other Mexicano carters were severely wounded.43  
Carreteros were an essential part of the trade and transport from San 
Antonio to Lavaca. Making use of the La Bahia Road or Mexican Cart Trail, 
carreteros hauled a variety of imported goods, returning to Lavaca with essential 
agrarian stuffs such as cotton, hides, and wool. Mexicanos dominated the 
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transport trade throughout the region, making profitable use of smaller, faster 
carts. Mexicano freight trains camped close to the road, minimizing time lost 
during stops. The advantages enjoyed by Mexicano carreteros undermined Anglo 
teamsters’ efforts to monopolize the freight business.  
Teamsters, according to Ellen Schneider and Paul Carlson, angered at the 
competition, “fabricated tales suggesting that cart drivers stole provisions and 
rustled cattle, activities which allowed the carreteros to underbid and charge 
lower rates.” By the summer of 1857 Teamsters and local allies organized small 
clandestine bands to terrorize defiant Mexicano cart men, attracting a number of 
“outlaws, local toughs, and other disgusting characters.” These criminal outfits 
attacked Mexicano cart trains after dark. Their faces covered with gunnysacks, 
they systematically terrorized Mexican freighters. They plundered their freight, 
destroyed their carts, wounded, and, in some cases, killed Mexicano fleteros.44 In 
October, Mexican Minister Manuel Robles i Pezuela alerted Secretary of State 
Lewis Cass that he had learned that there were some seventy-five victims. Robles 
also informed Cass that a number of Mexicano freighters and their families were 
forced into exile across the border having been victimized by the gunnysackers. 
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Tension had already existed due to bitter accusals of retaliatory border 
raids. Renewed accusations further agitated the ire of local ranchers. Schneider 
and Carlson suggest “the Mexican carreteros provided adequate scapegoats and 
targets for a variety of charges.” They attribute the racial animosity that fueled the 
attacks to the political activism of the xenophobic, anti-Catholic Know Nothing 
Party active in the region. Local mistrust was also exacerbated by the widespread 
belief that carreteros assisted slaves to resist. Carreteros were suspected of 
inciting local slaves and facilitating their escape while en route to their principal 
commercial entrepôt.45 
Cass, once convinced of the gravity of the matter, informed Governor 
Pease of the “sistema organizado de persecucion, violencia, espulsion, i aun 
asesinato.”46 Prompted by Cass’s intervention, Pease traveled to San Antonio to 
investigate further. After a number of conferences, Pease was convinced of the 
need for action. He organized a militia company to respond to the situation. He 
also reported his concern to the Texas legislature on November 11, 1857. Pease 
did not rule out the nefarious role of Mexicanos, nor did he forget the prejudices 
many held against their Mexican neighbors. Thus, Pease distinguished between 
“good” and “bad” Mexicans. Pease explained, “que un sentimiento profundo de 
hostilidad prevalecia en muchos de los condados al redor contra todos los 
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ciudadanos de origen Mejicano, i que habia peligro inminente de ataques en 
represalia por parte de ellos, los cuales si se comenzaban una vez debian 
inevitablemente dar por resultado una guerra civil de razas.”47  
Local law enforcement proved powerless to stem the tide of violence 
against Mexicano freighters. Not only had attacks become more frequent, but 
many targets of the organized violence were hauling freight destined for the 
numerous military posts in the region. The threat that persistent violence posed to 
military operations sparked military intervention. General David Twiggs assigned 
military escorts for the cart trains.48 Despite official efforts at intervention, the 
bulk of the violence did not end until local vigilante committees in Karnes and 
Goliad counties put down the “gunnysackers,” stemming the tide of the racial 
violence.  
A crucial, if not fully, examined element in the anticipated success of 
organized invasions of Mexican territory was the racial attitudes that most Anglos 
held regarding Mexican inferiority. The success of the recently concluded US-
Mexico war confirmed the dim view many Anglos held of their Mexican 
neighbors.49 These negative attitudes revealed themselves in the commonly held 
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belief that Mexicans could not maintain a republican government. Ambitious 
plans to carve out a new republic from the settled portions of Mexico’s frontier 
region depended, in some measure, on the pejorative views of Mexicans as 
soldiers and as local citizens. The arrogance of the men who organized and lead 
filibusters betrayed an almost total contempt for Mexicans. These racial attitudes 
viewed Mexicans as inept, cowardly and depraved. Even when expeditions failed 
newspapers exulted the efforts of adventurers who targeted Mexicano neighbors 
to the south, underscoring the attitudes that found any effort to dominate 
Mexicans and parts of Mexico as praiseworthy. 
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4. “HE HAD DEFEATED THE GRINGOS!” 
The many guerrilla wars in history have their points of difference, their peculiar 
characteristics, their varying processes and conclusions, and we must respect and profit 
by the experience of those whose blood was shed in them. 
Mao Tse-tung1 
 
As early as January 1859 Twiggs was concerned with the recent rise in 
attacks by Comanches. He was “determined to abandon the posts on the Rio 
Grande and place the troops on the frontier.” Leading citizens of the Rio Grande 
frontier, however, sent a petition to the Governor, Secretary of War and the 
President, strongly objecting to the possible removal of federal troops from Fort 
Brown, Ringgold barracks, and Fort McIntosh. “We believe,” the petition 
asserted, “if the post at Fort Brown and of Ringgold barracks were abandoned by 
the United States troops, the aforesaid bands of Mexican armed soldiers, 
highwaymen, and Indians, would cross into our Territory [sic], plunder our 
commerce, murder our citizens, and make desert our frontier.” Twiggs had a very 
different view of the threat the Rio Grande frontier faced. Confident that the 
danger did not result from the Mexican population, on either side of the river, 
Twiggs argued that “the outcry on that river for troops is solely to have an 
expenditure of the public money.” However, the petition, which had a number of 
prominent Spanish surnames among the over one hundred signatories, asserted 
that the lack of federal protection would mean a disruption of the mail, the circuit 
                                                 
1 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel Griffith, (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2000): 58. 
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judge, and the “unprotected commerce, which comprises many millions of dollars 
in specie coming out of Mexico per annum.” Ultimately, they concluded, 
“violence will be frequent, and followed close on the removal of the United States 
troops.”2 
Already by the Fall of that year violence had erupted. At the center of the 
turmoil was Juan Nepomucena Cortina. Not long afterwards, Cortina would ride 
at the head of an invasion of Brownsville, sparking months of turmoil and earning 
for himself the umbrage of many prominent Anglos. Cortina would remain the 
focus of official and popular attention believed to be the author of a ring of cattle 
theft and border violence directed against the US in general and Cortina’s 
personal enemies in particular. Cortina’s most vociferous US detractors believed 
him to be an irresponsible and irascible leader who manipulated the prejudices of 
Mexico’s poorest classes for unrestrained mischief against border Anglos. The 
crisis of cattle theft confirmed for many the unrestrained border war that grew in 
intensity by the mid 1870s, justifying, for example, the punitive attack on Las 
Cuevas orchestrated by Leander McNelly in 1875. 
Cortina dominated the political landscape of the Lower Rio Grande Valley 
throughout most of the second half of the nineteenth century. He provoked dread 
among local citizens, challenged the authority of prominent political leaders and 
                                                 
2 U.S. House, Difficulties on the Southwestern Frontier, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 52, pp. 5, 
12-15 
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battled distinguished military figures of two nations. Cortina’s enemies, such as 
Texas Ranger John Ford, disparaged him as the “Red Robber of the Rio Grande.” 
Scholars have believed that Mexicanos celebrated him as a “noble avenger.” 
Some, like Jerry Thompson, have portrayed him as “a high-stepping brush 
country caudillo.”3 In the forum of public opinion, the private councils of 
officials, and the tomes written by scholars Cortina has served as the archetype of 
the border bandit -the bête noire of the Greater Borderlands. Contemporaries and 
later historians limited their analysis of Cortina by constructing him as an 
archetype of the Mexican caudillo at the head of a system of Mexican banditry. 
However, the ambivalence with which Cortina was received and claimed by 
Mexicano communities on both sides of the Rio Grande challenge any easy 
explanations of the violence of the winter of 1859-60 and the turmoil that 
followed especially during the 1870s, as well as Cortina’s role in it. 
In this chapter I examine the turbulent tenure of Juan Cortina. I briefly 
review the most notable episodes of violence associated with, or more accurately, 
attributed to Cortina. In addition, I juxtapose what has been labeled the Cortina 
War with a brief discussion of Leander McNelly’s raid on Las Cuevas. 
Sometimes referred to as the Las Cuevas War, the actions undertaken by McNelly 
have been viewed by scholars who celebrate the Texas Rangers as a necessary 
                                                 
3 Jerry D. Thompson, ed., Juan Cortina and the Texas-Mexico Frontier, 1859-1877 (El Paso: 
Texas Western Press, 1994): 1. 
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and successful response to the cattle raids under the direction of Cortina. Long 
been considered the mastermind behind a program of cattle theft, scholars 
designated the series of depredations under Cortina during the late 1870s as the 
Skinning War. Weather the Second Cortina War, the Skinning War, or the Las 
Cuevas War, the number of labels for the conflict demonstrated the ideological 
slippage that facilitated the criminalization and infantalization of Mexicanos. The 
Second Cortina War, or Skinning War, loosely reached its peak between 1871 and 
1875. Porfirio Diaz’s removal of Cortina from the border region in 1875 signaled 
the demise of Cortina and the violence attributed to his criminal empire. 
Those knowledgeable on the subject of frontier conflict considered him 
the dominant protagonist in the unfolding narrative of border banditry 
orchestrated against the US prior to and after the US Civil War, having embodied 
all the attributes of the ill famed Mexican caudillo. In addition to exhibiting the 
negative portrayal charcteristics of caudillismo, Cortina’s tenure on the border 
confirmed, for many, the political immaturity of Mexicanos and the Mexican 
political system, especially the arrogance, vanity, capriciousness, and cupidity 
exercised in the petty tyrannies of regional factionalism.4 The very fact of 
                                                 
4 Eric Wolf and Edward Hansen define the caudillo as a chieftain who emerged from the alliance 
between criollos and mestizos during the Wars for Independence in Spanish held colonies in the 
Americas. These “leaders on horseback” created political systems, or caudillaje, that developed 
around a strategy for claims to power characterized, as: 1) the repeated emergence of armed 
patron-client sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and submission, and by a common 
desire to obtain wealth by force of arms; 2) the lack of institutionalized means for succession to 
offices; 3) the use of violence in political competition; and 4) the repeated failures of incumbent 
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identifying Cortina as a caudillo underscored the racialization operating in the 
interpretation of conflict and Cortina’s role in it. After 1860 his mere presence 
excited local claims about the precariousness of life on the border, often igniting 
pleas for more formidable protection against “thieving Mexicans.” Ultimately, 
most frontier denizens with means to make their views known attributed the 
border warfare throughout the period to Cortina and his dramatic sack of 
Brownsville in 1859.5 
Despite Cortina’s notoriety, his image, deeds and motives remain 
ambiguous. His political rivals, both military leaders and local officials from the 
Mexican side of the border, often supported his condemnation by Anglos. After 
1860 they pointed to his US citizenship and represented him, whenever possible, 
as an American problem. The final report of the 1873 Mexican Committee of 
Investigation, for example, acknowledges Cortina as a dominant political figure, 
                                                                                                                                     
leaders to guarantee their tenures as chieftains. Central to the personal power of the caudillo is 
machismo or a marked “capacity to dominate females” and the “readiness to use violence.” The 
caudillo possesses a unique ability to ascertain easily obtainable resources with the minimum of 
risk and opposition with the “’business acumen’ of the North American entrepreneur.” The 
political equilibrium of caudillisomo was always subject to dissolution by its own logic of fierce 
competition between rivals. The caudillo as a dominant form of politics ended in the 1870s and 
was replaced by “the dictatorships of ‘order and progress.’” The “prototypical dictator” was 
embodied in the figure of Porfirio Díaz. Eric Wolf and Edward Hansen, “Caudillo Politics: A 
Structural Analysis” Comparative Studies in Society and History 9 (January 1967): 168-179. 
Given that Wolf and Hansen rely heavily on machismo as critical element of caudillismo, it is 
instructive to consider Américo Paredes critique of machismo. “The fundamental attitudes on 
which machismo is based (and which have caused so much distress to those wishing to 
pschoanalyze the Mexican) are almost universal.” Américo Paredes, “The United States, Mexico 
and Machismo,” in Richard Bauman, ed., Folklore and Culture on the Texas-Mexican Border 
(Austin: CMAS Books, 1993): 232-233. 
5 For an example of the currency of the negative views regarding Cortina, see U.S. House, 
Depredations on the Frontiers of Texas, 42nd Cong. 3rd Sess., Ex. Doc. 39. 
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but relegates him to nothing more than a foil for Anglo political ambitions and 
schemes. By refusing to celebrate Cortina, the Committee offered a more nuanced 
portrait of him while also seeking to reveal US duplicity and disingenuousness 
regarding its investment in border conflict.6 
The attention to Cortina as a “border cuadillo” limits a more complex 
analysis of the political intrigue, economic competition, and racial strife that 
convulsed the region. It is worth noting Cortina’s career coincides with many of 
the most significant turning points in the conflict between Mexicanos and Anglos 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. Cortina’s personal history in the 
lower Rio Grande valley intersects with the intrigues of Anglo merchants and 
their legal accomplices in their concerted effort to displace Mexicanos from their 
land by politically marginalizing those who remained in the US after the war. 
Thus the resistance attributed to Cortina is a narrative that provides critical insight 
into the struggle between Mexicanos and Anglos seeking to control lucrative 
markets. In addition to Mexicano resistance to Anglo economic and political 
dominance, Cortina frames many of the severest diplomatic tensions between the 
two nations. Cortina was, without a doubt, a major element of the social war, at 
times prompting an increased military presence along the US-Mexico border 
given that each nation expended scarce resources to control him militarily.  
                                                 
6 Reports of the Committee of Investigation, Sent in 1873 by the Mexican Government to the 
Frontier of Texas (New York: Baker and Godwin Printers, 1875). 
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While Cortina captured the imagination of political and military leaders 
during the period of border conflict he has also dominated the imaginations of 
historians of the period and region. The literature treating Cortina and his exploits 
can be divided into four genres. The first consists of those authors who relied 
heavily on the memoirs of one of Cortina’s bitterest rivals, John Salmon Ford. 
Authors such as J. Frank Dobie, Walter Prescott Webb and later Lyman 
Woodman represent Cortina as a ruthless bandit confirming the worst in Mexican 
depravity. In Cortina they encounter a caudillo with little regard for exploiting the 
worst prejudices of a simple people. Consequently, for these authors, he was 
unquestionably an architect of the lawlessness and violence of the region.7  
General works that examine the Mexicano-Anglo conflict also portray 
Cortina as a notorious personage of the frontier. In these texts, Cortina appears 
simply as a bandit, who according to J. Fred Rippy “was the first conspicuous 
Mexican leader to raid the American border.” For Rippy, Cortina represented the 
kind of political turmoil that “a weak, turbulent, bankrupt state with varied and 
valuable natural resources” would produce. Michael Webster more charitably 
accepts Cortina as a leader of a people who were forced to confront the violence 
associated with American manifest destiny. Dale Floyd Beecher, simply affirms 
                                                 
7 John Salmon Ford, Rip Ford’s Texas, Stephen Oates, ed. (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 
1963); J. Frank Dobie, A Vaquero of the Brush Country (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 
1965); Walter Webb, The Texas Rangers, (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1989); Lyman 
Woodman, Cortina, The Rogue of the Rio Grande (San Antonio: Naylor Co., 1950). 
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Cortina as prominent in the many episodes of violence that political leaders 
exploited “to further their own ends.”8 The texts that specifically treat the Texas 
Rangers, such as those by Webb, Frederick Wilkins, and Robert Utley, share a 
disparaging view of Cortina.9  
A third, revisionist literature, provides a significant, if controversial 
reappraisal of Cortina’s life. José T. Canales and Charles W. Goldfinch initiated a 
more sympathetic treatment of Cortina by painting a complex portrait of a 
dynamic and intelligent leader. Moreover, Canales and Goldfinch argue 
convincingly that Cortina was a convenient device for Brownsville merchants and 
residents to ensure that government contracts would continue to benefit the 
region, providing the pretext for garrisoning federal forces nearby. Robert 
Rosenbaum also casts a favorable light on Cortina and by extension the Cortina 
War, asserting that the conflict associated with Cortina illustrated the devotion of 
a traditional peasant community eager to follow a charismatic leader.10 Chicano 
authors Pedro Castillo and Albert Camarillo, who shared Goldfinch’s earlier 
                                                 
8 J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1926); Michael 
Webster, “Texan Manifest Destiny and the Mexican Border Conflict, 1865-1880,” (Ph.D. Diss. 
Indiana University, 1972); Dale Beecher, “Incentive to Violence: Political Exploitations of 
Lawlessness on the United States – Mexican Border, 1866-1886,” (Ph. D. Diss. University of 
Utah, 1982). 
9 Webb, The Texas Rangers; Frederick Wilkins, Defending the Borders: The Texas Rangers, 
1848-1861 (Austin: State House Press, 2001); Frederick Wilkins, The Law Comes to Texas: The 
Texas Rangers, 1870-1901 (Austin: State House Press, 1999); Robert M. Utley, Lone Star Justice: 
The First Century of the Texas Rangers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
10 Charles Goldfinch and José Canales, Juan N. Cortina: Two Interpretations. (New York: Arno 
Press, 1974); Robert Rosenbaum, Mexican Resistance in the Southwest, “The Sacred Right of Self-
Preservation (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1981). 
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assessment, praise Cortina as a “social bandit.” Relying heavily on Goldfinch’s 
study, they present Cortina as a champion of his people determined to reverse the 
injustices suffered at the hands of corrupt, avaricious, and cowardly Anglos. 
Carlos Larralde introduces new primary sources to arrive at much the same 
conclusion as his Chicano colleagues.11  
A somewhat different appraisal while still celebratory comes from 
Americo Paredes. Rather than simply celebrating Cortina as a bandit, Paredes 
attributes more complex political motives to him, introducing the critical issue of 
Mexicano dignity. “In spite of what has been written about him by most Anglos –
and by some Chicanos as well—Cortina,” Américo Paredes concludes, “did not 
take up arms to rob the rich and give to the poor.” Paredes rejects portrayals of 
Cortina as a “‘Robin Hood’ of the Joaquín Murrieta type.” Rather, Paredes 
stresses the political dimensions of Cortina’s presence on the border. “What he 
was trying to give all Mexicans in Texas,” Paredes asserts, “was dignity and 
social justice.”12 
A fourth less notable if somewhat ambivalent genre includes work that 
neither condemns nor celebrates Cortina. Jerry Thompson’s work on Cortina and 
the well researched Master’s Thesis by James Douglas offer a border figure who 
                                                 
11 Pedro Castillo and Albert Camarillo, eds., Furia y Muerte: Los Bandidos Chicanos (Los 
Angeles: Aztlán Publications, 1973); Carlos Larralde, Mexican American Movements and Leaders 
(Los Alamitos: Hwong Publishing Co., 1976). 
12 Américo Paredes, A Texas-Mexican Cancionero: Folksongs of the Lower Border (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1995): 23. Emphasis added. 
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was simply a caudillo pursuing his own self interest.13 Thompson, one of the 
foremost scholars on Cortina, assesses Cortina as a prominent figure along the 
border who “was far from a sacrosanct saint.” Yet for Thompson he “was a 
rugged, fearless, and at times ruthless, frontier caudillo,” who “was a hero to his 
people.” “Through all the sound and fury that was the history of Texas and 
Mexico,” Thompson concludes, “this remarkable man established his niche in 
history.”14  
A Perfidious Inquisitorial Lodge To Persecute And Rob Us 
Cortina’s first major act of defiance in September 1859 sparked an interest 
in his past. Just after the US-Mexican War Cortina is alleged to have murdered his 
employer and made away with the stock he was hired to drive to market in the 
US. The Cameron County grand jury indicted Cortina for “cattle stealing,” later 
adding eleven more indictments with Starr County contributing an additional four. 
His most ardent enemies, such as Adolf Glaevecke, insisted that Cortina was an 
inveterate cattle thief. To the outrage of leading citizens who were able to make 
their voices heard on this matter, Cortina, on many occasions went about his 
business in the Brownsville-Matamoros area with impunity prior to 1860.15 
                                                 
13 Thompson, Juan Cortina and the Texas-Mexico Frontier; James R. Douglas, “Juan Cortina: El 
Caudillo de la Frontera” (M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1987). 
14 Thompson, Cortina and the Texas-Mexico Frontier, p.8. 
15 Reports of the Committee of Investigation, 1873, pp. 127-128. 
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On July 13, 1859 Brownsville city marshal Robert Shears was in the 
process of arresting “a disorderly Mexican.” While reposing in a café, Cortina 
witnessed the marshal pistol-whip the old gentlemen, a man who had once been a 
ranch hand for Cortina’s mother, María Estéfana Goceascochea de Cortina. As 
Shears dragged his captive by the collar; Cortina rose and intervened on the 
prisoner’s behalf. Cortina attempted to guarantee the old man’s peaceful conduct, 
but was severely rebuffed by Shears. Cortina answered Shear’s abuse by drawing 
his sidearm and putting a slug in the marshal’s shoulder. Cortina, with his abused 
companion on the back of his horse, rode out of Brownsville, making little effort 
to conceal himself or to seek refuge on the other side of the river.16  
Despite Cortina’s boldness, no one pursued the matter further. Shears later 
testified that shortly after that Cortina had settled in Matamoros. After the 
incident Cortina made a number of overtures to compensate Shears for “the 
damages and pain” he sustained. Shears ignored Cortina’s conciliatory gestures 
and the animosity between the two men grew. Ominously, in these messages 
Cortina informed Shears that “he was in command of a company of soldiers in 
Matamoros.”17 
                                                 
16 U.S. House, Troubles on Texas Frontier, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 81, p. 3. 
17 U.S. House, Hostilities on the Rio Grande, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 21, p. 17; Thompson, 
Cortina and the Texas-Mexico Frontier, p. 81. U.S. House, Difficulties on the Southwestern 
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On September 28, Cortina rode into Brownsville looking for Shears and 
others who had wronged him. At the head of some fifty men Cortina entered 
Brownsville well before daybreak.18 Cortina and his men crossed the river and 
commanded the streets of Brownsville. They first went to the jail, demanding the 
keys from the jailer, Robert Johnson. Johnson ran to the home of his neighbor 
Viviano Garcia who made every effort to protect Johnson and prevent Cortina’s 
men from entering his house. Despite Garcia’s best efforts, they burst through the 
door killing Garcia and another unidentified Mexicano neighbor. Johnson was 
dragged outside and quickly dispatched. In the struggle one of Cortina’s men fell 
and another was wounded. Cortina’s men liberated the handful of prisoners being 
held in the jail.19 
Cortina and his men searched for Adolphus Glaveacke, one of Cortina’s 
principal enemies. Glaveacke hid in Samuel Belden’s store narrowly escaping 
Cortina’s wrath. Respecting Belden, Cortina chose not to pursue Glaveacke 
further. Shears, not present when Cortina burst into his home, also escaped 
Cortina’s vengeance. Cortina’s men disarmed the guards of the magazine and 
                                                 
18 The estimates of men with Cortina range from forty-five to one hundred. 
19 U.S. House, Difficulties on the Southwestern Frontier, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 52, p. 21; 
The American Flag, Brownsville, (October 8, 1859). 
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made every effort to liberate one hundred and twenty five barrels of powder, but 
with little success.20 
Not long after daybreak, the terrified residents of Brownsville assembled 
and just as quickly pleaded for the assistance of Matamoros’ most influential 
citizens to intervene. Jose Maria Carvajal, Miguel Tigerina, Agapito Longoria, 
and others responded to their call and “by their entreaties the guerrillas were 
induced to leave.” Carvajal came to the aid of the almost one hundred Anglo 
Brownsville residents by initially garrisoning a portion of the Mexican National 
Guard at Fort Brown. Carvajal and Cortina agreed that Cortina would withdraw to 
Matamoros. Cortina however moved his entire force to his own rancho just eight 
miles outside of Brownsville, crossing the river in small groups for fear of 
retaliation.21 
Still apprehensive, Brownsville residents organized a Commission of 
Safety that deployed squads of twenty-two men each to patrol the barricaded 
streets of the city. Just days after the invasion, a number of Brownsville citizens 
wrote Governor Runnels and President Buchanan: “this man Cortinas [sic] is 
endeavoring to strengthen himself with his associates by arousing a feeling of 
hostility generally against all Americans, and thus give his operations a semblance 
                                                 
20 U.S. House, Difficulties on the Southwestern Frontier, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 52, p. 32, 
66; U.S. House, Hostilities on the Rio Grande, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 21, p. 17. 
21 The American Flag, Brownsville, (October 8, 1859). 
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to the partisan guerilla warfare so common in Mexico itself.”22 The threat of a 
renewed effort by Cortina to raze the town of Brownsville compelled mayor 
Stephen Powers to once again request the aid of seventy of Matamoros’ national 
guard on Saturday October 12. 
Cortina’s motivation for raiding Brownsville was to bring certain enemies 
of the Mexican people, by Cortina’s reckoning, to justice. Two of the men killed 
during the invasion had recently been accused of murdering innocent Mexicanos, 
while the others were targeted because of their history of involvement in the 
despoiling of Mexicano’s from their property. William Neal and George Morris, 
for example, had a reputation for victimizing Mexicanos. On November 21, 1859, 
W.P. Reyburn, the Appraiser General, reported to F. H. Hatch that William Neal 
“had shot a Mexican in the street of Matamoros, on account of jealousy, and by 
crossing the river had placed himself beyond the pale of Mexican law.” A few 
months later he murdered yet another Mexicano in Brownsville “for the same 
cause.” George Morris, another of Cortina’s victims, “had perpetrated many 
Mexican murders.” Robert Johnson had also been guilty of killing a Mexicano 
only months before his own death.23 In the first in a series of pronunciamientos 
issued by Cortina, he claimed that the three Anglos who died were “all criminal, 
wicked men, notorious among the people for their misdeeds.” Of those who 
                                                 
22 U.S. House, Difficulties on the Southwestern Frontier, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 52, p. 20. 
23 U.S. House, Difficulties on the Southwestern Frontier, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 52, p. 65. 
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managed an escape, Cortina condemned them as “more unworthy and wretched, 
[for having] dragged themselves through the mire to escape our anger, and now, 
perhaps, with their usual bravado, pretend to be the cause of an infinity of evils, 
which might have been avoided but for their cowardice.”24 
Cortina made every effort to inform the residents of the Lower Rio Grande 
about the motivations and justness of his effort.25 “An event of grave importance,” 
Cortina wrote, “in which it has fallen to my lot to figure as the principal actor 
since the morning of the 28th instant, doubtless keeps you in suspense with regard 
to the progress of its consequences.” Cortina’s first public proclamation informed 
Valley residents of the motivations and objectives of Cortina’s mobilization. “Our 
object as you have seen,” the pronunciamiento informs the reader, “has been to 
chastise the villainy of our enemies, which heretofore has gone unpunished. These 
have connived with each other, and form, so to speak, a perfidious inquisitorial 
lodge to persecute and rob us, without any cause, and for no other crime on our 
part than that of being of Mexican origin; considering us, doubtless, destitute of 
those gifts which they themselves do not possess.”26  
Not content to allow Cortina’s brashness to go unanswered Sheriff James 
Browne and a number of men rode out to Rancho del Carmen. They arrested 
                                                 
24 Thompson, Cortina and the Texas-Mexico Frontier, p.15. 
25 A complete collection of the proclamations issued by Cortina are contained in Thompson, 
Cortina and the Texas-Mexico Frontier. 
26 Ibid.,14-15. 
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Tomás Cabrera, considered to be one of Cortina’s chief lieutenants. Outraged, 
Cortina demanded that leading citizens of Matamoros intervene and insure 
Cabrera’s safety. Cortina warned that if Cabrera was not released Brownsville 
would suffer. Not long after, William Tobin and a company of rangers under his 
command joined the fray. The combined force under the direction of Tobin hung 
Cabrera.27 
Early on Cortina enjoyed a number of small victories. On October 23, 
1859 the Brownsville Tigers under the command of W. B. Thompson numbering 
some twenty men attacked Cortina at Rancho del Carmen. Although assisted by 
Colonel Laranca and portions of the Matamoros’ National Guard including close 
to forty rancheros, the assault proved to be a disaster. Under the command of 
Captain Thompson the hastily organized troop was easily routed, losing a four 
pound howitzer and a field piece. Later, it was alleged that Mexican forces 
feigned hostility towards Cortina in order to make the surrendered heavy artillery 
pieces available to Cortina once they were abandoned in the field. However, a key 
factor in the defeat was the delay in ammunition arriving to the scene of the fight. 
It was later revealed that Glaveacke’s failure to deliver it in sufficient time 
contributed significantly to the ignominious defeat.28 On November 25, 1859 
Tobin’s forces along with volunteers from Brownsville and remnants of the 
                                                 
27 U.S. House, Troubles on Texas Frontier, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 81, p. 5. 
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Tigers engaged Cortina at Santa Rita. Tobin at least succeeded in not losing their 
howitzer, but was still forced to quit the field in defeat. The early successes of 
Cortina and his force prompted the Brownsville American Flag to warn that 
Cortina “has good arms, and his men are under discipline, and fight with zeal.”29  
Cortina’s fortunes turned for the worst when December 5, 1859 Major 
Heintzelman arrived in the lower Rio Grande. Heintzelman marched out of Fort 
Brown on December 14, 1859 at the head of one hundred sixty five federal 
soldiers. Tobin’s Rangers and other remnants of the earlier militia force, totaling 
roughly about one hundred and twenty men, also joined Heintzelman. Cortina’s 
men had been camped at La Ebronal but had already begun to break camp when 
Heintzelman and his combined force arrived on the scene for their first encounter. 
The small number of Cortina’s men who had remained behind engaged the fast 
approaching combined force of federal troops and rangers. Tobin’s rangers were 
reluctant to take the lead position, owing to their having been thrashed in their 
first outing against Cortina just weeks before. One ranger fell mortally wounded 
to eight of Cortina’s men who were easily routed by the superior force.30  
The war was drawing to a close with the devastating defeats suffered by 
Cortina at Rio Grande City on December 26 and, later, at La Bolsa on February 4, 
1860. Ford and Captain Stoneman remained in the field, suspicious of the 
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cooperation Mexican officials might offer. It was believed that Cortina enjoyed 
the full support of Mexicanos on the other side. Despite this charge, Cortina’s 
forces encountered a number of obstacles in Mexico as, for example, when the 
Alcalde of Mier refused to allow thirty of Cortina’s men to march through the 
main plaza in January 1860.31  
Ford, under the pretext of hunting for Cortina, orchestrated a series of 
raids into Mexican territory for the purpose of provoking a military response from 
Mexico. Although Cortina appeared to be routed and his forces scattered, ranger 
Ford insisted on pursuing him into Mexico. Believing that fellow countrymen 
were facilitating his raiding, Ford rode into Las Palmas on February 5 and at La 
Mesa on March 17. Ford claimed that he had permission from select Mexican 
officials, suggesting that they were cooperating in the eradication of the Cortina 
threat to the frontier.32 
Ford continued his hunt for Cortina, crossing his command just below 
Edinburg, intent on riding into Reynosa and taking a number of Cortina’s most 
notorious followers reported to be in the town. Reynosa, a town noted for its 
“rather strong anti-American feeling,” was well aware of Ford’s conduct at Las 
Palmas and La Mesa just months before. When Ford rode into Reynosa on April 
4, 1860, well-armed Mexicano forces surrounded his entire command. At a 
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considerable disadvantage, Ford narrowly escaped to the American side of the 
river, just below Edinburg, believing it prudent to await further instructions from 
Colonel Robert E. Lee. The Colonel had just arrived at Fort Brown on April 11 
and immediately took command of all the forces in the field. Lee reproached Ford 
for entering Reynosa intent on causing mischief.33 
The Cortina War, like most conflicts, has been designated with a 
beginning and end point, a period constituting the war. In the case of the conflict 
associated with Cortina, the dates given are dependent on the main battles, 
confrontations that took place on the field, such as El Ebronal, La Bolsa, etc. 
Overlooked in the case of Cortina are the events that follow the most conventional 
engagements. Especially ignored have been the skirmishes that took place after 
the war. The events following the confrontation at La Bolsa expose the critical 
processes of naming and narrating the war, an essential aspect of the concomitant 
symbolic violence that accompanies physical violence. Lee’s arrival signaled the 
temporary end of the “quasi war.”  
Reflecting on the Anglo show of force after La Bolsa, Ford opined that 
Major Heintzelman, Captain Stoneman and himself “were thoroughly convinced 
of the complicity of the Mexican authorities on the Rio Grande in the war 
prosecuted by Cortina against the United States.” Following Lee’s arrival, Ford 
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wanted to pursue the conflict, hoping to keep pressure on Mexico for political 
purposes. Ford was explicit about his own motives:  
In order to put an end to this quasi war, or to cause it to expand into actual 
and open hostilities between the two governments, we descended upon 
Reynosa. An armed collision was, in our opinion, sure to cause the prompt 
inauguration of hostilities or a settlement of the matter and ultimate peace. 
 
Ford made no apologies for his conduct and the execution of his orders believing 
that “our action was in the direction of protection to life and property, and of the 
vindication of the rights and the honor of our government, and that it would 
sanctioned by a patriotic people.” Ford’s patriotism extended to his concern 
regarding the increasing sectional strife then plaguing the nation. Remarkably, 
Ford believed that a war between Mexico and the US, had it been precipitated as a 
result of chasing Cortina, would have “stilled for a season at least” the sectional 
strife then consuming the nation.34 
The turmoil surrounding Brownsville prompted Governor Sam Houston to 
appoint Angel Navarro and Robert Taylor to form a commission “to investigate 
the causes, origin, and progress of the disturbances upon the Rio Grande river.” 
On February 15, 1860 Navarro reviewed the events authored by Cortina. They 
reported to Houston the conditions across the border that allowed Cortina to 
operate with a degree of support they found alarming. Arriving at the same 
conclusion as many officers in the field, Navarro surmised that given the political 
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  183
turmoil in Mexico and the ill feeling towards Americans, “this boundary line is 
worse than an imaginary one, and, to defend what we already possess, it is 
necessary for us to adopt a line of defense west of the Rio Bravo.”35 
Cortina’s activities during and after the US Civil War are less well known 
and do not alter the narrative of his role in the border. By June of 1860 Cortina 
escaped into the Burgos mountains, resurfacing briefly after an attack on Carrizo 
on May 23, 1861. The unfolding of the French Intervention further complicated 
Cortina’s activities during the US Civil War. During the resistance against 
Maximilian, Cortina enjoyed notoriety as a prominent military and political figure 
in Tamaulipas. Cortina’s military alliances and service resulted in his rise from a 
lieutenant colonel to governor of the state of Tamaulipas. Cortina, in his official 
capacity, attempted to eliminate theft and banditry when possible. Despite his 
efforts, his career along the border was marred by accusations of unrestricted 
personal ambition fueled by the animosity directed against him by notable Anglos 
across the river.36 
Cortina continued to dominate the lower Rio Grande political landscape 
allegedly as the sole mastermind of the cattle rustling that plagued the frontier. 
Political leaders in Washington and Texas insisted Cortina was the leading figure 
responsible for the countless raids on local cattle.  
                                                 
35 U.S. House, Hostilities on the Rio Grande 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 21, pp. 9-10. 
36 Reports of the Committee of Investigation, 1873, pp. 148-153. 
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In the summer of 1876 Gustave Schleicher addressed the United States 
Congress requesting “the protection of the Texas frontier on the Lower Rio 
Grande.” “Few of known, and it will be difficult for many to realize,” exhorted 
Schleicher, “that for ten years a portion of these United States has been overrun 
continually by invading bands of robbers from Mexico and that our people in the 
border country have for years been suffering all the losses and dangers to life and 
property incident to a state of war and invasion.”37 The combined raids came to be 
known as the Skinning War. The narration of events focus on the depredations 
committed by bandit notables such as Alberto Garza and other unnamed 
marauding bands. Despite the prominence of other notable “bandits” such as 
Garza, Cortina remained the pivotal figure throughout the period. 
The Las Cuevas War 
 
The excitement of the Nueces town raid was quickly overshadowed by 
paramilitary operations at Las Cuevas. Historians represent the Nueces town as a 
pretext for retaliatory efforts directed by Leander McNelly. The chain of events 
began with Governor Richard Coke’s response to Sheriff McClane who pleaded 
for protection. Coke dispatched McNelly to the scene who set up headquarters at 
Brownsville, on June 12, 1875.  
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Upon arriving, McNelly and his men found a party of Mexicanos with two 
hundred sixty five head of cattle at Palo Alto. With little hesitation, McNelly and 
his men cut down twelve, losing one of their own. McNelly’s attack on the 
Mexicano drovers did not go unanswered. According to Assistant Adjutant 
General William Whipple, a larger party of Mexican soldiers crossed over to 
rescue them.38 However, two companies of Buffalo Soldiers arrived on the scene 
in time to deter the Mexicano relief force. Confronted by the larger American 
force they “retired quietly to the south side of the Rio Grande.” Historians of the 
rangers celebrate McNelly with little mention of the support made available by 
Buffalo Soldiers, highlighting McNelly’s actions as a series of justifiable 
chastisements against unruly Mexicans.39 
A critical aspect of the Las Cuevas war concerns intrigue instigated by 
McNelly with the assistance of Lieutenant Commander Kells. As early as June 3, 
1875 Ord requested General Philip Sheridan to send an iron clad ship to the 
mouth of the Rio Grande to patrol the river for “marauding bands.” President 
Grant agreed with Ord’s request and commanded the Secretary of the Navy to 
deploy the Rio Bravo. Lieutenant Commander Kells arrived in Brownsville to 
take command of the iron clad. According to Michael Webster, Kells made his 
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way to the Low Rio Grande valley with every intention of staging an incident and 
provoking Mexican nationals to fire upon US soldiers. His goal was to incite a 
war, providing the pretext for the occupation of a portion of the coveted northern 
territory. Lacking any discretion and disobeying direct orders, Kells quickly 
revealed his intentions in the pubs of Brownsville. Before departing for 
Brownsville, Secretary of the Navy George M. Robeson had given Kells explicit 
orders “to avoid any act which might be made a just subject of complaint on the 
part of the Mexican Government.”40 Kells’ indiscretion and arrogance 
underscored the attitude shared by many that it was possible to precipitate an 
international incident with little or no difficulty. Many prominent Anglos believed 
that such a course of action would terminate cattle raids.41 McNelley agreed with 
Kells as did Ord and a number of Ord’s line officers. The rangers and Navy man 
deliberated over a number of possible plans. Kells eventually proposed that 
McNelly drive a herd of cattle to the Las Cuevas ranch, providing the pretext for 
an attack on a suspected force of Mexican outlaws at the ranch. Not surprisingly, 
the target was Las Cuevas, a ranch that had long been believed to be, as Webster 
described it, “the notorious refuge of Mexican raiders, which Texans considered 
the headquarters of Cortina’s organization of cattle thieves.” Although 
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acknowledging McNelly’s and Kell’s nefarious actions historians have been 
reluctant to evaluate the “scheme” as anything more than the kind of daring for 
which rangers are renown, an act of bravado that McNelly would be celebrated 
for years to follow. According to Webb, for example, McNelly “had some deep 
scheme in mind,” and that McNelly’s intentions were “to bring on a war with 
Mexico.” Webster agrees with Webb, suggesting it was “a daring intrigue on the 
part of the United States citizens to manufacture a war with Mexico.”42  
On November 8, 1875 Kells and McNelly set out on the Rio Bravo 
ostensibly to intercept “a suspected crossing of cattle.” Unfortunately, the Rio 
Bravo grounded not long after launching. The brief delay enabled US Consul, 
Thomas Wilson to send a number of frantic telegrams informing Washington of 
the provocative expedition that Kells had begun. Wilson believed the crossing 
was completely contrived and immediately set in motion the chain of command 
that eventually forced Kells to stand down. Wilson’s work also prevented other 
squads in the area from crossing the river. On November 15 Commander George 
Remey relieved Kells of his command.  
Despite the initial failure of their plan, McNelly persisted in his efforts to 
ignite a cross border conflagration. It was not long before McNelly had an 
opportunity to cross to the other side for mischief. In mid November, while out on 
patrol, Captain Randlett spotted and gave chase to cattle rustlers with two hundred 
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fifty head of stolen cattle to the river’s edge. Clendenin arrived shortly after, 
demanding the cattle be returned. Clendenin’s order was not complied with, 
allowing McNelly an opportunity to take advantage of the moment. McNelly 
impatient with the progress of Clendenin’s strategy, prepared to crossover to the 
other side at 1 a.m. Eager to take full advantage of the situation, in the early 
morning hours of November 19, McNelly and twenty-nine rangers forded the Rio 
Grande intent on punishing the men gathered at the Las Cuevas Ranch.  
In preparing the pre dawn raid, McNelly had ordered his men to “kill all 
you see except old men, women, and children.” Just after crossing McNelly’s 
ranger company fell upon a small hamlet, surprising men chopping wood and 
women preparing the morning’s meal. McNelly’s pre-dawn raid unfortunately 
descended on Las Cucharas, not the Las Cuevas ranch that was their intended 
target. At Las Cucharas, the rangers ran pell-mell into the small community, 
striking down twelve men and women. William Callicott, one of McNelly’s 
rangers, later explained that “many of the men were on their woodpiles cutting 
wood while their wives were cooking breakfast at Las Cucharas on little fires out 
of doors.” McNelly later reported that four had been killed before a woman 
informed them they were at the wrong ranch. “Before daylight on 19th,” explained 
McNelly, “I started for the ranch, found what I supposed was the Cuevas, charged 
it, found five or six men there, and they seemed to be on picket. We killed four of 
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them and then proceeded on my way to Cuevas (a half mile distant) and about 
three miles from the river.” Callicott later recalled, “we shot the men down on the 
woodpiles until we killed all we saw in the ranch.”43 
McNelly and his men proceeded to Las Cuevas, despite having lost the 
advantage of surprise by attacking an innocent settlement. They laid siege to the 
ranch until forced to retreat against a fast approaching force of rancheros and 
local police. Falling back to the river, McNelly and his men took a defensive 
position on the bank and quickly set up pickets. The concealed rangers ambushed 
Juan Flores, at the head of a small scouting party that unwittingly stumbled into 
the ranger’s sights. Flores was believed to be a leader of the group and one of 
Cortina’s “favorite bravos.” During the ambush of Flores and his men, Randlett 
crossed with forty regulars from the Eighth Cavalry to support McNelly and his 
men.44 
The next day a white flag of truce was raised. Randlett arranged with 
Camargo authorities to suspend hostilities until 9 a.m. the next morning. On 
November 20, Major A. J. Alexander conferred with the alcalde of Camargo who 
informed him they would deliver the requested stolen cattle. Later that afternoon, 
they presented seventy-six head of cattle. Impatient and still unsatisfied, in the 
course of the negotiations McNelly threatened to attack the ranch if the stolen 
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animals and those guilty of the theft were not immediately handed over to 
American forces. Afterwards, thirty-five of the stolen cattle were driven to the 
Santa Gertrudis ranch of King. “From the best information I could get,” 
Alexander later reported, “seven of the thieves and their confederates were killed, 
and a number wounded. One of these men was killed by the Mexican authorities 
while taking him to the jail at Camargo, and another was hung by Mexican 
rancheros living on this side.”45 
You Will Order Cortina To Be Removed From This Frontier 
The majority of episodes of violence, especially the more prominent ones, 
were often attributed to the evil influence of Cortina. He was believed to be the 
mastermind of the depredations that formed part of the “quasi war” along the 
border. Many contended that Cortina was the head of a cattle syndicate that was 
designed deliberately to thwart American settlement in the region.  
The interpretation and focus on Cortina revealed deeply held attitudes and 
opinions regarding Mexicanos in general and Mexicano authorities specifically. 
For Anglos Cortina was a synecdoche for cattle theft. He also symbolized the 
Mexican official who would stop at nothing to fill his pockets with lucre. Mexican 
authorities were deprecated for their avarice, incompetence, cowardice and 
collusion with freebooters, who it was claimed populated the entire region. In 
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fact, many simply accepted as fact that communities directly on the other side of 
the river lived solely off plunder.  
Counter to the common sense of the time, a number of Mexicanos opposed 
Cortina’s presence in the region. Despite Anglo suspicion of Mexican officials 
who were often accused of gross indifference, unspeakable incompetence or 
avaricious collusion with the “banditti,” many prominent Mexicanos on both sides 
of the river challenged Cortina. If rancheros were not actively taking part in “the 
border troubles” they were considered to be in league with Cortina by facilitating 
a conspiracy of pirates. In some cases, these were the same Mexicanos who were 
locked in racial animosity with newly arriving Anglos and Indians.  
Cortina’s demise in the narrative of border conflict coincided with Porfirio 
Diaz’s own successful golpe de estado in January 1876. Diaz’s commitment to 
American business interests had earned him substantial and badly needed funding. 
It also made possible the tacit support of key line officers and even the 
commander of the military district to send well-armed troops in pursuit of 
political exiles agitating against his regime. Both the implicit and explicit support 
allowed Diaz to defeat Lerdo, who according to Hart, had been waging a guerrilla 
war that severely depleted Diaz’s treasury and exposed his dwindling support.  
The elimination of Cortina helped establish Diaz’s control in the north and 
ease US diplomatic pressure. John Ford was explicit: 
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Díaz asked if the Americans would loan him cash. He was told ‘you are no 
doubt fully aware of the trouble that General Cortina is causing on this 
frontier…. If you will give your word that, if successful in the revolution 
you are about to inaugurate, you will order Cortina to be removed from 
this frontier, Americans will loan you money.’ General Díaz gave his 
word. He obtained money from American citizens…. General Cortina has 
been under surveillance for nearly twenty years. Can any gentlemen dare 
say President Díaz has not fully redeemed his pledge?46 
 
It was, according to Hart, prominent entrepreneurial and industrial 
interests, especially railroad, under the leadership of King that organized the 
support for Diaz. His commitment to put an end to the “border troubles” meant a 
boon of US investment opportunities. King, who purchased $30,000 in Mexican 
National Railroad stock, promised Diaz additional financial assistance if he would 
rid southern Texas of the troublesome Cortina.”47 Once Diaz successfully claimed 
power, he addressed the border troubles by quietly allowing US military to cross 
into Mexico while in pursuit of alleged cattle rustlers although he publicly 
expressed outrage at US crossings. Later, after Treviño and Ord established a 
cooperative relationship, Diaz made his policy more public and became more 
openly conciliatory to the US by agreeing to reciprocal crossing rights. Diaz 
forced Cortina to return to Mexico City or face sure death, allowing him to live 
out his days under house arrest. 
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Hart argues that although the cattle raids were associated with Cortina, 
they were primarily, and most importantly, primarily directed at the financial 
interests of King and many of his associates. Cortina resented the loss of 
communal lands that Sabas Cavasos and others made available to ambitious 
entrepreneurs like King. Cavasos, according to Hart, had taken advantage of 
certain ejiditarios under dispute and illegally appropriated vast tracts of ranch 
land that he and his associates made available immediately following the US-
Mexican War. Cavasos had also consistently supported Anglo mercantile and 
industrial ambitions both during and after the American Civil War.48  
The investigations organized in the wake of the violence and subsequent 
scholarship that highlighted Cortina’s predations has been complicit with state 
interests attempting to attribute conflict exclusively to a few powerful individuals. 
Even though Cortina may have believed himself to be the caudillo of South Texas 
that would, as Thompson informs us, “abolish the evils of Anglo-American 
barrister shenanigans, and restore Mexican authority north to the Nueces River 
and perhaps beyond,” the fact remains that Cortina did not operate alone. The 
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conflict that Cortina’s life narrates was endemic to the borderlands. Nor was it 
limited to the US-Mexico border, it also marked the political tensions between 
Mexico’s center and periphery throughout the long nineteenth century. Moreover, 
it reflected the competition between the emergent north where the norteno culture 
flourished and that of the center, always suspicious of the Mexican ranchero 
whose direct contact with American expansion compromised him in the eyes of 
his southern compatriots. Although Cortina functioned as a symbol of Anglo-
Mexican conflict, his role was only one part of a more complicated process of 
border warfare. 
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5. “THEIR HEADS WOULD HAVE TO DANCE ON THE 
SANDS!” 
To rebel was indeed to destroy many of those familiar signs which he had learned to read 
and manipulate in order to extract a meaning out of the harsh world around him and live 
with it. The risk in ‘turning things upside down’ under these conditions was indeed so 
great that he could hardly afford to engage in such a project in a state of absent-
mindedness. 
Ranajit Guha1 
As the nation’s attention turned to St. Louis and other major cities during 
one of its most violent general strikes, Generals William Sherman, Phil Sheridan, 
and Edward O. Ord, along with Governor Richard Hubbard worried about the 
“Texas Troubles.”2 “Banditry,” especially cattle theft and a series of raids 
believed to be ordered by Cortina himself, and increased “Indian depredations” 
understood to have originated from Mexico, were so troublesome Ord was 
authorized to cross into Mexico in pursuit of depredators on June 1, 1877. While 
the region’s military and political leaders concerned themselves with south Texas, 
few people paid much attention to the violence erupting in the western part of the 
State. Few concerned themselves with the tensions that resulted from Judge 
Charles Howard’s brazen efforts to privatize nearby salt flats that had been 
available to the Mexicano community “from time immemorial.” Mexicanos not 
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only objected to Howard’s prohibitions regarding access to salt, they also 
demanded the punishment of those who had transgressed the law and local 
custom. Howard’s brutal murder of Louis Cardis, a prominent political leader and 
ally of the Mexicano community, angered local residents but generated little 
concern by officials outside of El Paso. Thus, the five-day gun battle in the streets 
of San Elizario in December of 1877 between Mexicano citizens militia, Howard 
and his allies, and a company of Texas Rangers shocked a nation. Once the nation 
learned of the capture of the ranger force and the public execution of Howard 
along with two successful local merchants, John Atkinson and John McBride, 
many believed war with Mexico was imminent.  
Most authorities knowledgeable on the region had little doubt that 
Mexicanos from the other side of the boundary were most certainly involved. The 
assumed participation not only raised the specter of an international crisis, but 
also suggested a race war loomed on the horizon. Convinced a long anticipated 
invasion from Mexico was imminent, local officials quickly decided to reestablish 
political authority over the predominantly Mexicano population of Ysleta, San 
Elizario, Socorro and outlying areas. Still others, especially the majority of the 
eighty Anglos who recently claimed El Paso as their home, could only worry for 
their safety and pray that the violence aimed at some of their countrymen would 
not result in the devastation of the region. As in other episodes of violence, the 
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San Elizario Salt War was the occasion to renew petitions for military protection. 
Pleas for federal forces were especially troubling since Fort Bliss had just recently 
been decommissioned. Colonel Edward Hatch would later report “the troubles 
have occurred since removal of the garrisons from El Paso and Quitman by the 
Department Commander of Texas.”3 Later, General Sheridan would claim he 
“never recommended the abandonment of Fort Bliss,” insisting that the papers 
were processed during his absence.4 
In this chapter I re-examine the San Elizario Salt War. Previous studies 
have overlooked the critical fact that Mexicanos played key roles on both sides of 
the battle lines. Moreover, Anglo allies could be counted among each faction. 
Despite the porousness of racial, and by extension class, boundaries, I argue the 
Salt War remains an important Mexicano resistance. Less a riot, mob action, or 
even a community revolt, the actions by Mexicanos amounted to an insurgency. 
The leadership, organization, and objectives resisted physical containment and 
political control. An insurgency better describes a diverse but organized portion of 
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the Mexicano community, a population that has been rendered mostly invisible in 
the multiple and competing interpretations of the events of that winter and the 
larger discourse of frontier defense. I suggest that the events of that winter amount 
to an “insurgency” that was undertaken primarily by Mexicanos in order to hold 
on to commons, restore their waning political authority, and reclaim their 
collective dignity in the face of Anglo excesses in the context of the imposition of 
Anglo capitalist material and social relations.  
I take up the Salt War in this chapter by and the chapter that follows. In 
the first chapter I closely examine the micro history of the war, detailing the 
various stages of the conflict. Through careful attention to the “ethnography of 
resistance” I demonstrate the diversity of each faction and their mixed motives for 
battle. However, acknowledging the complexity of the conflict through a strategy 
of reading the conflict through historical ethnography does not minimize the 
excessive violence, or “outrages,” by Anglos who had been defeated. Rather than 
narrate the number of beatings, theft, rapes and murder carried out by the rangers 
and a posse from Silver City, in the chapter that follows I examine the brutal 
reprisals that followed the street battle. I examine the violence visited upon 
innocent Mexicanos by closely investigating the local, state and federal 
investigations that followed the actual fighting. The fruits of these investigative 
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efforts allowed Anglos to regain control of the meaning of the story of the Salt 
War, further establish political control, and criminalize Mexicanos. 
The San Elizario Salt War has received only cursory attention from 
scholars. For some it easily fulfilled the pretensions of a war, evoked the fear of a 
race riot, or was easily dismissed as the undisciplined outrage of a Mexican mob. 
More importantly, scholars have tacitly agreed on the limited importance on the 
entire sequence of events that have been designated as the Salt War, including the 
deteriorating relationship between Cardis and Howard. Major John B. Jones, 
commander of the Texas Ranger Frontier Battalion who later played a key role in 
an investigation of the events, struggled to name the episode, explaining the 
events as a series of outbreaks or convulsions, including the “October mob,” the 
“November riot,” and the “December mob.” Naturally, his designations and 
narrative stressed the criminality, spontaneity, and political immaturity he easily 
attributed to the Mexicano population.5 
Ultimately, scholars of the West generally, and the US-Mexico 
Borderlands in particular, have been unenthusiastic about exploring the 
implications of the ignominious defeat of the famous frontier force and even less 
interested in recounting the violent reprisals by Anglos against innocent 
Mexicanos that followed. H. H. Bancroft simply narrates the events as not much 
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more than “a serious trouble” of “perfidious Mexicans.”6 William Leckie regards 
the Salt War as “a small scale civil war” that only ended once the “battle 
toughened” Buffalo soldiers under the command of Hatch rode into the plaza of 
the dusty border towns and restored order.7 
Scholars who focus on the Texas Rangers have offered especially 
problematic interpretations of the El Paso Troubles. While difficult to ignore as 
part of ranger history, it remains the only instance of the capture of a Texas 
Ranger company and as a consequence an undeniable blemish in the record of the 
Frontier Battalion specifically and the Texas Rangers as a whole. Eager to affirm 
Anglo dominance in the region, scholars of the rangers preferred to exalt Anglo 
subjugation of the “wild” and “degenerate” populations of the frontier. Thus, they 
had difficulty treating the defeat critically.8 Two prominent and extended 
treatments of the Salt War are worth closer examination. It is important to note 
that they are flagrantly incestuous, further revealing the extent of racial bias. Both 
studies further expose the uncritical interpretations present in the public 
statements of Anglos on the scene. Charles Ward’s “The Salt War of San Elizario, 
1877” and Walter Webb’s The Texas Rangers, share a number of pejorative 
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assumptions in their interpretation of the events and their assessment of the 
people. These works provide a glimpse into the production of knowledge that 
serves state and market interests.9 The narrative of the Salt War confirms for both 
men a fundamental truth of Texas history. Ward asserts that  
the incident adds another example of a maxim of Texas History -that 
Texans can whip almost any number of Mexicans as long as they keep to 
fighting, but are sure to lose when they begin to parley.10 
 
Similarly, Webb informs his readers of the “axiom in Texas history that when a 
Texan fights a Mexican he can win; when he parleys he is doomed; and so it was 
in this case.”11  
Webb and Ward highlight El Paso’s arrested development by pointing to 
geographic isolation, the relative size of the Mexicano population, limited 
commercial access to Eastern markets, unschooled Mexicanos who were 
unprepared for Anglo capitalism, and the constant threat of depredations by 
Indians and “bandits.” An “isolated” region populated predominantly by 
Mexicanos would have “little or no sense of loyalty to the government” and 
possess only “the faintest understanding” of its legal institutions. The result would 
                                                 
9 Charles Ward wrote his Master’s Thesis under the direction of Walter Webb. Afterwards, Ward 
accused Webb of inappropriately making use of his study. On a number of occasions Ward 
appealed to Sonnichsen to intervene and remedy the situation but to no avail. Sonnichsen papers… 
10 Ward, “Salt War,” p. 135. 
11 Webb, Texas Rangers, p. 360. 
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be a “race war” in which it would be as Webb proclaims, “rough sledding with the 
Mexican horde.”12 
A generation of scholars uneasy with the pejorative representation of 
Mexicanos in US history viewed the Salt War as a community upheaval for self-
preservation common to the Mexican American experience. Rodolfo Acuña, the 
dean of Chicano history, proclaims the Salt War a “people’s revolt.” Similarly, 
Mary Romero questions the ethnocentric assumptions of manifest destiny by 
viewing the Salt War as a peasant revolt. Robert Rosenbaum declares the events 
as a struggle for self-preservation by Mexicano peasants unable and unwilling to 
assimilate into the Anglo dominant order, adding that the conflict was an example 
“of times when Mexicano frustration and rage coalesced into the collective 
violence of community upheavals.”13 Thus, Chicano scholars have placed the Salt 
War in the context of a protracted struggle by Mexicanos against the 
dispossession they faced immediately following the US-Mexican War. 
The Problem with Salt 
In the final days of June, 1877, the salt question was taken up when 
Howard, John McBride, Ward Blanchard and “three colored men” formed an 
expedition to survey and claim the remaining portion of the Guadalupe Salt 
                                                 
12 Webb, The Texas Rangers, pp. 345-346. 
13 Rodolfo Acuña, Occupied America: A History of Chicanos (New York: Longman, 2000); Mary 
Romero, “El Paso Salt War: Mob Action or Political Struggle?” Aztlan 16 (1985): 139; Robert 
Rosenbaum, Mexicano Resistance in the Southwest: “The Sacred Right of Self-Preservation,” 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981): 64-65. 
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Lakes. Howard organized the expedition on behalf of his father-in-law George 
Zimpleman who had applied to locate sections with Memphis and El Paso 
Railroad certificates. Howard’s efforts on behalf of Zimpleman were troubled in 
many ways, not the least of which was the Texas and Pacific Railroad Company 
contested Zimpleman’s own claim to the railroad scrip.14 
Howard should not have been surprised that people protested his efforts to 
“locate” the remaining portions of the Guadalupe Salt Lakes. Howard no doubt 
was familiar with the brief and turbulent history of salt in the region. Samuel 
Maverick had already located much of the salt flats, although Albert Fountain had 
contested his claim long. This initial struggle for salt occurred long before 
Howard anticipated riches from newly acquired salt.15 Mexicanos had freighted 
salt from the San Andres salt beds eighty miles to the northwest of El Paso since 
1824 and had to fight to maintain unfettered access to those as well.16 The 
Guadalupe Salt Lakes, a hundred and ten miles to the east of El Paso, directed 
attention away from San Andres when a road made the lakes more accessible in 
1863. The temptation to control the salt trade erupted into a number of conflicts 
                                                 
14 U.S. House, El Paso Troubles in Texas, 45th Cong., 2nd Sess., Ex. Doc. 93, p. 51. Hereafter 
cited as El Paso Troubles in Texas. 
15 Ibid., 127-8. 
16 J. J. Bowden, “The Magoffin Salt War,” Password 7:3 (Summer 1962): 106-110. 
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not long after the road had been established, dividing the entire community into 
the Salt Ring and Anti-Salt Ring with Fountain in the middle of the fray.17 
Undaunted by previous failed intrigues to control salt, Howard’s party set 
out with “three Mexicans” who according to him refused to proceed believing that 
the party would be “mobbed at the instigation of Louis Cardis.” Before arriving at 
the salt lakes, Howard and his company stopped at Fort Quitman to survey two 
sections of six hundred forty acres adjacent to the fort, land presumed to be 
potentially rich in silver. After completing the Quitman survey, the party made its 
way to the salt lakes. At the lakes Blanchard surveyed three sections of six 
hundred and forty acres, each immediately adjacent to the Maverick property. As 
Zimpleman’s agent, Howard claimed the property by posting “notices that all Salt 
Lakes belonged to him... warning people against taking salt without paying him 
for it.”18  
On September 29, Macedonio Gándera and Jose María Juárez set out to 
defy Howard’s notice and challenge his bid to control the salt trade. Before they 
had even set out, these two “prominent Mexicans” found themselves standing 
before the bench of Judge Gregorio N. García.19 Once in front of the magistrate, 
Gándera abandoned his earlier defiance, publicly denying any plans of freighting 
                                                 
17 El Paso Troubles in Texas, pp. 128-9. 
18 Ibid., 69-71. 
19 Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, p. 143. 
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salt. Juárez, on the other hand, remained steadfast in his resolve. He defiantly 
proclaimed “in a very threatening and insulting manner to the court” that he 
intended to go for salt. García answered by ordering them to be held in custody 
and not released until payment of a two hundred dollar bond.20 
Upon learning of the incarceration of Juárez and Gándera, forty to fifty 
residents of San Elizario and Ysleta gathered to free them both. They also 
petitioned Justice of the Peace Porfirio García to issue a warrant for Howard’s 
arrest. Exasperated by the inactivity and resistance of the Garcías, the party 
arrested them both. The Garcías’ intransigence also prompted the organized 
citizens to convene “a court of their own [in which they] tried them for wrongs 
(real or supposed) done to them and their American friends.”21 They also 
intercepted Howard who was en route to Austin, binding him in the back of a 
wagon. Sheriff Kerber was also disarmed and spirited away “to the camp of the 
insurgents” where he was held prisoner.22  
Immediately, friends and associates of Louis Cardis alerted him that the 
Garcías, Howard and Kerber were in trouble. J. R. Mariani, another friend and 
associate, explained to Cardis that the “people took up arms.” Mariani begged 
Cardis to intervene and to use his “influence to pacify the excited people.” Cardis 
                                                 
20 Ward, “The Salt War,” pp. 44-45; El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 106. 
21 Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, p. 143. 
22 El Paso Troubles in Texas, pp. 73; 142. 
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quickly made his way to El Paso and negotiated the release of all the captives 
including Howard. “I begged for his life with all my might,” Cardis later wrote in 
his diary. With the assistance of Father Pierre Bourgade, the local parish priest, 
both men arranged the resignation by both Garcías; the posting of a twelve 
thousand dollar bond by Howard and the surrender of all claims to the Salt Lakes. 
Jesús Cobos, Tomas García, John Atkinson and Charles Ellis put up Howard’s 
bond. It was also agreed that Howard be exiled from El Paso.23 Under the escort 
of eight men on the evening of October 4, Howard returned to San Elizario in 
preparation to leave for New Mexico at dawn the next day.24 Forced to flee to 
Mesilla, Howard had no choice but to feign relinquishing the salt lakes to the 
people of the valley communities. Captain Blair later reported that part of what 
may have motivated the incarceration of local officials was that it was alleged that 
the judge, despite being Mexican, was “under Howard’s dictation.”25  
The situation alarmed the eighty Anglo American residents of Franklin. 
Telegrams reached the desk of civil and military authorities around the state. 
Although Kerber had escaped, he found himself powerless to do anything. He 
notified Governor Hubbard that “none of the American citizens are safe so long as 
                                                 
23 El Paso Troubles in Texas, pp. 61, 73, 99; Mesilla Valley Independent, October 6, 1877. 
24 Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, pp. 145-146. 
25 Report of Capt. Thomas Blair, December 19, 1877, “Disturbances at El Paso, TX September 
1877-May 1878,” “Special Files” of Headquarters, Roll 14. 
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we have no troops to enforce law and order.”26 Kerber also complained that he 
had difficulty raising a posse. Outraged at the detention of legally constituted 
authorities, Kerber informed Rucker that a military force was necessary to 
“disperse the mob” given that there were “not enough Americans living in the 
county to form a force sufficient for the purpose.” Kerber confessed that US 
citizens of Mexican descent refused to “obey his summons to act as a posse.” He 
insisted, “the Mexicans who are not with the rioters sympathize with them and 
cannot be relied upon.”27  
While Cardis and Bourgade were intervening in the troubles, Lt. Rucker 
learned of the disturbances. Lt. Rucker, accompanied by a local guide, proceeded 
to San Elizario in order to confirm the “various rumors.” Unfortunately, twenty 
armed men escorting Howard stopped Rucker and his party en route. Rucker 
believed “that every American in the county would have been killed, had not their 
terms in Howard’s case been complied with.” Rucker noted that the men he saw 
appeared to be well organized and that it seemed that they “had been preparing for 
the events for sometime.” He also believed that “their meetings were so secretly 
conducted that the civil authorities did not know anything about their 
                                                 
26 El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 142. 
27 Report of Lt. Rucker, October 2, 1877, “Disturbances at El Paso, TX September 1877-May 
1878,” “Special Files” of Headquarters, Roll 14. 
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movements.”28 On October 11, 1877 Edward Hatch reported that the lives and 
property of “english speaking American citizens” were not safe. 
Military officials anticipating further tension assessed the Mexicano 
population and the role of Mexicanos from the other side. After receiving 
Rucker’s reports, Brvt. Major General Pope informed Col. R. C. Drum, Assistant 
Adjutant General, “that it is possible that there may arise the difficulties 
apprehended by Lieut. Rucker and if so it will be judicious to have a force at El 
Paso large enough to prevent the intrusion of Mexicans from the Mexican side of 
the Rio Grande.”29 Both Pope and Rucker believed that Mexicans on the 
American side of the river, although U.S. citizens, would “sympathize, in any 
controversy, with the Mexicans from the south side of the Rio Grande and not at 
all with the American born citizens on this side.” Any disturbance, Pope 
concluded, would be between “the combined Mexicans from both sides of the Rio 
Grande and the Americans.” Notably, Pope commented that it would be “very 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Pope expressed concern regarding the possible complications that would follow if troops were 
sent and garrisoned in El Paso. Believing that once troops were stationed in the region it would be 
difficult to deploy them elsewhere on along the frontier of New Mexico and Colorado where they 
are already stretched thin, it being “impossible to get them away again or indeed to avoid 
constantly strengthening them.” The reasons for the difficulty he confessed were “obvious and not 
strange to our experience.” “If troops are sent there,” Pope explained, “they will of course be kept 
there as the demands for them and the reasons therefor [sic], actual and imaginary or manufactured 
will increase with everyday of occupation.” 
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difficult to discriminate in a riot, or other disturbance between those Mexicans 
who are citizens of Texas and those who are foreigners.”30  
Cardis continued to mediate. He also organized committees of safety and 
wrote Governor Hubbard to assuage his alarm.31 Cardis was aware that telegrams 
and newspaper articles were circulating information about a Mexicano uprising, 
and that an armed invasion from Mexico was imminent. Cardis may have been 
referring to a communication Hatch had sent Rucker ordering the Lieutenant to 
“investigate whether or not it is true that the property of the United States are in 
danger on account of the afore-mentioned invasion.” Since the presence of Rucker 
and his men caused some concern, Cardis assured his friends and neighbors that 
Rucker had no other intention but to “investigate the case and make his report to 
the General.” He was confident that, “tranquility and peace and the truth will 
manifest itself in time.”32 
I’m Going to Kill Him Anyway! 
Cardis and Howard had connived earlier to profit from salt. However, 
their partnership quickly deteriorated leading to the thrashing that Howard gave 
Cardis in June. Wesley Owens, a servant of Howard’s, recalled the day Howard 
and Cardis met at Fort Quitman. Before they departed on the surveying 
                                                 
30 Letter from Pope to Drum, Nov. 7th, 1877, “Disturbances at El Paso, TX September 1877-May 
1878,” “Special Files” of Headquarters, Roll 14. 
31 El Paso Troubles in Texas, pp. 142, 62-63; Ward, “Salt War,” pp. 55-56. 
32 W. W. Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, 1859-1898 (El Paso, 1901): 144-145. 
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expedition, not expecting to find Cardis at the fort, Howard had said to Owens: 
“Wesley, when I get back from Fort Davis, if Cardis don’t let me alone I’m going 
to kill him. I’m going to kill him any way, for he has been bothering me long 
enough.”33 Howard found Cardis in the store and office of S. Schutz & Bro on 
October 10, 1877. Howard fired at Cardis hitting his exposed abdomen, just 
beneath the cover of the desk. They removed Cardis’ lifeless body on a plank and 
discovered his pistol still in its scabbard and a blood-splattered missive Cardis had 
been writing to the citizens of Ysleta and San Elizario.34  
Not long afterwards, Howard surrendered himself to Magoffin, the 
customs inspector. At the urging of Magoffin, Howard fled Franklin “to escape 
the vengeance of Cardis’ friends.”35 Howard believed his troubles resulted from 
Cardis’ insidious control of the Mexicano population. Just days prior to the 
assassination, Howard defiantly reported that the “reign of terror” which rocked 
the county resulted from “the work of one man, whose evil counsel [sic] for years 
has hung over the Mexican population of El Paso, like a pall.” Howard explained 
to the readers of the Mesilla Valley Independent that Mexicanos were ignorant and 
envied Anglos. Howard insisted Mexicanos were easy prey for a man like Cardis 
                                                 
33 El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 59. 
34 Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, pp. 146-147; El Paso Troubles in Texas, pp. 59-60; Mesilla 
Valley Independent, October 13, 1877. 
35 Report of Capt. Thomas Blair, December 19, 1877, “Disturbances at El Paso, TX September 
1877-May 1878,” “Special Files” of Headquarters, Roll 14. 
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who “fastened upon the unfortunate Mexican population... like a vampyre [sic], 
and has fed on their ignorance and prejudices.”36  
A number of witnesses noted the personal animosity that had developed 
between Howard and Cardis. Sheriff Kerber informed Governor Hubbard that 
Cardis “is considered here the commander of said mob.” Kerber explained that 
Cardis “tells them in his speeches that they have the right to organize into armed 
bands if they think that they would not find justice.” District Attorney, J. A. 
Zabriske also confirmed a general dislike of Cardis. He supported Kerber, 
asserting “it wasn’t necessary” to formally charge and hold Howard since “if it 
was any other country but this a monument would be erected to his [Howard’s’] 
memory for delivering us from a tyrannical, unscrupulous scoundrel.” Major John 
Jones confirmed the attitudes of many of the Anglo witnesses, suggesting that 
Cardis had been after Howard –keen on destroying his business interests and even 
wanting him dead.37  
In the end, the murder also exposed the partisanship that each man 
claimed throughout the community. Most Anglos were heavily invested in 
recuperating Howard’s actions and overlooking his most flagrant transgressions 
by emphasizing the negative impact Cardis exercised on Mexicanos. Anglos and 
later scholars considered Cardis “Mexicanized” by virtue of his facility with the 
                                                 
36 El Paso Troubles in Texas, pp. 142; 156; Mesilla Valley Independent, October 6, 1877. 
37 El Paso Troubles in Texas, pp. 142, 156. 
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language and his own Italian heritage, a designation that made him suspect. Thus 
the political squabbles and economic competition between Howard and Cardis 
was veiled beneath the fabric of race.  
Send Us Help for the Honor of the Gringos 
Mexicanos were indebted to Cardis assistance and recognized his value to 
the valley community. Angered by Howard’s brazen disregard for the law and the 
loss of a respected leader, the citizens of the lower valley organized a “junta” 
made up of three representatives from each town. They met in Ysleta, the county 
seat, and agreed to “request the County Judge, G. N. García, to resign and in case 
of this refusal to compel him to do so.” They offered the position to E. Stine 
“provided he would bind himself not to prosecute those who have taken part in 
the insurrection, and to prosecute Judge Charles Howard to the utmost.” Stine 
declined the honor. He took the opportunity to remind his neighbors “that he or 
any other man who held the office must obey the law.”38 The junta insisted 
Howard be brought to justice and that the bond previously posted be relinquished.  
Governor Hubbard had to attend to pleas from concerned Anglo residents. 
Howard’s bondsmen reported that  
the mob have got together to arrest and kill and plunder Ellis, Cobos, 
Tomas García, Atkinson, Gregorio García and others. Some eight of ten of 
us have got together & will fight til [sic] we die; we are in Atkinsons [sic] 
house -send us help for the honor of the Gringos. 
                                                 
38 Mesilla Valley Independent, October 27, 1877; November 3, 1877. 
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Hubbard dispatched Jones to El Paso. He arrived on November 3 and immediately 
met with Howard and A. Fountain. Kerber warned Jones to “be on the lookout, 
Major -these greasers are very treacherous.” Jones also arranged a meeting with 
the junta. With the assistance of Father Bourgade as translator, the junta informed 
Jones they were lawfully assembled. They also asserted that someone bring 
Howard to justice, otherwise they would. The junta made it clear to Jones that 
Howard’s bond had been forfeited and that his bondsmen should be compelled to 
relinquish the twelve thousand dollar bond. Jones made every effort to dissuade 
them from pursuing any further course of action, advising them to “obey the law, 
go quietly and disband themselves.” The junta presented a copy of the 
Constitution of the United States, reminding the Texas Ranger Commander of 
their legal rights of free speech, assembly and bearing of arms.39  
Bourgade faithfully communicated the “tacitly or audibly expressed” 
opinion of the junta. Bourgade relayed to Jones that those gathered believed 
that in making arrest of Howard and the judges they were right, because 
they were the people and the people were the law; that for the same reason 
they were right in forcing Howard to sign his relinquishment of claim to 
the Salt Lakes [sic], and because they had no hope of collecting the 
forfeited bond in the courts, they had a right to take measures to collect it 
themselves by force. 
 
                                                 
39 El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 154; Ward, “Salt War,” p. 65; El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 66. 
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Later that night, the representatives confronted Jones about the rumor that he was 
raising a company of rangers from the area. They asked that they be allowed to 
raise their own company with their own officers.40 Ignoring the junta’s concerns, 
Jones commissioned John B. Tays as a Lieutenant with a command of twenty-two 
men. 
Before Jones organized the new force of rangers, he disbanded an already 
existing unit largely staffed by Mexicanos. Previous formations of Texas Rangers 
included companies of local men who were accustomed to responding as part of 
organized militia units to raids. These companies included Gregorio García, for 
example, a local resident who had previously led eighty men on an expedition 
against Apaches.41 García later led a “captain of a company of rangers in 1871.42 
Another Mexicano resident, Telesforo Montes, had commanded a Minute 
Company for El Paso County throughout 1871-1876.43  
Jones only empowered García temporarily “to call together as many as he 
could of the better class of Mexicans, to get them together and arm them, and hold 
them under arms… to preserve the peace.” Once Jones replaced García with Tays 
and a new muster of rangers, García still made every effort to continue to assist 
                                                 
40 El Paso Troubles in Texas, pp. 99-100. 
41 James Day and Dorman Winfrey, The Indian Papers of Texas and the Southwest, 1825-1916 
vol. 4 (Austin: Pemberton Press 1966): 170. 
42 El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 43. 
43 Day and Winfrey, The Indian Papers of Texas and the Southwest, p. 393 
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the new ranger force. García led a small squad of five men entirely on his own 
initiative. García’s unofficial auxiliary unit helped protect Ellis’ store before he 
and his command were forced to surrender.44  
While Jones was busy re-establishing Anglo authority, Howard was 
determined to return to El Paso in order to pursue his claim on the salt lakes. 
During Howard’s absence, he made sure to be in constant contact with Jones. In 
Mesilla, Howard made a futile attempt to enlist some local men to accompany 
him as an armed escort. Howard also demanded more efforts by the military to 
restore order. “If the governor don’t help us,” Howard defiantly proclaimed, “I am 
going bushwhacking.”45 Major Jones arranged for Howard’s return on November 
16. When Howard arrived, Magoffin quickly swore out a legal complaint and 
bonded him in the sum of $4,000. Magoffin pleaded with Howard, “for Lord’s 
sake to stay away until the court met.” Howard’s incarceration was moot since 
according to Judge Blacker “there was no jail in El Paso County.” After a few 
days in El Paso, Howard returned to Mesilla.46 
On December 2, local fleteros gathered sixteen carts in order to freight salt 
from the disputed salt lakes to the valley communities. The salineros embarked 
from San Elizario, intending to return on the twelfth with their carts brimming 
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46 Mesilla Valley Independent, November 24, 1877; El Paso Troubles in Texas, pp. 154; 80; 124. 
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with salt. “People of this town and other towns, having nothing to live upon,” 
explained Vidal García, resolved “to go to the Salt Lakes, get salt and take it into 
Mexico and trade it for provisions.” The expedition numbered approximately 
twenty men mostly from San Elizario, since according to García, “the other towns 
for fear of Howard, retired from this arrangement.” On the same day, Howard left 
Las Cruces and made his way to San Elizario determined to investigate the 
rumors of a salt lake expedition. News of the December freighting outfit also 
reached the governor who warned the men “to obey the laws and to respect civil 
authorities and the State military forces in El Paso.” Directing his orders 
specifically at Francisco Barela, the governor insisted that “you can control your 
people, if you will, I’m informed. Do so.”47 
Tensions escalated while Howard had been exiled in Las Cruces. Much of 
the ill feeling towards local Mexicanos by Howard and his associates surfaced in 
the local tavern. Vidal García related that “friends of Howard,” especially 
Atkinson, would get drunk and insult Mexicanos. “We resolved not to respond,” 
García explained, “but to suffer these insults which were given [to] by Mexicans 
of this town at all times, whether drunk or sober.” On December 11, San Elizario 
merchant and one time deputy sheriff, John Atkinson boldly declared to Mexicano 
residents of San Elizario that Howard, his business partner and political ally, 
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would soon arrive. “If they were men,” Atkinson proclaimed, “the salt question 
would be settled.” The following day, Atkinson, with considerable more courage, 
informed his Mexicano neighbors that “the heads of those who went to the Salt 
Lakes would have to dance on the sands.” Atkinson also taunted Cipriano 
Alderette: “Look here, I have a few cartridges for use when Howard gets here.” 
“Very well, we’ve got plenty,” responded Alderette.48  
Atkinson and Charles Ellis had a long history of antagonizing Mexicanos. 
According to El Paso attorney Edmond Stine they “both held responsible county 
offices for a number of years, and... made themselves very obnoxious at the time 
to a large part of the Mexican population.”49  
On December 12, Howard arrived in El Paso under the escort of four men 
from Tays’ newly organized ranger company. He quickly filed “a writ of 
sequestration, commanding the sheriff to take the salt into his possession. Vidal 
García, brother of Judge Gregorio García and “friendly to the mob,” explained 
that upon learning of Howard’s arrival, the people “reunited with those from other 
towns and took possession of the streets.”50 Thinking “it was not safe for him to 
come with four men,” Tays proceeded to meet Howard in El Paso. As Tays and 
twelve of his men made their way to El Paso, they encountered Chico Barela at 
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the head of a file of eighteen mounted men who let Tays pass.51 Tays immediately 
dispatched Captain Thomas to Franklin to inform Blair of the movements of a 
possible force of resistance “from the other side of the river.”52  
Blair started for San Elizario late in the afternoon. Two miles outside of 
San Elizario, an armed man challenged Blair. As Blair approached, he saw 
another man disappear into nearby bushes. Within three hundred yards of San 
Elizario’s main plaza, Blair testified he “was challenged and halted by not less 
than a dozen voices at the same time and from various directions.” Blair 
positioned Lt. Payne and his men behind an adobe wall directly to the rear of him. 
The streets in front of Blair and his men were lined with men and ropes stretched 
across at intervals. Blair demanded to know “by what authority” they dared to halt 
him, insisting they had no right to interfere with an officer of the United States 
Army. He requested an audience with their captain. Despite his admonitions, the 
captain of their guard informed Blair “it was an affair of their own.” Insisting that 
Blair had no role in the troubles, they explained “they were going to take Howard 
and if I attempted to interfere, he would resist me with his whole force.”53  
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Blair estimated that there was close to three hundred fifty “sober and well 
organized well armed determined men, with a definite purpose.” Aware of the 
level of organization and their own precarious situation, Blair withdrew. Blair 
later explained that his orders allowed for intervention only in the case of the 
involvement of Mexican nationals. Estimating that no less than one hundred fifty 
men surrounded him and believing his duty required that he return to Ysleta, Blair 
marched his troops out of San Elizario towards Ysleta.54 “It was anticipated,” 
Blair later reported, that “his [Howard’s] appearance in San Elizario would be the 
signal for action on part of the Mexicans.”55  
The insurgents made it clear that they wanted Howard. Blair explained 
that he cared little for Howard. Blair revealed that he was in fact concerned for Lt. 
Tays. According to Blair, the men he spoke with agreed that Tays was a good 
man but that they could not understand why he was defending Howard -if he gave 
them Howard the whole affair would be over. Blair insisted that he was only 
fulfilling his duty. “This,” Blair reported, “seemed a new idea to them, they had 
imagined he was a friend of or hired by Howard to defend him.” They asked Blair 
if Tays was working under orders, to which, Blair replied “there was no doubt of 
it.” Blair pressed further, inquiring why, if they had such a high regard for the US 
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army, did they initially fire on his men. Blair discovered that they were simply 
following their orders to fire upon anyone who attempted to enter.56 
The force of men that Blair encountered was by no means unified in its 
attitude to American authorities and its citizens. Blair reported that there were a 
number who wanted to hang him on account of his brief clash with them only 
days before. Chico Barela, who Blair identified as the principal leader, intervened 
and refused to allow the hanging. Blair and his men also discovered that at 
Socorro a detachment of men were waiting “to shoot us as we returned.” Blair 
returned to El Paso by way of the Mexican side of the river “on the advise of 
some friendly ones.”57 
Prior to the street battle, on Tuesday, December 11, Tays had ordered 
Pablo Mejía to the Salt Lakes. Mejía returned two days later unable to join his 
comrades who had hastily commandeered quarters in buildings owned by Ellis. 
When Mejía discovered the precarious situation of his comrades, he quickly 
acquired a fresh horse and made his way to Mexico. He would not rejoin his 
command for five days, well after the worst of the fighting. During the street 
battle, Mejía traveled under cover of night on the Mexican side, “avoiding to be 
seen by the Mexicans, who knew me well.” As Mejía rode on the Mexican side, 
keeping close to the river, he discovered “a great many camps of families in the 
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bosque, where there were carts, wagons, &c [sic] camped.” He discreetly avoided 
detection by any of the refugees who had left their homes for fear of their safety. 
Mejía estimated there to be a half dozen camps “on the other side” located just 
eight miles below San Elizario.58  
Tays and Howard arrived in San Elizario at six in the evening. Upon 
arriving, Howard, Tays and the remaining rangers made their way to the store of 
Charles Ellis. Howard visited with Ellis and “Mexican friends [who] came to see 
him [Howard].” Tays had strategically posted men around Ellis’ home, mill and 
store. The rangers converted Ellis’s property, including the store, the detached 
storeroom and the corral into a makeshift fort by barricading the doors and 
windows and cutting portholes into the thick adobe walls. In the hastily 
commandeered quarters, Owens, Andrew Loomis, John McBride, and John 
Atkinson also gathered with Howard and the rangers.  
Sometime around 10 o’clock Ellis decided “to have a talk with the 
Mexicans.” Ellis armed himself with a revolver in his boot and set out for the 
main plaza to investigate further. Despite Howard’s warnings not to go, Ellis left 
the security of the impromptu fort. Tays later testified that that evening the 
“Mexicans began to hallo [sic] and shout.”59 Ellis never returned to the security of 
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his buildings. Days later Ellis’ mutilated body was discovered in the outlying sand 
hills. The night passed with Tays and his men maintaining their vigil unaware of 
Ellis’ fate.60 
On the morning of December 13th, Tays discovered an organized force had 
taken strategic positions behind the thick adobe walls and rooftops of the town.61 
Howard and the others discovered that they lines of pickets squads of cavalry 
threatened the fort. According to the Mesilla Valley Independent, the force 
confronting Tays was highly organized: 
in point of fact... they have an excellent military organization, they have 
their commander-in-chief, are divided in companies with captains, 
lieutenants, sergeants and corporals; they maintain a respectable degree of 
military tactics, are not badly armed, and when together present as 
respectable a military appearance as any Mexican soldiers.62 
 
In the morning Atkinson, McBride and McDaniels had positioned 
themselves on the roof of the post office. Mexicanos shouted at Atkinson 
demanding Howard and threatening to kill every one of them. “We want 
Howard,” they proclaimed. Atkinson replied, “if you want him, come and get 
him.”63 While the men shouted at one another from across the street, Thomas 
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Zickefous noted the arrival of new men. “The Mexicans,” explained Zickefous, 
“were raising a fuss.”64 
Charles Mortimer, the sergeant of the ranger company was the first struck 
down, just outside of Ellis’ store. Gregoria Zuniga reportedly shot Mortimer in the 
back. Tays dragged the wounded sargeant into the converted fort, a slug having 
ripped through his back and exiting just below his nipple. Mortimer died later that 
evening.65 Once Mortimer fell, Zickefous remembered, “they commenced firing 
from all directions, and continued incessantly, night and day, until Sunday the 
16th.”66 
Tays raised a flag of truce to “let old man Loomis out.” He and James 
McDonald spoke with Francisco Barela and a half dozen others for about a half 
hour. The demand remained for Howard to be given up and Tays agreed to 
present the proposal to Howard. After informing Howard of the proposal, Tays 
acquiesced to bring him out, only if he consented. If he refused, Tays remained 
committed to “fight it out.” Tays assured Howard that “he would defend him to 
his last man.” Howard confided to Tays, “he did not think it was any use to stand 
them off any longer, and that he would be willing to make any sacrifices or 
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compromise to save our lives.” According to Owens, Howard opted to put his fate 
in the hands of Barela and the others because his confidence in the support of the 
rangers was rapidly dwindling. He “heard the Rangers, some of them, growling 
and grumbling at being kept prisoners on his account.”67  
Tays and Howard met with Barela. Tays chose to interpret the silence of 
Barela and the others as a clear indication that “they had no intention of keeping 
their promise or making any compromise.” At one point, Barela left the room 
allowing Howard to talk “freely about the troubles.” Howard reassured Tays that 
he was committed to doing what was necessary “to settle the trouble.” Not long 
after Barela left the room, three men removed Tays despite his protests. Tays’ 
escort threw him into a small room where he joined three other prisoners.68  
During Tays’ absence Atkinson took the initiative to make additional 
arrangements. He brokered the surrender of the entire force of Texas Rangers. He 
also gathered eleven of the twelve thousand dollar bond along with a promise to 
give up claims to the salt flats in exchange for the safe conduct of all those under 
siege. When Atkinson returned from his own meeting with the junta, he informed 
the rangers that Tays had sent for them. The disarmed rangers, according to 
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Corporal H. Mathews, were “marched in a dirty room [where] many of us fell 
asleep.”69  
At different moments during the street battle civilians attempted to 
intervene on behalf of family and friends in the ranger force. Once the siege had 
ended and the rangers were taken captive, there were renewed efforts to retrieve 
loved ones. On December 14, Patricio Apodaca, a resident of Ysleta, travelled to 
San Elizario for the purpose of securing the release of two of the rangers: his 
father-in-law Price Cooper and his brother-in-law Santiago Cooper. Unsuccessful 
in retrieving the Coopers, he remained in San Elizario hoping for events to take a 
turn for the better. Apodaca, like many others, found themselves in San Elizario 
witnessing the events unfold. Thus, it is likely that many who were assumed to be 
members of “the mob” were simply spectators or, like Apodaca, present out of 
concern for family members.70 Ranger Marsh’s mother, for example, attempted to 
retrieve her son after learning that Captain Blair had met with some of the leaders 
of the San Elizario force. Ranger Campbell’s mother was successful in retrieving 
her daughter-in-law and her two grandchildren from captivity.71 
Not long after they took Tays to the corral, he recalled that “someone 
made a speech to a large audience of the mob.” Tays testified he heard the speaker 
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“put the question whether or not Howard should be killed.” Tays detected “no 
dissenting voice” and shortly afterwards heard the “report of several guns.” Four 
or five men also took out Atkinson and McBride from an adjacent room. Atkinson 
was stood against an adobe wall, next to where Howard lay riddled with bullets 
and hacked by a machete. Atkinson, his back to the wall with guns aimed 
menacingly in his direction, stared at his neighbors and customers of almost 
fifteen years. McBride looked on with fear. “Acabenlos! Acabenlos!” cried the 
gathering. Atkinson ripped open his shirt and yelled at the small firing squad, 
“Fire!” Five slugs tore into his belly. Atkinson stood once again and shouted: 
“‘Mas [sic] arriba cabrones!’” Two more shots rang out and he dropped to the 
ground. “He motioned to his head, and Dediderio Apodaca... put a pistol to his 
head and finished him.” The firing squad dispatched McBride quickly after with 
considerably less drama.72 
Mary Antonia Cooper, the wife of Price Cooper, witnessed the execution 
of Howard and the others. “I don’t know the name of the persons who killed these 
men,” she later explained, “but I saw Jesus García, the Sonoranian [sic], shoot 
Howard in the face after he was down. I also saw Jesús Telles cut Howard across 
the breast with a machete.”73 “Some friendly Mexican women,” Captain Blair 
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confirmed, “saw, that the firing party –of nine men—were all from the other 
side.”74 
If Any More Americans Are Killed I Will Resist You With My Whole 
Force 
 
Following the executions of Howard, Atkinson, and McBride San Elizario 
remained under the control of the armed and organized Mexicano militia. On one 
occasion, Schutz’s freight wagons were escorted under guard. As late as 
December 18, vedettes and pickets were still posted “as far as old Fort Bliss.”75  
Cooper remembred that Barela appeared “to be chief of the mob.” 
However, Cooper was able to name fifteen participants -Francisco Barela, 
Desiderio Apodaca, Ramon Zambrano, Leon Granillo, Guillermo Gándera, 
Manuel Lopez, Pedro Olguín, Eugenio Loya, Barnabel Candelario, Jesús García, 
Luciano Frescos, Gorgonio Zuñiga, Guadalupe Lucerro, Guerro Chaves, Jesús 
Chaves and Juan Naranjo- as men he had known well and for several years. He 
recognized them as US citizens and claimed. Participants later testified that Barela 
was the “leader of the mob.” Scholars who relied on the documents made 
available by the investigation that followed were quick to accept Barela as the 
undisputed leader.76 
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The rangers were released as a result of the insistence of Barela. “The 
more violent of the party,” according to Blair, wanted to have all the Americans 
shot, “but Chico [Francisco] Barela opposed it –said there had been enough blood 
shed and that only after they had killed him could any more Americans be killed.” 
Before their release, each was asked “whether they were employed by the 
Governor of Texas or by Howard” and required to sign a blank paper. Blair later 
explained that the rangers admitted that it was fortunate “that troops did not 
appear whilst they were prisoners, or that would have been the signal for their 
destruction.”77 
Remarkably, the captured rangers were given back their mounts. 
Zickefous asked Cooper to talk with Barela “about turning over my horses.” “I 
talked with Chico Barela about the horses belonging to the Rangers,” Cooper later 
testified.78 Cooper prevailed upon Barela, from one old friend and neighbor to 
another, to return all the horses which “he said finally he would turn them over.” 
Mathews confirmed that Barela told Cooper that “he would see about turning our 
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horses over.”79 A mounted armed guard escorted the released prisoners as far as 
Socorro.80 
Once freed, the rangers rode to El Paso and discovered Sheriff Kerber 
busily preparing to launch an attack upon the San Elizario community. Kerber had 
enlisted thirty men from Silver City, New Mexico, to form a posse. Tays later 
admitted that they “were bad men, that they were acting badly, and they didn’t 
appear to be under any restraint.”81 Kerber and the posse acquired arms from 
Schutz. According to Schutz, Kerber boasted “he knowed [sic] them [Mexicans] 
better... and that he would give almost anything to have a war with them, so that 
he could have a chance to fight them, the sons of bitches.”82  
Making their way for San Elizario, the combined force perpetrated what 
appeared to be random acts of violence and terror. Mariana Nuñez later testified 
she suffered a gun shot to the shoulder the day Kerber, Tays and the rangers 
arrived at her home in Socorro. She and her husband were in their kitchen when 
the rangers burst through the front door. Her husband barricaded the kitchen door, 
holding back the rangers. They fired fifteen shots, striking her husband in the 
forehead and in the stomach. The rangers pushed through the door once his body 
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fell to the floor, shooting him twice more as he lay dying. They searched the 
house, but Nunez explained to the investigative tribunal that she could not tell 
what they were looking for as they tore through the trunks and beds. Neither 
could she understand why they had been targeted by the ranger violence in the 
first place, since her husband had been in Las Cruces “during the whole time of 
the troubles in San Elizario.”83 
Even prominent residents were not spared the terror of the roving rangers 
and posse from Silver City. Candelaria recounted that on December 23, he and his 
son were returning from Las Cruces at the head of three wagons. They were 
stopped and disarmed as they passed the ranger “quarters” at Ysleta. According to 
Candelaria, “They pointed their pistols at my head and at my boy’s head, asking 
who we were, and if we had any arms.” As justice of the peace of Ysleta 
Candelaria was outraged and “demanded to know by whose order they were 
acting on.” The rangers took Candelaria’s Sharp’s rifle, an infantry rifle and two 
pistols from his son’s belt. Candelaria protested to the sheriff, demanding his 
weapons be returned. Kerber ordered Tays to return his small arsenal.84 
The rampage of the combined force of rangers and Silver City posse did 
not end until the arrival of Colonel Edward Hatch. Governor Hubbard dispatched 
sixty “battle toughened buffalo soldiers” from Forts Davis, Bayard and Stanton 
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under the command of Colonel Edward Hatch.85 Upon arriving, Hatch issued 
General Field-Orders No. 1 and assumed command of all the troops in and around 
San Elizario as far as the Cuadrilla. Hatch’s intention was to prevent “further 
outrages” by the rangers.86 
Hatch arrived in Ysleta to discover “that the men of the county, [of] 
Mexican descent apparently, were rallying, and that the women and children were 
fleeing for their lives.” Major J. F. Wade, arriving from Fort Bayard with the 
Ninth Cavalry, described riding into San Elizario to restore the peace: “All people 
at Ysleta came out to meet us, [to] say they fear nothing but the Rangers.” Blair 
had admonished Kerber by noting that his volunteers: 
have been committing outrages of greater or less magnitude on the 
peaceable people of the valley, including women and children, who, for 
fear of your [Kerber] men, have fled from their homes, and are now 
perishing for want of food and from exposure to cold in and around the 
village of Sarogoza [sic], Mexico.87 
 
Kerber explained to Hatch that two men were dead and two others had been 
wounded. He also learned that one woman had been “shot through the lungs.” 
Kerber insisted to Hatch that they had been resisting arrest. Traveling further 
towards Ysleta, Hatch discovered two additional bodies “directly in the middle of 
the road”. Hatch concluded, “in my own mind... these prisoners were killed 
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without necessity.” The investigative Board later agreed with Hatch’s assessment 
of the wantonness of executing prisoners, remarking in their final report “that 
notable among these atrocities should be classed the shooting of two Mexican 
prisoners, who were bound with cords when turned over to the guard at Ysleta.” 
The Board judged the ranger deeds as no less than “wanton outrages.”88 
The events in the winter of 1877 in the Western part of the state were not 
simply a riot or mob action, but a Mexicano insurgency that reveals the 
momentary collapse of an incipient hegemonic process due to the excesses of 
brutal processes of enclosure, both social and material. Challenging the limited 
notion of spontaneity, Guha stresses that insurgencies possessed “conscious 
leadership” in which two antagonistic consciousness “met for a decisive trial of 
strength.”89 The conflict subsumed in the title, Salt War, is as much about the 
negotiation of Mexicano identities and their strategic claims to citizenship in 
social, political and economic spaces they had traditionally dominated and only 
recently, if reluctantly, were forced to concede. Rather than investigate the San 
Elizario Salt War as a moment of crisis in a manichean racial struggle between 
Anglos and Mexicanos, the violence of that winter must be re-read to account for 
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those Mexicanos who, wittingly or unwittingly, conspired with Anglo merchants, 
allied with prominent political leaders served as rangers.  
Unfortunately, there has been little attention to the internal tensions with 
the Mexicano community. In all cases, Mexicanos are a homogenous, one-
dimensional whole. Depending on what side of the political spectrum, Mexicanos 
reacted either in revolt or riot. In either case, the diverse agency of different 
factions, informed in large part by the conflicts internal to the community, are 
effaced. A number of conflicts divided the loyalties of the Mexicano. Most 
notable were those who pursued their own political and economic interests by 
cooperating with and supporting leading Anglos. Such collaboration could lead to 
service in the Texas Rangers, such as the notable role played by young Pablo 
Mejía. Most importantly, prominent Mexicanos also connived with Anglo 
authorities both during and after the investigation and indictment of those citizens 
involved in the fray. 
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6. TO GIVE UP MY PERSON TO HIM! 
By contrast, the well-worn litany of “lootpillageandrape” implies that male soldiers rape 
women the way a tornado inhales barns and tractors: anything that comes in the path of 
warfare, it is imagined analogously, is susceptible to warfare’s random violence. Men 
caught up in the fury of battle cannot be expected to be subject to rules of conduct, much 
less the fine print of memos. Grabbing a stray chicken or a stray woman –it is simply 
what male soldiers do as they sweep across the landscape. 
Cynthia Enloe1 
 
On December 31, 1877, not long after the violence of the San Elizario Salt 
War had subsided, President Rutherford B. Hayes ordered an investigation into a 
critical, if unexpected, part of the unfolding Mexican Border Troubles. The 
decision for a military tribunal attracted the attention of Governor Richard 
Hubbard who insisted that the state of Texas participate in the investigation. Local 
county officials also organized an inquiry for the purpose of “legally” obtaining 
arrest warrants, extraditing individuals believed to be leaders of “the mob,” and 
recovering stolen property. A local Grand Jury eventually produced indictments 
for murder, extradition requests, and complaints for the recovery of stolen 
property. These investigative projects sought to restore “law and order” to the 
region. 
The previous chapter paid close attention to the “micro history” of the 
insurgency, otherwise known as the Salt War. The narrative of the conflict 
presented in the previous chapter confirms multiple histories of violence: the 
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murder of Cardis, the street battle, the public executions of prominent Anglos and 
the brutal reprisals by rangers and the Silver City posse. An additional, if often 
overlooked aspect of the violence were the number of investigations once the 
physical conflict ended. In addition to the more explicit material violence that 
constituted the Salt War, the investigations conducted by the military with the 
assistance of the Texas Rangers as well as the local criminal investigation are as 
much a part of the war and the story as the street battle in December. The 
bureaucratic operations visited upon Ysleta, Socorro, and San Elizario closely 
resembled others conducted by federal authorities immediately following 
dramatic episodes of conflict, contributing significantly to an already emergent 
“representational machine,” a theme taken up in more detail in the next chapter. 
More importantly, the state’s investigative apparatus also exposed other 
aspects of the violence generally overlooked. The violent reprisals that were 
indiscriminately visited upon the Mexicano community have been subsumedand 
naturalized into the category of “outrages.” Ultimately, the ranger defeat and the 
vicious reprisals on innocent Mexicanos have been overshadowed by the 
emphasis on Mexicano criminality in the form of a riot or mob action as the Salt 
War has generally been represented. Such a maneuver erases the “lived 
experience” of violence. Although glaringly apparent in the documentation 
produced by the investigation it has been overlooked in the narrative of the Salt 
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War even though it was a critical part of the war’s logic. Thus, the brutal rape of 
Salomé Telles, one example of the “outrages” that took place, has been effaced, 
erasing the particular experience of a female victim and drawing attention away 
from the brutal excesses of Anglo paramilitary forces. 
To Show What is Probably the True History of the Matter 
The military tribunal that heard the case of the San Elizario Salt War 
included Colonel John King, Ninth Infantry; Lieutenant Colonel William H. 
Lewis, Nineteenth Infantry, and First Lieutenant and Adjutant Leornard Hay, 
Ninth Infantry, acting as recorder. They convened on January 22, 1878 at 3 p.m. 
at Fort Bliss.2 Assistant Adjutant General E. R. Platt instructed Lewis, as the 
presiding officer, to thoroughly investigate “the whole subject of the troubles.” 
The Board was also to assess the conditions of the region making sure to fully 
disclose the causes, the participants and the events. 
The investigative Board had before it a formidable task, for it “met with 
noticeable reluctance on the part of many people in the different localities where 
its sessions were held.” The hesitation by many witnesses, primarily because of 
fear of later reprisals, meant that many “refused to testify at all.” The conflict’s 
potential to “excite local animosities” also explained “the guarded language to be 
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found in many of the statements found by intelligent parties.” Despite these 
difficulties, the Board concluded that the combined forces of rangers and posse 
from Silver City, “contained within its ranks an adventurous and lawless element, 
which, though not predominant, was yet strong enough to make its evil influence 
felt in deeds of violence and outrage matched only by the mob itself.”3 
The tribunal made liberal use of a number of reports produced by officers 
in the field. In an effort to produce a thorough and “unimpeachable report,” King 
was instructed to take advantage of Colonel Edward Hatch’s report and if 
necessary to confer with him. Once both reports were completed W. M. Dunn, the 
Judge Advocate General, believed Hatch’s report “in every general feature” 
coincided with the Board. Curiously, Hatch warned that the frontier would 
experience additional outbreaks of violence equal to, or more serious than, the 
previous troubles. The source of conflict in the future, Hatch opined, would be “in 
connection with the water taken from the Rio Grande for irrigation.”4 King and 
the other investigators also concurred with Hatch’s analysis regarding the 
potential for future conflict. “As time progresses,” the Board concluded, “and the 
country is opened by accessions to its populations, sure to come –for it is a most 
fertile region and gloriously rewards the labor spent in irrigation—the question 
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[of water] must grow in importance, and may occasion trouble beyond the reach 
of diplomacy to settle.”5 
When General John Pope forwarded Hatch’s report, “El Paso Troubles,” 
to the division commander he also drew special attention to the “interesting 
paper” of J. P. Hague, district attorney from El Paso. Although confident that the 
report produced under the direction of Colonel King would be the “more 
comprehensive,” Pope believed that the narrative provided by Hague would 
“show what is probably the true history of the matter.”6 In addition to providing 
an important interpretation as to the actual causes of the troubles and suggestions 
to avoid subsequent disturbances, Hague’s “paper” touched on a number of key 
issues on the role of Mexicanos from the other side of the river. 
One of the most critical responsibilities given to the tribunal was to gauge 
the extent “Mexicans from Mexico were engaged in it.” The Board sought to 
discover if, for example, they “came singly or in bodies… organized and armed,” 
or if they arrived at a late date. The difficulty of determining the level of 
participation by Mexican nationals exposed a number of complications. One of 
the most notable difficulties was how to refer to county residents, the majority of 
whom were Mexicanos. Platt instructed King “to be careful to discriminate 
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between citizens of Mexico and those of Texas, and if you use the word Mexican 
state exactly what you mean by it.”7 
The descriptions given by Anglo elites regarding the Mexican character 
clearly express the hatred and fear that pervaded the West Texas community. 
Anglo authorities, civic leaders, merchants, and investigators generally did not 
distinguish among Mexicanos. Regardless of nativity or other differing 
characteristics, Anglos emphasized their ignorance and unbridled passions. 
Hague’s written testimony to the investigative board revealed this view: 
The people [Mexicans] of one [side of the border] are bound to those of 
the other by more than the ordinary obligations of race and hospitality. 
They have married and intermarried; their interests are in many respects 
identical; their wants and fears spring from the same source and hold them 
in sympathy; for time out of mind they have reciprocally enjoyed the same 
feasts and festivities; they are united by the same religion, and have all 
passions and prejudices common to an ignorant people.8 
 
Other documents were introduced with the same intent of painting Mexicanos in a 
bad light. Atkinson and nine other prominent residents, for instance, announced in 
a letter to Governor Hubbard that the “armed and organized body” were “in their 
manners, habits, customs, and feeling Mexican to the backbone, and who hold the 
laws of the United States in the most supreme contempt.” Similarly, district Judge 
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Allen Blacker testified that the Mexican character was docile, disposed to evil and 
susceptible to intrigues directed by others: 
they also have the utmost, unbounded confidence in their leaders. If they 
have a good man to lead them, there is not a more pacific, easily-
governed, and loyal people on the face of the earth than the Mexican 
people of El Paso County. If they have a bad man, they will be just as bad 
as he wants them to be. 
 
Both officials and ordinary citizens, who had a platform to share their views in 
either official or unofficial capacities, viewed Mexicanos as either docile or as 
capable of the worst kinds of violent excesses. When Anglos emphasized 
Mexicano depravity they represented it as a result of a nefarious leadership, 
reflecting the ambitious and wicked designs of a greedy few.9  
Major John B. Jones and Texas’ Minority Report 
Major John B. Jones commander of the Texas Rangers’ Frontier Battalion 
played an active and critical role in the federal investigation while conducting a 
parallel inquiry for Texas. King, Lewis, and Hay, members of the federal tribunal, 
collaborated with Jones who had been selected by Hubbard. Jones had been in 
Franklin prior to the outbreak of violence and played a critical role in the events 
just before much of the physical violence broke out. While it may not have been 
out of the ordinary to convene an investigative Board to research the causes and 
outcome of the “El Paso troubles,” it was unusual that a representative of the State 
                                                 
9 El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 143, 122. 
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joined the Board. Jones arrived in El Paso in mid February only to discover the 
Board had already begun its work  
Despite Steele’s admonishment, from the beginning Jones made every 
effort to limit the Board’s investigating scope and claim the final authority over 
the “border troubles.” He worked to keep the investigation within the narrow 
parameters that both Adjutant General William Steele and Jones had agreed upon 
earlier –the violence at the hands of Mexicanos between December 12 and 17. 
Arguing that the events that followed the street battle were under the exclusive 
purview of state or local authorities, Jones insisted that violations by state forces 
would be subject to local authority only. Jones also chose to emphasize the 
participation of Mexicanos from the other side. He consistently drew attention to 
the international scope of the conflict. Not surprisingly, he minimized the 
violations by the combined force of rangers and Silver City posse.10 
Jones was, without a doubt, an active and motivated investigator. He 
conducted numerous interviews, soliciting statements from key participants and 
observers well after federal authorities were satisfied with their own reports. 
Empowered by the state of Texas, Jones felt it necessary to produce a Minority 
Report to supplement the “the tedious and arduous investigation.” Although 
Jones’ report conformed in large part with the analysis of the final Majority 
Report, it did contest some key conclusions. The differences between the two, 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 48-49. 
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although subtle, are revealing. The disagreements are not so much ideological as 
they are political, revealing critical contradictions between the state and federal 
government. 
Ultimately, Jones contributed significantly to the edifice that enabled the 
erasure of certain acts of violence. Jones’ conduct, and his subsequent report 
deliberately minimized the tumultuous events following the major melee. This 
resulted primarily from his insistence that any review of state forces should be 
subject to his authority, as the commander of the Frontier Battalion. In so doing, 
he drew attention away from the violent retribution carried out by Tays, Tucker 
and Kerber and lent support to the “police actions” that followed the “major 
battle” as legitimate. The report gives little importance to key episodes such as the 
rape act against Salome Telles. In effect, Jones’ minority report as well as the 
federal effort relies on the category of “lootpillageandrape” to describe and 
analyze the “outrages” of that winter. Indeed, the reports taken together deny the 
specific experience and agency of women in the war and during its aftermath. The 
lack of attention does not mean the investigators did not fully appreciate the 
extent of violence, however its marginalization in the documentation not only 
resulted in the failure to prosecute paramilitary forces for their actions but also 
stressed the excesses of the “rioters.” 
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The El Paso Grand Jury 
On March 4, 1878 Judge Allen Blacker convened the District Court of the 
20th Judicial District in Ysleta. District Attorney J. A. Zabriske, County Clerk G. 
W. Wahl, and Sheriff Charles Kerber, gathered the names of both the grand and 
petit jurors for that session. Selected as grand jurors were Augustin Marqués, B. 
Maning, Gumersindo Peangon, Juan García, José María Gonzales, Gregorio 
García, Jesús Cobos, Tomas Marise and Charles Wilson. All were present that 
day with the exception of Charles Wilson whose absence meant the proceedings 
were delayed until the following day at 10 a.m. Judge Blacker ordered Kerber to 
secure the necessary number of jurors.  
The following day José María Gonzales claimed an exemption in order to 
excuse himself from the jury on the grounds that he had recently been elected 
Justice of the Peace for Precinct Number 1. Gonzales had faithfully performed a 
number of civic duties on previous occasions, having served as Justice of the 
Peace, County Commissioner, and Sheriff. But, for this particular obligation he 
deliberately declined to serve, invoking the exception. Francisco Barela’s 
daughter’s marriage to José María Gonzales’ son, Francisco Gonzales, may have 
informed his decision. Gonzales, like many other Mexicanos living in Texas, were 
consistently forced to negotiate a number of conflicts and challenges that 
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citizenship in the US and the attachments to the region implied.11 Declining to 
serve on the Grand Jury may have been a clever maneuver to maintain domestic 
tranquility by not involving him the proceedings that could lead to legal action 
against Barela. Gonzales’ subtle maneuver may been an effort to chart a course 
between alienation and accommodation.12 
The following day Kerber completed the Grand Jury roster by summoning 
Ward Blanchard, George Kohlhaus, J. W. Campbell, George Johnson and Martin 
Apodaca. After Blanchard was designated foreman, the entire jury was instructed 
as to their duties and adjourned. Throughout March the Grand Jury indicted over 
one hundred and fifty alleged perpetrators. During the proceedings they issued 
charges against a number of local residents for advising, commanding, 
encouraging and procuring murder as well as burglary. The Grand Jury also 
identified a number of presumed leaders of the mob. Tays admitted before the 
Grand Jury “I have not designated persons by names,” adding that he could 
identify them only by sight. Forced to admit that he did, “not know them well 
enough to identify them by their respective names,” he offered sufficient evidence 
for the grand jury. He explained that, 
                                                 
11 Francisco also served as a Texas Ranger. In 1930 he and Manuel Ortega were the only two men 
drawing a pension as rangers and Indian fighters in the so area. “Valley Pioneer Taken by Death,” 
El Paso Herald Post, June 25, 1930; “Mrs. Gonzales To Be Laid To Rest Thursday,” El Paso 
Times, June 25, 1930. 
12 Broaddus, Legal Heritage of El Paso p. 124. The District Court was more than likely meeting in 
rooms rented from Jose Maria Gonzales for the sum of five dollars. 
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from many sources, some of an official character I can state Francisco 
Barela, Desiderio Apodaca, Eugenio Leyva Barnahel Candelario, Jesus 
García, Luciano Frescos, Ramon Zambrano, Guadalupe Lucerro, Guero 
Chaves, Jesus Chaves, Eutermio Chaves and Juan Naranjo were the 
persons who shot and killed Howard, Atkinson and McBride and have 
been charged before the civil authorities.13 
 
Local officials were confident that those indicted had fled to the other side 
of the border to escape reprisals. Although these men and women were all 
perceived as Mexicanos, they were known to be US citizens. In response to the 
requests for extradition Mexican authorities strategically argued that they were 
Mexican citizens, as an attempt to avoid capitulating to the extradition orders 
through diplomatic maneuvering. The legal machinery that worked to extradite all 
those believed to be hiding on the other side was initiated and controlled by the 
same faction that had supported Howard. 
There were no legal actions taken against Howard when he murdered 
Cardis. Indeed, those responsible for the murder of Mexicanos immediately 
following the melee also escaped prosecution or any official attention from state 
authorities. Many of the men who made up the grand jury labored under the same 
influence. 
To Give Up My Person To Him 
                                                 
13 Depositon, John B. Tays, “Motin de Mexicanos contra las autoridades Americanas en Isleta y 
San Elizario, Texas;” Legajo L-E-64; Archivo Historico “Genaro Estrada”; Secretaria Relaciones 
Exteriores, Mexico, D.F. Hereafter cited as “Motin de Mexicanos contra las autoridades 
Americanas en Isleta y San Elizario, Texas.” 
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On February 16, 1878, Salomé Telles appeared before the Board 
investigating the San Elizario Salt War.14 Telles testified that sometime late in 
December in the afternoon, two rangers arrived at her home in Ysleta. The two 
men killed her dog and “shot at some chickens.” Later that evening, the two 
rangers who had terrorized her earlier that day forced their way into the home of 
her brother-in-law, Juan Alderette. They brandished their weapons and robbed 
him of between three or four dollars. Alderette confirmed for the tribunal that two 
rangers came to his door and asked to be let inside. According to Alderette, he 
had his entire weight against the door to prevent them from entering. One of the 
rangers repeated his request: “Open the door; I am a gentlemen, I won’t do you 
any harm.” Unfortunately, an unidentified Mexicano accompanying Alderette that 
day reassured him that it would be alright to let the rangers enter. Once inside, the 
intruders forced Alderette to open his trunk, taking all his money. 
The rangers ransacked the remaining rooms, looking for arms that might 
be hidden in the house. Not alone in the home, Telles attempted to misdirect the 
intruders by emphasizing that the only people in the house were “a couple of old 
people and my children.” Following their search they forced Alderette and the 
                                                 
14 An initial investigation of census data suggests Salomé Telles may have been forty-seven years 
old at the time of the Salt War.  
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other Mexicano outside at gunpoint. One of the rangers stood guard outside the 
door of Alderette’s house, while the other ranger raped Telles for two hours.15  
Alderette ran for assistance but was unable to find any aid. Alderette 
departed for over four hours. After Alderette returned he learned from his sister-
in-law that “the rangers had put a pistol to her breast and forced her to give up her 
person to him.”16 Pedro Candelaria, Ysleta Justice of the Peace, later identified J. 
Williams and F. Johnson as the two “rangers” responsible for the rape. Despite 
the corroborating testimony and the available evidence regarding the intrusion and 
the rape, no action was taken. While there is no documentary “evidence” 
confirming that rape was a deliberate policy decision prior to or during the Salt 
War, the rapes that took place after the street battle were authorized in one sense 
by the attitudes and practices of militarized Anglo forces. Moreover, the 
participation, and in some cases the tacit approval, of local officials such as 
Sheriff Kerber and Tays suggests more than complicity.17 
                                                 
15 El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 90. 
16 Ibid., 90-91. 
17 “Systematic rapes,” Cynthia Enloe emphasizes, “are administered rapes.” The designation of 
rape in war-time as something more than random or ad hoc event or occurrence reverses 
generations of previous attitudes and thinking about rape during or as a result of war. “By 
contrast,” Enloe argues, “the well-worn litany of ‘lootpillageandrape’ implies that male soldiers 
rape women the way a tornado inhales barns and tractors: anything that comes in the path of 
warfare, it is imagined analogously, is susceptible to warfare’s random violence. Men caught up in 
the fury of battle cannot be expected to be subject to rules of conduct, much less the fine print of 
memos. Grabbing a stray chicken or a stray woman –it is simply what male soldiers do as they 
sweep across the landscape.” Enloe points out that rape was not recognized as a war crime distinct 
from “a string of charges” until the prosecutions of eight male Bosnian Serb military and police 
officers as part of the International War Crimes Tribunal, announced June 27, 1996. Cynthia 
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Rape has received little attention in relation to the unfolding violence of 
the West. More recently, rape as an instrument of war and tool of domination has 
earned more serious treatment, especially in contemporary contexts of conflict. 
Equally important are the strategies women have used to survive rape, especially 
in situations of war. Unfortunately sexual violence directed against women has 
not been fully researched in the context of the social war of the US-Mexico 
Borderlands. Thus, despite advances in research for the late twentieth century the 
specific incidents and impact of rape that resulted from westward expansion, and 
the racial conflict it generated, has not been fully incorporated into broader 
discussions of violence in the West during the nineteenth century.18  
One early study of sexual violence by Antonia Castañeda, although 
focused on the Spanish colonial period, provides critical insights into the role of 
rape in situations of social and political domination. Castañeda rightfully 
challenges earlier scholars of the Spanish Borderlands tradition who minimized 
the role and impact of sexual violence against indigenous women as nothing more 
than the “friction between Spaniard and Indian.” Indeed, early Borderlands 
                                                                                                                                     
Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2000): 134-35. 
18 For a discussion of domestic violence on the frontier, see Melody Graulich, “Violence Against 
Women: Power Dynamics in Literature of the Western Family,” in Susan Armitage and Elizabeth 
Jameson, eds., The Women’s West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987): 111-126. 
Researchers have begun to draw attention to rape as part of the low intensity war currently 
underway in the Borderlands. See, for example, Sylvanna Falcón, “Rape as a Weapon of War: 
Advancing Human Rights for Women at the US-Mexico Border” Social Justice 28:2 (Summer 
2001): 31-50. 
 249
scholars attributed sexual violence to the degraded character of a mestizo 
population, suggesting that newly arrived settlers were “half breeds of the least 
energetic classes.” Similarly, Scholars emphasizing the frontier as an explanatory 
device for violence against women drew attention to “a shared life of hardship 
and risk.” Castañeda also rejects the notion advanced by later revisionists that a 
“distinct frontier culture” emerged due to “the isolation and distance from the 
central government.” Although sexual predation of Amerindian women posed 
administrative challenges for colonial authorities, Castañeda explains that 
violence towards women was part of an accepted arsenal to be exercised as “a 
legitimate expression of superiority” by conquering Spaniards. “While rape and 
other acts of sexual brutality did not represent the official policy on this or any 
other Spanish frontier,” Castañeda concludes, “these acts were nevertheless firmly 
fixed in the history and politics of expansion and conquest.” Not content with 
dismissals that emphasize the limitations of colonial administrators and unique 
frontier conditions, Castañeda argues that these claims do not fully explain “the 
origins or the continuation of sexual violence against women.”19 
                                                 
19 Antonia Castañeda, “Sexual Violence in the Politics and Policies of Conquest: Amerindian 
Women and the Spanish Conquest of Alta California” in Building With Our Hands: New 
Directions in Chicana Studies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993): 18, 24, 25. See 
also, Antonia Castañeda, “History and the Politics of Violence Against Women,” in Carla Trujillo, 
ed., Living Chicana Theory (Berkeley: Third Woman Press, 1998): 310-319. For a similar study 
that links racial violence, social control and the politics of sexual violence, see Jacquelyn Dowd 
Hall, “’The Mind that Burns in Each Body’: Women, Rape, and Racial Violence,” in Ann Snitow, 
Christine Stansell, and Sharon Thompson, eds., Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality (New 
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The rape of Salomé Telles was fundamentally a militarized rape, a 
physical act of violence against women used as a weapon in the context of war. 
As part of the events that comprise the San Elizario Salt War, specifically during 
the reprisals carried out by the combined forces of Tucker’s and Tays’ men, the 
rape of Telles was a racialized, public event meant to attack the Mexicano 
community as a whole. The rape was undertaken, for example, with full 
knowledge of Alderette and an unidentified Mexicano. Public officials such as 
Candelaria also knew of the rape, enough to identify Telles’ attackers during his 
testimony. Despite his political influence, Candelaria was unable to insure the 
persecution of the culprits. The role of these men in relating additional details of 
the event suggests that many people were familiar with the violation either during 
or immediately following its occurrence. Ultimately, the rape undermined the 
perceived role of rancheros in protecting their homes along the frontier.20 
As a whole the testimony gathered by the Board did not contain a great 
many women’s voices despite their participation in the events that winter. The 
very prominent testimony by Telles about the violence directed at her warrants 
                                                                                                                                     
York: Monthly Review Press, 1983): 328-349. Work remains to be done regarding the privileges 
Anglos enjoyed by virtue of the threat of sexual violence. 
20 For an important discussion of the identity of rancheros as protectors of their community, see 
Ana Maria Alonso, Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on Mexico’s Northern 
Frontier (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995). In the narrative of Anglo-Mexican social 
antagonism the focus on domination and resistance has too often emphasized claims to honor and 
the construction of men’s identities as protectors of their community against class and race 
enemies in a turbulent frontier. 
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closer scrutiny.21 Her testimony transformed the investigation into a site of 
struggle. Her refusal to remain silent challenges previous views of resistance 
usually attributed to men during moments of physical conflict. Reliving a 
traumatic episode, Telles confronted the Texas Rangers, exposing their role in the 
material violence of December.  
Her recorded statement, reproduced in extenso below, records her 
remarkable opposition to powerful forces. It also provides some insight into the 
symbolic violence that is part of the Salt War, making it a significant text. 
No. 17 
El Paso, Tex., February 16, 1878. 
 
Personally appeared before Col. John H. King, Ninth Infantry, and Lieut. 
Col. Wm. H. Lewis, Nineteenth Infantry, members of the board of 
officers, Mrs. Salomé Telles, who states: 
 
That the latter part of December last two rangers came to my house in 
Ysleta and killed my dog in the afternoon and then shot at some chickens. 
I was at the house with my whole family, consisting of three girls and two 
boys. I took my family and went to my brother-in-law’s Aldaretta’s for 
protection, where I remained with my three smallest children, sending my 
two eldest daughters to a neighbor’s house. The same two rangers came to 
Aldaretta’s house that same night and made us open the door for them, and 
made us open the trunk which was in the room, with pistols in their hands, 
taking out of the trunk about three dollars and a half. They then searched 
through the beds and came to my bed and threw back the cover and asked 
who is here. I said only a couple of old people and my children. Up to that 
time my brother-in-law and the man –a Mexican—had been in the house. 
The rangers ran them out, and one of the rangers went out and stood guard 
                                                 
21 Here I am following the lead of Ranijit Guha in which he analyzes the contested representation 
of the death of young woman. See, Ranajit Guha, “Chandra’s Death,”in Ranajit Guha, ed., 
Subaltern Studies V: Writings on South Asian History and Society (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1996): 135-165. 
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on the outside, while the other, who remained inside, pointed the pistol at 
my breast and forced me to give up my person to him. They then left. The 
man who committed the outrage upon me was a large man with a black 
beard. 
 
Witness: E. Stine, Interpreter. 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this February 16, 1878, at El Paso, 
Tex.  
Leonard Hay. First Lieutenant, Adjutant Ninth Infantry.22 
 
Accepting this particular episode as “a discursive site” of struggle compels us to 
consider the context from which it emerged. Telles’ testimony against the two 
rangers who terrorized her over the course of an entire day is an extraordinary 
effort to denounce a rape as a crime of war. Her commitment to expose her 
attackers not only contests the violation directed against her it also recuperates the 
dignity of the larger community.23 
The purpose of presenting Telles’ complete testimony is to directly engage 
one of historiography’s traditions. In comparison to the other testimony collected 
during the investigation, Telles’ statement adds only a small part.24 Also the 
prolonged assault on Telles’ family and person, concluding in the rape perpetrated 
                                                 
22 El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 90. The names of persons throughout the Congressional 
document vary in spelling. 
23 Telles’ statement echoes what Guha has noted for evidence in similar contexts. “To read these 
statements as an archive is to dignify them as the textual site for a struggle to reclaim for history 
an experience buried in a forgotten crevice of our past.” Guha, “Chandra’s Death,”p. 142. Joan 
Scott has argued that we must complicate experience as a category for historical analysis, 
suggesting people inhabit social categories available to them within specific circumstances. See, 
Joan Scott, “Experience,” in Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds., Feminist Theorize the Political 
(New York: Routledge, 1992): 22-40. 
24 However, as Ranajit Guha reminds us of historiography’s time honored practices, it is a 
“tradition that tends to ignore the small drama and fine detail of social existence, especially at its 
depths.” Guha, “Chandra’s Death,”p. 138. 
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against her, is only one part of the events of the San Elizario Salt War. However, 
it sheds light on other aspects of the “outrages” that followed the more prominent 
street battle.25  
The violence of the assault begins when the rangers first arrived at her 
home in Ysleta. Her statement they “came to my house in Ysleta” suggests they 
had prior knowledge of Telles and deliberately targeted her. The threats they 
posed and their aggression, as in the shooting of her dog and later some chickens, 
suggest that they may have initially been frustrated as a result of the failure of an 
earlier plan, such that it was. Her agency in taking full responsibility for her 
family and anticipating the need to take further steps to ensure their safety is 
clear. In addition to defending her home, Telles thwarted their efforts to take 
advantage of her two eldest daughters. Anticipating the rangers’ persistence, she 
safeguarded the two young women by sending them to a neighbor’s house. 
Alderette testified that the “two girls [were] living at the house, one 18 and the 
other 20 years of age,” and that the rangers had asked for them specifically when 
                                                 
25 I am conscious here to explicitly avoid representing it as her rape, but rather as an act of 
violence and exercise of power done to her by men operating in an official capacity. Similarly the 
use of the passive tense is avoided in order to underscore the specificity of the violation and her 
agency in the collective resistance of the Salt War. In this gesture, I am following the lead of 
Cathy Winkler. See, Cathy Winkler, “Rape as Social Murder,” Anthropology Today 7:3 (June 
1991): 12-14, esp. note 4. In addition to the cautions required regarding representations that 
suggest “blaming the victim,” Sharon Marcus argues against seeing rape “as the fixed reality of 
women’s lives” by drawing our attention to rape situations as linguistic facts that are scripted: “A 
rape act imposes as well as presupposes misogynist inequalities; rape is not only scripted –it also 
scripts.” Sharon Marcus, “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape 
Prevention,” in Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott, eds., Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: 
Routledge, 1992): 387; 391. 
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they first arrived at Telles’ home. In relocating herself and her remaining children 
to her brother-in-law’s home she was taking necessary precautions to protect her 
family, no doubt well aware of the rangers’ notorious activities. Telles’ 
presumption that the rangers would return indicates the predictability of the 
somewhat widespread and frequent incidence of sexual violence directed against 
women. If, as Cathy Winkler argues, rape is “social death,” Telles’ survival and 
her efforts to hide her daughters, defend her household, and ultimately confront 
her attackers reclaims her dignity and that of the Mexicano community as a 
whole.26 
The ever-present threat of sexual violence, given the authorized presence 
of the rangers and the men who formed part of the Silver City posse, is supported 
by the testimony of J. P. Miller, also a resident of Ysleta. In a similar attack like 
that on the household of Alderette, Miller found himself woken out of a sleep 
when two men knocked on his door at midnight. Miller at first refused to open the 
door. Convinced he had no choice, Miller acquiesced to their demands. Miller’s 
assailants marched him out of his home between them at gunpoint, stopping about 
twenty steps from the door. Miller testified: “They then told me to keep quiet and 
tell them where these women were and they wouldn’t hurt me. I then begged for 
the women with no effect.” His pleas unsuccessful, the two intruders forced 
Miller to return to the house in order to search for the women. When all three men 
                                                 
26 Cathy Winkler, “Rape as Social Murder,” Anthropology Today 7:3 (June 1991): 12-14. 
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entered the darkened building, they quickly discovered the women had quietly 
fled to a neighbor’s house, the flickering candlelight confirming their escape. 
Soon afterwards, Miller fled “to the soldier’s camp.” After the episode, Miller 
identified the men who attacked him as part of “Tuckers crowd.”27 
The power relations refracted through Telles’ conduct suggests that the 
rape of Telles did more than simply call into question the honor of Mexican 
males, as it was in part intended to do as a strategy and instrument of war, it also 
highlighted strategies of resistance available to different members of the 
community. The presence of women as active participants, witnesses, victims and 
survivors of violence during the nineteenth century raises critical issues of how 
violence is narrated. Women were active in the “brushfire wars” and “raids” not 
only as victims, as for example in the case of murder, rape and captivity, but were 
also integral to making sure the effects of wars did not destroy the social fabric of 
the community, which was consistently threatened in the social antagonism of the 
period. The instructive question is not only who is narrating or what “master 
symbol” of the violence is privileged in the narrative, but rather it points to the 
roles and actions critical to the different kinds of resistance. Most importantly, it 
underscores how communities were sustained and rebuilt following the 
catastrophes of social war. 
                                                 
27 El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 95. 
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From Time Immemorial 
Just a week before Howard’s execution a local group of citizens petitioned 
Governor Hubbard for redress. On December 4, 1877 four hundred thirty six 
Mexicanos, claiming to represent the entire county, sent a memorial to the 
Governor. The memorial challenged Howard’s claims to the Guadalupe Salt lakes 
and requested the Governor intervene in order to resolve the legal rights to the 
lakes and avoid future conflict. The memorial made it clear that the majority of 
citizens “decline to believe the assertion of Mr. Howard that his is the favored 
one.” “The people generally could not believe,” the memorial proclaimed, “that 
such authority was vested in Howard because he did not present any authentic 
evidence sustaining such claim and had they seen any document purporting to 
establish such a title they would have doubted their genuineness.”28 
The memorial also demanded an investigation to expose the machinations 
of Howard and his allies. They insisted that any grant or petition put forward by 
Howard, for legal rights to the lakes, be rejected until a full inquiry into his 
involvement in any schemes he might be developing could be conducted. The 
memorial made clear that failure to revoke Howard’s spurious claims on the lakes 
would force them to act. Their statement was emphatic: “exasperated they will be 
                                                 
28 The following discussion relies on the “Memorial by the People of El Paso County,” December 
4, 1877, “Motin de Mexicanos contra las autoridades Americanas en Isleta y San Elizario, Texas.” 
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compelled to drive out the oppressor, thus becoming rebels, disobeying the orders 
of the legitimate authorities, or they must have recourse to some other expedient.”  
The collective statement sought to insure access to the lakes for the use of 
the entire population. The grant of ownership to Howard would clearly benefit 
one individual at the expense of the majority, who they asserted had enjoyed 
access and benefits from the Guadalupe Salt Lakes “from time immemorial.” 
“The transfer of this title to a single individual would prove that the supreme 
authority of the state disregards entirely the first principle of universal justice, and 
sanctioned by all civilized countries, viz: that the welfare of the many must be 
preferred to the benefit of the few.” Any grant that sustained Howard’s claim 
would amount to a monopoly that would undermine the rights of those thousands 
“born and raised on the soil;” who enjoyed rights “since the establishment of said 
towns under the Spanish government.” Denied access to the salt lakes, local 
residents would be forced to abandon their homes and “fields of their ancestors” 
and face starvation or become slaves under the brutal authority of Howard as a 
feudal lord. “He who becomes master of the salt lakes,” they explained, “will also 
pretend to master of [sic] the people.” 
The memorial indicted Howard for having disrupted the community on a 
number of occasions given that he was, “an insolent and quarrelsome person.” 
The assassination of Cardis “created the greatest confusion, and disturbed the 
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peace and tranquility of this community.” The citizens believed it was necessary 
for the governor to prosecute Howard. Failure to do so would mean he would 
realize his “ignoble desire that a conflict should take place in this county.” A 
conflict, the memorial concluded, “which would cause the blood of our citizens to 
be shed.” 
The claims made by the citizen’s memorial regarding the salt lakes were 
based on their view of their connection with the land. Much of this sense of place 
had its roots in the Spanish strategy of settlement, strategies pursued by the 
Spanish in hostile and remote territory. Salt, like other resources including water 
and pasturage, were made available to the entire community for its survival. 
Commons were an essential part of the strategy of frontier expansion and defense 
developed by the Spanish. The citizens proclaimed: “the free use in common of 
the Guadalupe salt lakes is an essential and necessary to the inhabitants of this 
county as much so as is the common and free use of the waters of rivers and 
springs, of air and light, or the warmth of the sun.” 
On February 25, 1878 Mexicanos claiming to be on the side of law and 
order, empowered themselves as a commission in order to address the 
investigating Board. The commission warned the Board “members of the late 
mob” were still organized and possibly seeking vengeance. Vengeance, they 
worried, could easily be directed at them. Given their vulnerability, the 
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commission requested the Board propose the stationing of troops and the 
reestablishment of a post. Arguing that the previous locations of Fort Bliss and 
Fort Quitman were too far to provide adequate protection, they offered to donate a 
tract of land in a well-irrigated place, in hope of drawing the government 
installation within ten to twelve miles of San Elizario. “We fear,” they explained,  
that bands of lawless men may rise, who, accustomed to rob, murder, and 
plunder, and taking the advantage of our present situation to commit 
crimes, will carry them into effect –particularly should these parties come 
from the opposite side of Rio Grande, from whence we apprehend the 
most danger, and who, depredating, in order to effect their escape would 
have to travel but a short distance, as a few steps, we may say, would 
place them beyond our reach, setting at distance the laws and authorities 
of our county.  
 
Although they echoed the same complaints and fears voiced by Hubbard and most 
Anglo officials, they felt a need to further distance themselves from fellow 
Mexicanos. “Finally,” they explained, “we would state that in asking for this 
permanent protection we wish to have it understood we are not revolutionary, nor 
do we wish any war. All that we ask is that our lives and property be protected, 
that we may live in peace and harmony, and go unmolested about our business, to 
procure the subsistence for ourselves and families, and bearing the name, as we 
have heretofore, of law-abiding citizens.”29 
Not long after the violence in December, County Commissioner Juan N. 
García anonymously wrote to the Mesilla Independent claiming “some of the 
                                                 
29 El Paso Troubles in Texas, pp. 109-10. 
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reports are true, some are false.” García felt the need to distinguish Mexicanos on 
the side of the law from those who participated in the mob. He specifically 
singled out, Gregorio García, Telesforo Montes, Porfirio García, Jesús Cobos, 
Maximo Aranda, Pablo Mejía, and Pablo Romero as law abiding Mexicanos. J. N. 
García also included in the number of “citizens of Mexican origin who stood by 
the side of the law and order at the risk of their lives.” Distinguishing himself 
from the criminal element enabled him to emphasize what he believed to be the 
defining characteristic of the mob: the ignorance of its leaders. In a disparaging 
tone, he ridiculed Chico Barela stating that he “cannot tell the first letter of his 
name, and he is the most intelligent among them.”30 
The fragile hegemonic process brought with it a number of points of 
contention, which had been building up for years. “Trouble among the people,” 
Tays later testified, “had arisen there before.” Tays explained that there had been 
“reports of threats and riot… to rise up against the legal authorities,” and that such 
attitudes “were prevalent among the Mexican citizens.”31 It manifested itself, for 
example, in the resistance against the mandatory school law led by Antonio 
Borajo the parish priest. Even Telésforo Montes, a one time ranger and a “law 
abiding Mexicans,” refused to comply with the law. His refusal and his record of 
official service to the state undermined the assertion that opposition to the school 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 97-98. 
31 Depositon, John B. Tays, “Motin de Mexicanos contra las autoridades Americanas en Isleta y 
San Elizario, Texas.” 
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act was simply the result of the sinister activities of Borajo, the one many Anglos 
believed had exercised a wicked influence on the docile Mexican population just 
prior to the Salt War. 
Valley residents and freighters had been accustomed to supplementing 
their incomes by freighting salt to communities as far as Chihuahua, Mexico. 
People like Gándera and Juárez defiantly proclaimed they would freight salt in 
September. Undetected but no less defiant, Antonio Barela also freighted salt 
sometime in November. The larger freighting party organized in December was 
doing more than asserting a right to salt but reclaiming a quickly dissipating 
authority over the region. The struggle for salt became a symbol of an emergent 
Anglo hegemonic order, a system fast replacing the authority established through 
Spanish and later Mexican dominance in the region understood in the statement: 
“from time immemorial.” Mexicanos defiantly asserted their rights to commons, 
through a long established land tenure system. Thus, salt began to symbolize the 
diminishing access and loss of control of the political process and the subsequent 
reduction in economic opportunity that Mexicanos faced as Anglos established 
their dominance in the region. 
The investigations did not confirm, despite all the declarations to the 
contrary, an organized invasion from the other side of the river. Hatch believed 
that there were at least four companies with Barela leading one of them. Hatch 
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surmised that Blair, had only identified the one led by Barela, therefore believing 
that Mexicanos from the other side did not participate in the events. Thus it was 
not an international conflict as many had claimed. There were indeed “Mexicans” 
from the other side who took part in key ways and at critical moments. The 
majority of participants were spectators, armed only because most men traveled 
that way. 
Mexicanos who took part in the Salt War have been represented as 
forming nothing more than a mob.32 Only a small portion of the Mexicano 
community took up arms, although many more suffered throughout. Participants 
in the San Elizario Salt War had distinct motivations, both individual and 
collective, for taking up arms against particular Anglo merchants and political 
leaders. Moreover, the diversity within the Mexicano community revealed 
competing strategies for survival and resistance as each negotiated the dramatic 
changes of the era. The residents of Ysleta, San Elizario and Socorro exhibited 
racial, ethnic and class diversity, as in the case of the Garcías, all of who played 
prominent roles on both sides of the battle. Vidal saved his brother G. N. García’s 
life when he rescued him from the house where he was being held under guard. 
                                                 
32 A number of Marxist scholars have contested the limited analytical value of the category of 
“mob.” E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” 
in Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: The New Press, 
1993); E.P.Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 
1966); George Rudé, The Crowd in History, A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and 
England, 1730-1848  (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1981). 
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Earlier Vidal García had assumed that his brother perished with Ellis. Upon 
discovering he still lived, Vidal rescued his brother ordering him to remain in his 
home until after Howard and the others had been executed.33  
Mexicanos, especially those that played key roles as “leaders” were, for 
the most part, unnamed and therefore easily conflated into the mob. Blair, for 
example, in only a few instances mentioned any participants by name. Francisco 
Barela is one of the most prominent among the few participants that appear in the 
reports. Barela achieved this notoriety primarily for his role in intervening on 
behalf of Blair and later the rangers. Anglos were quick to designate Barela as the 
single or primary leader of the mob.34 Prominent individuals in the “border 
troubles” have proven intractable in conforming to the historical interpretation of 
the border caudillo or strongman, as in the case of Barela who is often labeled as 
either a border bandit or military leader, rogue or patriot. 
The Mexicano community took up arms to resist the enclosure of long 
held communal property -to defend, in other words, their “moral economy.” They 
sought to establish justice and address the serious violations by the region’s 
leading Anglos. Informed by a distinct legitimizing tradition, or moral economy, 
                                                 
33 El Paso Troubles in Texas, p. 108. 
34 “It is likely that the importance of charismatic leadership (often by outsiders),” Gavin Smith 
explains, “has been exaggerated largely because of the requirements of post hoc account-giving, 
which tends to conform to the structural requirements of narrative order and above the structural 
requirements of the movement being described.” Gavin Smith, Livelihood and Resistance: 
Peasants and the Politics of Land in Peru (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989): 27. 
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Mexicanos acted decisively in opposition to Anglo incursions. Mexicano action 
reflected what E. P. Thompson has interpreted as the moral economy of collective 
resistance, or “a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the 
proper economic functions of several parties within the community, which taken 
together, can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor.”35 
Salt, including the ownership of the salt lakes and the right to freight it, 
was indeed one of the most critical points of contention. Only a small number like 
Solomon Schutz refuted the “salt theory,” emphasizing the personal feud between 
Cardis and Howard. The implication being that Cardis exerted an extraordinary 
amount of political, and decidedly negative influence, on a docile Mexicano 
population. As private feuds unfolded, collective reprisals were visited on the 
region. Most observers and participants agreed that the struggle over the 
communal rights to the Guadalupe Salt Lakes Mexicanos claimed by law and 
custom was the major cause. Blair’s opinion was more typical. He was convinced 
the conflict began with Howard’s attempt to locate the salt lakes “which the 
                                                 
35 E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common, Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: The 
New Press, 1993), p. 188. Thompson asserts that a more rigorous historical inquiry, that 
transcends stereotypes, can establish “in almost every...crowd action some legitimizing notion.” 
Thompson’s investigation of collective direct action in 18th century England argues for a “moral 
economy” in which “the men and women in the crowd were informed by the belief that they were 
defending traditional rights or customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the wider 
consensus of the community. On occasion this popular consensus was endorsed by some measure 
of licence afforded by the authorities. More commonly, the consensus was so strong that it 
overrode motives of fear or deference. See also E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the 
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and Present, 50 (1971), 76-79. 
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Mexicans had been obtaining salt from time immemorial for their own 
consumption and for sale in Mexico as well.”36 
The violence resulted as a response to a history of abuses perpetrated by 
Anglos who represented the worst transgressions of social arrogance and political 
excess within the context of the expansion of merchant capital. The Mexican 
reprisals were directed at representative figures -of law, commerce and land 
speculation. These were partly justified by the language and ideology found in 
legal apparatuses such as the federal and state constitution and US treaties signed 
with Mexico in 1848 and 1853 as well as traditional practices and values of the 
community. 
                                                 
36 Report of Capt. Thomas Blair, December 19, 1877, “Disturbances at El Paso, TX September 
1877-May 1878,” “Special Files” of Headquarters, Roll 14. 
266 
7. WRITING VIOLENCE IN THE US-MEXICO 
BORDERLANDS 
There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of barbarism, barbarism taints also the 
manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another. A historical materialist 
therefore dissociates himself from it as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush 
history against the grain. 
Walter Benjamin1 
Although much attention has been paid to the various episodes of violence 
along the US-Mexico Border, there has been too little focus on the number of 
investigations undertaken by the Mexican and US governments following 
outbreaks of extreme conflict. Throughout the period following the US-Mexico 
War persistent conflict commanded the attention of policy makers, diplomats, 
military authorities, local officials and border residents all concerned with 
minimizing the frequency of conflict along the border. Between 1859 and 1878 
the US organized almost a dozen investigations on the national and local levels.2 
                                                 
1 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, Essays and Reflections. Hannah Arendt, ed. (New York: 
Schocken, 1969): 256-7. 
2 The investigations resulted in collections of documents that include the following: “Protection of 
the Frontier of Texas” ordered to be printed January 6, 1859, provides “copies of correspondence 
between the US officers and Governor Runnels, and similar correspondence between the Secretary 
of War and General Twiggs.” “Difficulties on Southwestern Frontier” ordered to be printed April 
2, 1860 includes documents from January 13, 1859 to March 26, 1860 regarding “the difficulties 
on the Southwestern frontier.” This selection of letters primarily focuses on the Cortina troubles. 
“Troubles on Texas Frontier,” ordered to be printed on May 5, 1860 compiles letters from the 
Secretary of War “in relation to the troubles on the Texas frontier, since his last communication to 
the House on this subject,” covering a period from March 1, 1860 to April 26, 1860. 
“Depredations on the Frontiers of Texas,” ordered to be printed on December 16, 1872, inquires 
into the depredations on the Texas frontier. “Texas Frontier Troubles,” ordered to be printed on 
February 29, 1876, presents the work of a special committee appointed by the House of 
Representatives on January 6, 1876, “to inquire into the causes and the nature and extent of these 
depredations, and the measures that might prevent their continuance.” “Mexican Border 
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Mexico, on the other hand, countered with a substantial border investigation of its 
own conducted in 1873. The Mexican government considered their investigative 
efforts so urgent a retort to the official US investigation that they translated and 
distributed their findings throughout the United States two years later.  
While the sources and impact of Mexicano-Anglo conflict remain a topic 
of scholarly debate, the organized efforts to collect all available information 
regarding the causes and remedies of violence, solutions that would be beneficial 
to the national projects of both nations, have been largely overlooked. Literature 
on the rangers, for instance, has been notoriously uncritical about its sources, 
making liberal use of the documentation made available following the 
investigative efforts examined in this chapter.3 Political histories of the border, on 
the other hand, have chosen to focus on the successes and failures of key border 
                                                                                                                                     
Troubles,” ordered to be printed on November 13, 1877, includes reports from the Secretaries of 
State and War regarding “Mexican border troubles.” “Texas Border Troubles,” ordered to be 
printed on January 12, 1878, archives testimony taken by the Committee on Military Affairs. 
“Relations of the United States with Mexico” ordered to be printed on April 25, 1878 is an 
extensive collection of documents undertaken by the Committee on Foreign Affairs providing an 
“inquiry into our entire relations with Mexico.” “El Paso Troubles in Texas” ordered to be printed 
May 28, 1878 transmits the majority and minority reports of the investigations into the San 
Elizario Salt War. An additional document provided the report submitted by Colonel Hatch. 
3 Walter Webb, The Texas Rangers, (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1989); Frederick 
Wilkins, The Legend Begins: The Texas Rangers, 1823-1845 (Austin: State House Press, 1996); 
Frederick Wilkins, Defending the Borders: The Texas Rangers, 1848-1861 (Austin: State House 
Press, 2001); Frederick Wilkins, The Law Comes to Texas: The Texas Rangers, 1870-1901 
(Austin: State House Press, 1999); Charles M. Robinson, The Men Who Wear the Star: The Story 
of the Texas Rangers (New York: The Modern Library, 2001); Robert M. Utley, Lone Star 
Justice: The First Century of the Texas Rangers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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personages including notable diplomats, military officers, and political leaders.4 
Without a doubt official inquiries documented and narrated the variety and 
frequency of violence along the US-Mexico Border, yet they have not been 
critically reviewed for playing a key role in the nature and scope of border 
warfare. 
The reports that the frontier citizens and officials wrote, the claims they 
put forward for reparations, the exaggerated newspaper accounts, the depositions 
and legal writs, as well as the anecdotes collected from popular sources, all 
became fodder for later investigations. Frontier settlers clearly were agents and 
narrators of frontier violence. Michele-Rolph Trouillot’s distinction between three 
uses of the term history underscores the complex role of history in border conflict. 
People are both actors and narrators actually participating in the sociohistorical 
processes, the first meaning of history. They also share or produce knowledge 
about that process, the second meaning. The complications of “history” 
consequently produce a third meaning in “the overlap between the sociohistorical 
process and our knowledge of it.”5 
                                                 
4 James F. Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926); Carl Coke 
Rister, The Southwestern Frontier, 1865-1881 (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1928); 
Robert D. Gregg, The Influence of Border Troubles on Relations Between the United States and 
Mexico, 1876-1910 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937). 
5 The “vernacular use of the word history,” according to Trouillot, suffers from a “semantic 
ambiguity” that includes “the facts of the matter and a narrative of those facts, both ‘what 
happened’ and ‘that which is said to have happened.’” Trouillot adeptly uses the story of the 
Alamo to illustrate his point. Although Santa Anna defeated the rebels at the Alamo after a twelve 
day siege, he ignominiously was routed and ultimately captured at San Jacinto on April 21. Santa 
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By the 1870s, US investigative committees began to introduce their final 
reports with a brief historical overview that narrated a view of frontier conflict 
with a number of shared assumptions. The investigations built upon a narrative 
that became a critical part of each investigation that followed. At first glance, 
these investigations, taken as a whole, reveal, as Ranajit Guha has ably stated, 
how historiography operates as “a vital discourse of the state.”6 The investigations 
promulgated competing interpretations of the causes, remedies and consequences 
of the turmoil that defined the region. Naturally, each nation represented the 
source of the violence as emanating from the indifference or, in some cases, the 
machinations of the opposing government and its citizens. Investigations provided 
critical support for a number of diplomatic initiatives and foreign policy 
imperatives. 
Investigative projects collated a variety of documents produced during 
episodes of conflict. The effort to write violence required an archive. The 
establishment of such an archive on behalf of the US had two major sources. The 
                                                                                                                                     
Anna recovered from the defeat at San Jacinto regaining the presidency four more times, but 
according to Trouillot he lost the battle he had won at the Alamo. “Houston’s men had punctuated 
their victorious attack on the Mexican army with repeated shouts of ‘Remember the Alamo! 
Remember the Alamo!’ With that reference to the old mission, they doubly made history. As 
actors, they captured Santa Anna and neutralized his forces. As narrators, they gave the Alamo 
story a new meaning.” The Alamo became a trial of heroes rather than a brutal defeat. The battle 
cry that drove the men to victory at San Jacinto, “reversed for more than a century the victory 
Santa Anna thought he had gained in San Antonio.”  Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: 
Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995): 1-3. 
6 Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1999): 2. 
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first were the legal claims by Texas for re-imbursement for its countless sacrifices 
in providing for its own defense. The second, and by far the most important, were 
the formal investigations undertaken by the US Congress. Both nations 
established such an archive, each with varying degrees of success. An archive not 
only in the traditional sense of a collection of documents, the kind historians 
generally refer to as primary sources. But, more importantly, an archive in the 
additional sense suggested by Foucault. An archive, as Foucault argues, is “not 
the totality of texts that have been preserved by a civilization or the set of traces 
that could be salvaged from its downfall, but the series of rules which determine 
in a culture the appearance and disappearance of statements, their retention and 
their destruction, their paradoxical existence as events and things.”7 Thus, in a 
profound sense, once combined these texts “played a part in the reality they speak 
of –and that, in return, whatever their inaccuracy, their exaggeration, or their 
hypocrisy, are traversed by it: fragments of discourse trailing the fragments of a 
reality they are apart of.”8 Few will argue that archives are, as Nicholas Dirks 
reminds us, “contaminated by interpretation and selection.” Insisting that archives 
are too often viewed as a space “free of context, argument, ideology –indeed 
history itself,” Dirks emphasizes that they bear the “ideological birthmarks” of a 
                                                 
7 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, vol. 2 of The Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984, James D. Faubion, ed. (New York: The New Press, 1998): 309. 
8 Michel Foucault, Power, vol. 3 of The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, James D. 
Faubion, ed. (New York: The New Press, 2000): 160. 
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genealogy that “encodes a great many levels, genres, and expressions of 
governmentality.”9 The advantages enjoyed by the US enabled the establishment 
of a “Texas text,” a discourse that crept into the documentation, organization and 
interpretation of the archive that subsequently supported a great deal of 
celebratory historiography. Thus, the archive is more than a monument containing 
a specific US past, but a contested, and therefore contingent process in service of 
an enduring settler colonial project. 
In each document as well as in the combination of texts not only was a 
historiography produced but ethnography of frontier violence was made available 
as well. Interestingly enough, these historiographies and ethnographies of border 
conflict emerged at a moment when the disciplines of history and anthropology 
were just evolving. Most importantly, the combined effect of the investigations 
supported the infantalization and criminalization of Mexicanos as a people and a 
nation, further legitimizing processes of despoliation. The narrative built on the 
work of previous committees relying on the ideological sediment that named 
Mexicanos and Indigenous people as criminal and politically immature. As 
                                                 
9 Nicholas B. Dirks, “Annals of the Archive: Ethnographic Notes on the Sources of History” in 
Brian Keith Axel, From the Margins: Historical Anthropology and Its Futures (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002): 48; 59. The quote, “ideological birthmarks” is from Ranajit Guha and the 
“Prose of Counter Insurgency.” For an important essay that traces the historical development of 
the archive and seminar as gendered practices for establishing the discipline of history, see Bonnie 
G. Smith, “Gender and the Practices of Scientific History: The Seminar and Archival Research in 
the Nineteenth Century” American Historical Review 100:4 (October 1995): 1150-1176. 
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nationalist discourses, they justified conquest, narrated the “legitimate” rights of 
the victors, defined the frontier or settler ideal, and vilified autochthons.10 
The historiography and ethnography forged through the series of 
investigations reflects a “double and simultaneous textual construction,” similar to 
the representational machine Ricardo Salvatore argues obtains in the case of 
representations of Latin America as a whole. The double construction renders “the 
other (South America) in terms of a perennial deficit or vacuum, and ascribing 
meaning to ‘the mission’ (the role of the North Americans in the region).” Using 
Stephen Greenblatt’s notion of a “representational machine,” Salvatore points out 
that 
the objective is not to construe yet another reified version of empire but to 
propose an analytical framework that can accommodate multiple forms of 
imperial engagement, relate cultural anxieties and questions of political 
economy in the United States to the discursive production of empire, and 
attribute its due importance to the changing technologies of reproduction 
and display. 
 
                                                 
10 The US Southwest as a region has been the focus of various foundational historical productions 
dating as far back as 1820. “History,” Joan Scott explains, “has been largely a foundationalist 
discourse” in the sense “that its explanations seem to be unthinkable if they do not take for granted 
some primary premises, categories, or presumptions.” “These foundations (however varied, 
whatever they are at a particular moment) are unquestioned and unquestionable; they are 
considered permanent and transcendent. As such they create a common ground for historians and 
their objects of study in the past and so authorize and legitimize analysis; indeed analysis seems 
not to be able to proceed without them.” Joan Scott, “Experience,” in Judith Butler and Joan Scott, 
eds., Feminist Theorize the Political (London: Routledge, 1992): 26. Gyan Prakash defines 
foundational historical texts as those “ultimately founded in and representable through some 
identity -individual, class, or structure- which resists further decomposition into heterogeneity.” 
Gyan Prakash, “Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian 
Historiography” Comparative Study of Society and History 32 (April 1990): 397. 
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Critical here is the assemblage of representations that “are collections of 
dispositives or devices (each one with its own logic of representation) organized 
for the production of cultural difference.” Through various technologies and 
strategies of circulation, representational machines “translate an undifferentiated 
succession of local, individual, concrete events of encounter into larger, more 
meaningful narratives –narratives that convey meaning to formulations of nation, 
empire, race, or masculinity—each culture must work with and through certain 
representational technologies.”11  
In the execution and production of investigations were the essential 
elements of colonial violence. Useful here is Jose Rabasa’s notion of “writing 
violence,” in which he suggests that colonial violence is both the physical acts of 
terror, or material violence, as well as the violence constituted through its process 
of representation. For Rabasa colonial violence is composed of an aesthetics, 
epistemology, and ethics. An aesthetics of colonial violence refers to the epic 
topoi made available in western cultural systems; ethics include the legislative 
enactments that regulate conquest and occupation; and epistemologies of colonial 
violence are systems of knowledge that define “indigenous knowledges as 
irrational, superstitious and idolatrous.” Anglos exercised material violence in the 
various efforts to remove, pacify, or “bring to justice” wayward or intractable 
                                                 
11 Ricardo Salvatore, “Representational Machines of Empire,” in Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. 
Legrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural 
History of US-Latin American Relations (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998): 71-73. 
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Indians and Mexicans. As Anglos justified their right to expand in what they 
believed to be an undeveloped territory; they celebrated acts of colonial 
domination as necessary and legitimate (even heroic); represented indigenous 
inhabitants as degenerate and less than human; and produced legal and cultural 
codes that justified their domination.12 
One of Congress’ first efforts to investigate the persistent problem of 
violence on the Texas frontier began in 1858. On December 23, Secretary of War, 
John B. Floyd complied with a request by the House of Representatives to provide 
“copies of all the correspondence in this department between the officers of the 
government of the United States and Governor Runnels of Texas,… also, similar 
correspondence between the Secretary of War and General Twiggs.” The material 
submitted by Floyd consisted of a collection of letters dated from January to 
December of 1858, that outlined the response to the incursions carried out by 
Indigenous peoples. Floyd penned a brief note included with the selection simply 
identifying the papers being transmitted.13 What is noteworthy about this early 
collection of documents titled, the “Protection of the Frontier of Texas,” is the 
lack of any significant editorial apparatus. A brief prefatory note penned by Floyd 
that did little to actually contextualize the events referred to in the letters 
                                                 
12 José Rabasa, “Of Zapatismo: Reflections on the Folkloric and the Impossible in a Subaltern 
Insurrection,” in Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, eds., The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of 
Capital (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997): 423. 
13 U.S. House, Protection of the Frontier of Texas, 35th Cong. 2nd Sess., Ex. Doc. 27, pp. 1-77. 
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accompanied this early effort. The lack of any specific editorial intervention 
signaled only a minimal interpretive intrusion in the collection of documents. The 
texts themselves convey the unfolding pattern of conflict with little to no 
embellishments.  
On March 29, 1860 Floyd had a second occasion to provide President 
James Buchanan and the House of Representatives another collection of 
documents. Complying with a House resolution issued the first of March, Floyd 
transmitted “all the information in possession of this department concerning the 
difficulties on the southwestern frontier.” The papers contained vital information 
regarding a number of the “difficulties” that plagued the Texas frontier from 
January 1859 to March 1860. A great many of the documents resulted from the 
Cortina revolt and were collected to provide more information about its possible 
resolution. This compendium of letters and documents, much like the one that 
preceded it, also did not contain any significant editorial framework. Rather, it 
simply collected a selection of the transmissions between all the concerned 
parties. The correspondence selected documented the entire Cortina conflict.14 
The bureaucratic exigencies of submitting vital communications between 
officials could easily be accomplished in a short period of time and was by no 
means unusual. In some cases, just a few documents were forwarded to complete 
the range of relevant texts, providing as full an insight as possible. Such was the 
                                                 
14 U.S. House, Difficulties on Southwestern Frontier, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 52, pp. 1-147. 
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case when President Buchanan complied with a request by the Senate on February 
23, 1860.15 Similarly, the Secretary of War forwarded a few pertinent documents 
to the House a month later.16  
The Senate’s motivation for requesting documents was “the alleged 
hostilities existing on the Rio Grande, between the citizens or the military 
authorities of Mexico and that State [Texas].” This compilation of documents 
bore the distinction that the Secretary of War provided an interpretation of the 
events described. “In preparing the papers called for by the resolution,” Secretary 
Floyd explained, “I have thought it might be a matter of interest, perhaps 
importance, to have a succinct statement of the origin and progress of the troubles 
on that border.” Floyd’s intervention offers “a synopsis of the transactions,” 
making use of all the papers from his office, including many that had not been 
requested and therefore not sent by the Senate. “It will appear from these 
documents,” Floyd asserted, “that nothing could exceed the contrariety of 
statement of opinion, even among those having the best opportunity of knowing.” 
Convinced that the difficulties confronting the border were very serious and likely 
to worsen, Floyd briefly outlined General Twigg’s decision to abandon Forts 
Brown and McIntosh as well as Ringgold Barracks, all three forts situated along 
                                                 
15 U.S. Senate, Message of the President of the United States, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 21, pp. 
1-22; U.S. Senate, Message of the President of the United States, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 24, 
pp. 1-3. 
16 U.S. House, Difficulties Between the People of Texas and Mexico, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Mis. 
Doc. 38, pp. 3-7. 
 277
the Rio Grande and each staffed with a single company of troops. Floyd’s brief 
summary of the major events comprising the Cortina revolt, noting the turning 
point in the conflict as December 24, 1859, when Cortina was soundly routed and 
forced to flee to Mexico. The “disorder and growing hostility” that Floyd 
described compelled him “to order a concentration of all the force upon that 
frontier which the exigencies of the service elsewhere would allow.”17 
Once again, on March 26, 1860, the House requested, “all documents 
received” in the office of the Secretary of War “in relation to the troubles on the 
Texas frontier.” Although the collection of documents Secretary of War Floyd 
forwarded to the House contained no interpretive apparatus as did his previous 
package, the one he sent on May 3, 1860 contained a substantial report by Major 
Samuel Heintzelman along with other relevant documents. Originally written as a 
report to Colonel Robert E. Lee, the document penned by Heintzelman contains 
an important narrative of the substantial portion of the Cortina revolt.18 
The Claims of Texas 
Following the US-Mexican War, Texas persisted in seeking substantial 
support, and in some cases, restitution from the federal government regarding 
Texas expenditures for frontier defense. The state government claimed that they 
had not received well-deserved military support or compensation for the costly 
                                                 
17 U.S. Senate, Message of the President of the United States, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 21, pp. 
1-5. 
18 U.S. House, Troubles on Texas Frontier, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 81, pp. 1-105. 
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defensive forces they themselves put into the field. The state of Texas believed it 
was owed money. One solution the State pursued to solve its frontier problem was 
the raising volunteer companies of rangers. After putting volunteers into the field 
at key moments of crisis, Texas sought reimbursement from the federal 
government for their expenses.19  
In 1854 depredations became such a problem for the state that General 
Persifer F. Smith, commanding General of the Department of Texas, was 
authorized to call upon the governor for aid and to muster volunteers for service. 
Between November 1854 and September 1860, Texas mustered volunteer troops 
to take the field “for the purpose of suppressing Indian hostilities on the frontiers 
of Texas.” One such volunteer effort was the ranger company mustered by 
Governor Elisha M. Pease and led by James Callahan during the summer of 1855, 
ultimately leading to the sack of Piedras Negras. Not only was the state of Texas 
clamoring for compensation, a number of litigants, all residents of Piedras Negras, 
were hoping to be paid for losses they sustained during the Callahan raid.20  
By November 1857, the Texas State legislature approved a bill that 
“inaugurated the project of seeking from the United States reimbursement of 
expenditures made by the State on account of its rangers or volunteers.” Texas 
pursued its claim despite charges that many of its vouchers and other evidence 
                                                 
19 U.S. House, Claims of the State of Texas, 42nd Cong. 2nd Sess., Ex. Doc. 277, pp. 1-180. 
20 Ibid., 1. 
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had been called into question. The turmoil of the US Civil War had prevented the 
auditors for the state and the national government from investigating the matter of 
claims. The confusion of the war meant that many of the records were either lost 
or destroyed. The state’s efforts, only temporarily interrupted, were once again 
renewed by 1871. On April 30, 1872, the House Committee on Appropriations 
ordered the publication of the “Claims of the State of Texas.” Upon resuming the 
investigation the federal auditor’s examination of the evidence made public the 
report “Claims of the State of Texas” allowed for only $20,225.35, leaving a 
balance of $202,918.54 to amount for unaccepted claims.21 
The Robb Commission 
On July 5 and 6, 1872 Thomas P. Robb, F. J. Mead, and Richard H. 
Salvage gathered at New Orleans, while on their way to Texas. The three men had 
been authorized by the President and by resolution of both houses of Congress, 
“to inquire into the extent and character of said depredations, by whom 
committed, their residence or country inhabited by them, the persons murdered or 
carried into captivity, the character and value of the property destroyed or carried 
away, from what portions of said State, and to whom the same belong.” The 
Commissioners began their investigation into “the depredations having been 
committed for several years past upon the frontiers of the State of Texas, by bands 
                                                 
21 Claims of the State of Texas, p. 33; 66. 
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of Indians and Mexicans” through advertised “public sessions” that began on July 
30 and ended on October 3, 1872.22  
The Robb Commission, as it came to known, classified the depredations, 
the major object of their investigation, into three types -cattle stealing along the 
entire length of the Rio Grande; Indian depredations in the same region; and 
Indian depredations in north and northwest Texas. Cattle stealing was further 
distinguished between that which occurred between the mouth of the Rio Grande 
and Laredo and thefts which took place from Laredo to El Paso. Although the 
Commissioners readily acknowledged that all portions of the state required their 
due consideration, they were forced to concede that the region west and to the 
north would “call for the most careful examination in the future.” The three 
investigators covered territory from Point Isabel to Rio Grande City with much of 
their time spent in Brownsville.23 
Despite an initial admission of the limitation of the investigation, the US 
Commissioners to Texas put forward what they believed was a rather definitive 
assessment of the causes of unrest in the region. “In submitting a report of their 
investigations into the alleged outrages committed on the persons and property of 
the citizens of Texas by armed bands of Mexicans and Indians, which is 
necessarily ex parte in its character,” Robb, Mead, and Salvage concluded, “the 
                                                 
22 U.S. House, Depredations on the Frontiers of Texas, 42nd Cong. 3rd Sess., Ex. Doc. 39, pp. 2. 
23 Ibid., 1-3. 
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commissioners are thoroughly impressed with its shortcomings in fully grasping 
the serious complications which have disturbed the peace and quiet of our 
southwestern border for so many years past.”24 
Despite their initial caution, the US Commissioners had occasion to 
reference another important collection of documents. “Extending back for twenty 
years and over a superficies exceeding one-half of the entire area of territory in 
the state of Texas,” the Commissioners asserted, “these frontier troubles are 
traceable directly to an unwise system of legislation regulating the commerce of 
the right bank of the Rio Bravo, which has made that frontier a rendezvous for the 
lawless, and a base of operations for an illicit traffic with the interior of Mexico 
and the United States, detrimental alike to the commercial prosperity of the two 
governments, and to the unorganized condition of society on the two banks of the 
Rio Grande, its natural sequence.”  
Like previous investigation, the Robb Commission took up the issue, and 
legacy, of the Cortina War. Remarkably, the Commission linked the Cortina War 
to the establishment of the Zona Libre in March of 1858. “To such an extent did 
this decree encourage smuggling and lawlessness,” the Commission explained,  
that eminent Mexican authority, at one time, estimated the floating 
population in the city of Matamoras [sic] at over forty thousand; and so 
bold were these outlaws in their operations, that within two years after the 
decree establishing this ‘free zone’ was issued, they, to the number of 
                                                 
24 The remaining discussion regarding the Robb Commission is taken from Depredations on the 
Frontier of Texas, pp. 39-41. 
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three or four hundred, under the leadership of General Juan N. Cortina, 
crossed from Mexico into Texas, attacked the city of Brownsville, 
murdered several citizens, engaged the United States troops between that 
city and Ringgold Barracks, plundered the country through which they 
passed, and retired to Mexico. 
 
In addition, Robb, Mead, and Salvage laid the responsibility for frontier 
lawlessness on the powerlessness of “civil authorities on the right bank of the Rio 
Bravo” who were notorious at being “unable to enforce law and suppress violence 
within its own borders,” hoping to determine to what extent the perpetrators were 
“public enemies” or “private malefactors.”  
The solution proposed by the Commission included “the employment of a 
sufficient force of cavalry to enforce law and protect life and property on the Rio 
Grande.” Fully anticipating that organizing a cavalry force meant depleting 
already existing forces stationed along the ring of forts first established after the 
war, the Commission proposed the raising of a volunteer force. “It’s 
recommended,” the Commissioners proclaimed, “that a regiment of volunteers be 
raised, on the western frontier of Texas, for its protection, to be officered by 
officers of the Regular Army of the United States, detailed for the purpose, and to 
be used under the direction of the commanding general of the Department of 
Texas.” The Regular Army would provide strict discipline and “restrain the very 
natural tendency of volunteers to avenge indiscriminately individual wrongs.”  
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Although the Commission admitted that the two republics had a “long-
established friendship,” it stressed that Mexico “has been rent with civil 
commotion, conspiracies, and insurrections” since her independence from “the 
standard of Castile.” While recognizing the internal turmoil that weakened the 
reach of the arm of the Mexican state to the furthest reaches of the northern 
frontier, the Robb Commission placed much of the burden of violence on 
America’s southern neighbor. “The commissioners have endeavored to point out 
with impartiality, in connection with the conduct of that government, the prime 
causes of these frontier complications, which, in their opinion, are ingrafted [sic] 
in the long-established frontier policy, and have been enforced by the army of that 
republic.” The Robb commission introduced and codified many of the persistent 
themes, such as Mexican imbecility and collusion that would develop throughout 
the period. 
The Mexican Committee of Investigation 
In response to the work of the 1872 Robb commission, the Mexican 
Government countered with “the appointment in the neighboring country of a 
similar commission.” On October 2, 1872, the Mexican Congress appointed 
Ignacio Galindo, Antonio García Carrillo and Augustín Siliceo to investigate a 
portion of the border that totaled close to four hundred fifty miles. The Committee 
stated, “the Mexican Government wanted to have the matter investigated on its 
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side, and as impartially as possible, for it felt the necessity of being prepared 
against the plots of some malicious claimants and other ambitious private parties 
in this country.” In addition to informing the US public of Mexico’s views of 
border conflict, the Committee hoped to reveal how depredations of all sorts 
impacted Mexicanos.25 
The Committee identified public archives that “they ransacked…most 
industriously.” They interviewed close to three hundred witnesses producing 
some 17,688 pages of manuscript. They completed and published their work in 
December 1873. The Committee argued that “all possible difficulties [that] have 
been marring the relations of the two lines” can be divided into four epochs, 
including 1848-1858; 1859-1860; 1861-1865; 1866-1872.26 In addition to cattle 
and horse theft, the Committee believed it incumbent on them to investigate the 
combinations “for evils of a very different nature from horse stealing.” Thus, they 
insisted the recovering of fugitive slaves, smuggling and the discharging of 
firearms across the river fell under their investigative purview.27 Taking up the 
issue of invasions organized from Texas, the Committee investigated four types: 
those for the purpose of robbery; those which proposed political pretenses to 
                                                 
25 Reports of the Committee of Investigation, Sent in 1873 By the Mexican Government to the 
Frontier of Texas, translated from the Official Edition Made in Mexico, (New York: Baker and 
Godwin, Printers, 1875): iii-iv. I have relied heavily on the translated text. The Spanish language 
version contains useful appendices that are absent from the translation. 
26 Ibid., 205. 
27 Ibid., 178. 
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execute aggressions against Mexico; open hostility towards Mexico; and 
interventions by the United States in the “internal questions of Mexico.”28 
However, the inquiries made by the Committee were not limited to cattle theft. In 
fact, the broad scope of the investigation was motivated by the wide variety of 
conflict that consumed the border since the conclusion of peace between the two 
nations. The Committee presented its findings as very thorough, providing 
important insights regarding the threats to person and property of populations on 
both sides of the river. Two years later a translated edition was printed and 
distributed in the United States. Their goal in producing a translation was to 
disabuse US officials and citizens of the misperceptions and uninformed 
apprehensions they labored under regarding the conditions of the frontier.  
A number of scholars have referred to the Committee’s report, drawing 
from it important details to corroborate events. Unfortunately, the more critical 
interpretive contributions by the Committee regarding the source, organization 
and impact of violence along the border, have been largely ignored. Secondary 
works have favored the number of US investigations as well as the memoirs of 
prominent Texas Rangers, notably John Ford.29  
Despite this oversight, the Committee’s extensive evidence that it 
collected and its interpretation of violence along the frontier merits renewed 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 185. 
29 John Salmon Ford, Rip Ford’s Texas, Stephen B. Oates, ed., (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1987). 
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consideration. Differing in large part from the number of investigations organized 
by the US, the Reports of the Committee of Investigation reveals the extent of the 
racialization and the criminalization suffered by Mexicanos. The existence of the 
Reports speaks to the competing “discursive regimes” regarding frontier conflict 
during the integration of the region into the US economic and political orbit.  
The report of the Committee painstakingly refutes the claims of previous 
US investigations. The Committee directly challenged the assertions put forward 
by the Robb Commission. According to Galindo, Garcia Carrillo and Siliceo, the 
conclusions of the Robb Commission were patently unsupported “in consequence 
of an enormous exaggeration.” By contrast the Mexican Committee argued that 
Mexicanos endured more from the depredations of lawless elements of all races. 
Mexican communities, along the border, the Committee investigators concluded, 
were constantly threatened by the “pernicious evils” that overran the region. The 
Committee reasoned that since “the moral condition of our frontier is far superior 
to that of Texas, it does not seem proper that the causes of the existing criminality 
of the counties situated alongside the Bravo should be looked for on the Mexican 
border.”30 More to the point, the Committee exposed “the propensity which has 
existed, upon the part of the United States frontier, to deprecate the rights of 
Mexico… as also the tolerance of the Texan authorities, a tolerance which, in 
                                                 
30 Reports of the Committee of Investigation, 1873, p. 76. 
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certain cases, has amounted to complicity.”31 Ultimately, the Committee had little 
difficulty in attributing the activities of banditti along the border to the United 
States.  
In order to substantiate the claims it made, the Committee investigated the 
“disorganization on the United States frontier” by closely examining the role of 
state and local authorities. Specifying four aspects of Texas authority, including 
legislation, public administration, police, and administration of justice, the 
Committee suggested that the legal apparatus was deficient, failing to provide 
assistance for victims.32 Texas authorities failed “to prevent schemes” and were 
equally incapable of providing an adequate remedy to theft. Indeed the legal 
system, according to the Committee, was often a greater barrier to recovering 
property due to the imposition of heavy costs in returning stolen goods to their 
rightful owners. Examining the laws of Texas as a strategy to determine the extent 
and progress of cattle stealing, the Committee focused on the legitimacy of the 
brand, the necessity for bills of sale and the specific procedures for shipping 
cattle. 
The Committee addressed the persistent complaint of US officials 
regarding the failure of Mexican authorities to effectively intervene by inquiring 
into “the conduct of the Mexican authorities.” The Committee recognized the 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 184. 
32 Ibid., 104-110. 
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interest in an efficient and effective effort by Mexican authorities to end cattle 
theft operations, especially from Mexican proprietors who had a self-interest in 
protecting their own economic investments. Not only were Mexican authorities 
able to prevent thefts and capture thieves, unlike their Texas counterparts, they 
were also able to resolve disputes much more quickly and with fewer incurred 
expenses.  
One of the most important aspects taken up by the Committee was “the 
conditions of the cattle trade.” Ultimately, the Committee concluded that the 
extent of cattle theft demonstrated the limited role of the Mexican frontier as a 
market and point of export. The Committee sought to demonstrate that “not all the 
cattle stolen in Texas and brought to the bank of the river were transported to 
Mexican territory.” By closely examining the trade and traffic in cattle and hides 
in Matamoros, the Committee concluded that cattle and hides were not taken to 
the interior of Mexico but exported. Traffic in stolen animals and hides often went 
through Boca del Rio for example.33 The system of the registration of hides had 
reduced the success of cattle theft as a whole. The registry of cattle and hides, the 
Committee argued, “always produced the best results” and had become more 
professional with the transfer to the municipal treasury in September 1870.34 The 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 91-104. 
34 The important case of Augustin Menchaca, a judge of the northern district, whose treatment at 
the hands of Henry Klahn and L. Shedd reveals the extent that Mexican authorities were accused 
of assisting or being indifferent to criminals. It also reveals the imposition of Anglo authority into 
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Committee insisted that the cattle industry could not have faced destruction by 
robbery, owing to the expansion of the cattle market following 1868 and the 
devastating effects of drought in 1872-73.35 
To the extent there was cattle theft the Committee placed much of the 
blame for its increase on the depredations that were carried out during and after 
the war. Relying on what statistical evidence was available, the Committee 
revealed that those who put forward complaints regarding losses from 1866-1872 
increased their stock despite the losses, natural or otherwise. In fact, the 
Committee’s research indicated that Anglo ranchers were able to export more 
than in previous years. Confederate forces organized raids into Mexico for the 
purpose of theft and to punish Mexicanos who executed a guerrilla war, operating 
on both sides of the river, designed to undermine the Confederate war effort. The 
Committee believed that the depredations organized as part of the war continued 
long after it had ended.36 Ultimately, the Committee impugned many of the 
complaints put forward by prominent Texas ranchers. Surprisingly, their 
investigation revealed strategic collaborations, as in the case of Francisco Iturria 
                                                                                                                                     
the Mexican system, such that Klahn and Sledd insisted on inspecting Mexican ranches with the 
legal authority and assistance of Mexican officials. Despite criticism of the Texas system’s 
inefficiency and inconsistency, the Commission notes the cooperation between Ford and Mexican 
authorities in 1870 
35 Reports of the Committee of Investigation, 1873, pp. 41-47. 
36 Ibid., 65-72. 
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and Richard King who were exposed for profiting from the thefts while also 
claiming to having been victimized.37 
The Committee viewed the category of robbery as “one of the most 
complicated in this investigation, embracing as it does, so many details.” The 
Committee distinguished four types of groups involved in cattle stealing: those 
who were residents on both sides and who were organized in Mexico for the 
purpose of “carrying hostilities to the Confederates”; those American Texans who 
stole cattle during and after the war; those who were commissioned “to confiscate 
cattle belonging to confederates” and continued stealing; and finally those 
vagabonds “who are always in readiness to commit any crime.” The final 
category included the Lugos, Mexicanos “who acquired notoriety, not so much for 
their participation in cattle stealing, as for their being supposed to be in 
communication and under the protection of General Cortina.”38 
The Committee linked the vexed question of cattle theft to larger political 
issues. One such concern was the “spirit prevailing on the left bank of the river,” 
which mistakes Mexicanos from their nationality for their race. Yet another was 
the Anglo ambition to expand into Mexico up to the Sierra Madre. Following 
extensive and by all accounts sophisticated research the Mexican Committee of 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 164-177. 
38 Ibid., 72-91. The animosity directed at Cortina quickly and decisively transformed from intrigue 
into a system. The antagonism towards Cortina was a pretext for mistakenly attributing activities 
to Cortina, when they were properly blamed on two corps of cavalry, the Fieles de Cortina and the 
Exploradores. 
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Investigation concluded that the cattle theft that plagued the border region was 
nothing more than a pretext for longstanding ambitions by the US and its citizens 
to control additional Mexican territory beyond the boundary. The Committee 
concluded, “the question of cattle stealing is only an incidental one, and is 
doomed to disappear so soon as it shall have answered its political purposes.” 
“What merits particular attention is,” they explained, “that series of crises which 
have periodically occurred in their intercourse since 1848, and the invariable 
solution of which has been sought for in the expansion of territory. This is in 
substance the meaning of the question of cattle stealing.”39  
Given the assertion of the problem, the Committee also argued that, 
“nevertheless, both governments are certainly interested in regulating the 
condition of their respective frontiers.” Although admitting to the “inefficiency of 
the local authorities on both frontiers,” the Committee offered a number of 
suggestions, including the establishment of a federal force of military and police; 
expeditious action by the courts; “suppression of all kinds of expenses” for police 
and judicial action; and the persecution of all thefts regardless of “place where the 
offense may have been committed.” They proposed amendments to the 
extradition treaty sufficient “to facilitate the action of the courts.”40 
                                                 
39 Reports of the Committee of Investigation, 1873 pp. 222-223. 
40 Ibid., 213-222. 
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Although Anglo officials presented horse and cattle theft as only occurring 
to or impacting Anglos exclusively, it was clear that Mexicanos on the Mexican 
side of the river also suffered from theft. The Committee asserted “it is impossible 
to deny that since 1848 the stealing of horses has been carried on in Mexico, for 
the purpose of carrying them into Texas and selling them there. It must also be 
admitted, that since 1862 cattle have been stolen in Texas, taken into Mexico, and 
sold there, but it is not true that this has been carried on to the extent alleged by 
the complainants in Texas; there is no doubt, however, about the fact.” Mexicanos 
made every effort to recover their property despite the difficulties that such an 
effort entailed. Rancheros suffered from the depredations of independent, often 
indigent, cattle thieves. They also fell victim to the substantial Texas ranches that 
easily procured maverick cattle. Mexicanos were often forced to take 
extraordinary measures so as not to be accused of improprieties.41  
They argued that the system of theft throughout the entire border region 
produced the same demoralization for both sides of the river, the practice and 
consequences being the same. However, the Committee distinguished between the 
character of stealing undertaken by Mexicanos and Anglos. Although the 
demoralization of the lower Rio Grande was not peculiar or greater than in any 
other region, the Committee did concede that the system of theft resulted from the 
participation of a great many Mexicanos, but this only because “the majority of 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 47-65. 
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the inhabitants are of Mexican origin, from whence it necessarily follows that the 
generality of robbers there must belong to that race”.42  
The depredations associated with Mathews reveals the difficulties 
rancheros faced as a result of the criminal activity along the frontier, 
underscoring the precariousness of Mexicano life and property. The notorious 
horse thief, Frederick Mathews, for example, victimized Mexicano stock ranchers 
forcing them to seek redress. A complaint initiated by the town council of 
Reynosa on March 11, 1852, addressed to the Mexican consul at Brownsville, 
alleged that a band of horse thieves under the leadership of Mathews “established 
themselves in Las Salinas, and collected a drove of horses amounting to four 
hundred.”43 The town council advised the Brownsville authorities that this was 
not Mathews’ first and only raid for horses, demanding “that something be done 
to stay the evil.” The unsuccessful persecution of Mathews revealed the 
precariousness of Mexicano life and livelihood. The Committee learned that the 
consul collaborated with John Rhea, collector of customs, in publishing a notice 
that the horses were contraband and that anyone taking part in transporting the 
drove would be legally punished. Despite such efforts only a portion of the stock 
was recovered while en route to San Antonio. Once the property was returned to 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 72. 
43 Ibid., 12. 
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its Mexicano owners, they were attacked “by bands of American highwaymen” 
when returning to Mexico.44  
The Committee was forced to look into the turmoil associated with Juan 
Cortina. “He has been made the object of the severest criticism along the whole 
length of the Mexican line,” asserted the Committee, “his forces have been termed 
organized hordes, and it was said that they penetrated into Texas for the purpose 
of committing the greatest depredations.” The revolt of 1859 earned Cortina the 
animosity of Anglo elites which increased to unnatural proportions following 
Cortina’s assistance to northern forces during the US Civil War. They interpreted 
Cortina’s tenure on the frontier in a much more complicated manner than that 
proffered by most political and military leaders in Texas. In Cortina, the 
Committee saw nothing more than a pretext for further “producing a conflict with 
Mexico” to satisfy the venal machinations of a select few and the territorial 
expansion of a covetous nation. They concluded “that an artificial life had been 
given to him [Cortina] in Texas, and that when it ceased to serve as a political 
means for more extended purposes… he resumed his natural proportions.”45 
The Committee chose to interpret the events during the winter of 1859-
1860 as no more than a revolt. Despite believing that Cortina’s actions in 1859 
were a turning point, their analysis of the revolt linked it to the number of evils 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 15-16. 
45 Ibid., 127; 147-148. 
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that American citizens of Mexican birth endured. Claiming that the Cortina War 
was no more than a revolt allowed the Committee to assert an entirely different 
interpretation of Cortina’s significance and his relation to the more complicated 
causes of violence along the border. Cortina’s decision to retire to his ranch, 
acquiescing to the requests of several prominent persons to leave Texas, was 
noteworthy especially given that the safe crossing of his men in small groups took 
some time to organize. Not long after his men disbanded and retired to the other 
side, the Committee noted that the hanging “of one of his followers” compelled 
him to return to Texas, “giving his movement a more definite character.” “It is 
worthy of notice that when the revolt assumed this aspect,” the Committee 
remarked, “it was popular among the ‘Texan Mexicans.’”46  
A significant turning point in the enmity directed at Cortina took place 
when he formally requested a pardon. “That which at its commencement was an 
intrigue,” the Committee asserted, “subsequently became converted into a 
system.”47 The Committee pointed out that while Cortina’s prior history of 
“banditry” drew notice in explaining the character and role of the border villain, 
his accusers did not receive similar scrutiny. They had, in fact, achieved a certain 
degree of notoriety for their role in the theft and sale of horses, mules and cattle. 
After exhaustive research they identified Adlofo Glaevacke as someone with a 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 128-129. 
47 Ibid., 154. 
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long history of participating in an organized ring of horse and cattle theft. 
Glaevacke, one of Cortina’s most notable foes, enjoyed the fruits of a system of 
depredations that preyed upon ranches just on the other side of the river. He 
claimed various benefits through his successful political leadership in the border 
communities. While, Glaevacke obtained some notoriety, Cortina struggled 
unsuccessfully to expose the duplicity of his erstwhile foe and to rid himself of 
what he believed to be a wicked enemy. 
The Committee exposed another critical issue regarding the violence 
attributed to Cortina: his initial revolt originated in Texas. Not only did the 
Cortina rebellion embark from Texas soil, but Cortina was an American citizen. 
The Committee drew attention to the fact that the local newspaper and the 
Cameron grand jury, for example, indicted Cortina for murder and treason, a legal 
action that could only be taken on account of his American citizenship. Mexicano 
officials were consistent in considering Cortina an American problem, in its 
origins and its jurisdiction. In fact, Mexicano authorities were zealous in 
preventing Cortina from using Mexico as a launching point for mischief.  
Many of Cortina’s band were severely persecuted by Mexican authorities. 
While the rank and file that rode under Cortina’s banner were largely Texas 
Mexicans with specific grievances there were other supporters of some stature. 
The Committee attributed the participation of Texan Mexicans, including those of 
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some means and public presence, to the history of legal and illegal spoliations that 
had developed into “a well settled political principle” that “regarded Mexicans as 
enemies and an inferior race.” The numerous grievances of Mexicanos who had 
made their homes on the American side of the river, were peculiar to Mexicanos 
who claimed and were denied their US citizenship rights. “The Texan Mexicans 
enjoyed no greater personal security than did their property,” explained the 
Committee, “and what is remarkable, is that they were wronged and outraged with 
impunity, because as far as they were concerned, justice and oppression were 
synonymous.”48 
After highlighting the local motivations that translated into negative 
representations of Cortina as a bandit, their report drew considerable attention to 
the criminalization of Mexicanos on both sides of the border. According to the 
Committee the entire Mexican nation was under indictment as a land of rogues. 
Not denying the existence of a criminal element, the investigative team sought the 
explanation for the theft of stock and racial violence in the failure of both states to 
adequately police the border. 
Texas Frontier Troubles 
A House resolution passed on January 6, 1876, approved the formation of 
a five-member committee ordered to investigate depredations along the lower Rio 
Grande. The House committee had no less a purpose than to collect “all important 
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information bearing upon the subject” in order that “a true representation of the 
condition of the country from the Lower Rio Grande frontier could be gathered.” 
The Report and accompanying documentation was printed on February 29, 1876 
under the title “Texas Frontier Troubles,” gathering material from both the 
Department of State and War Department. Information from the State government 
of Texas was also procured. In addition to extensive documents, the House 
Committee also heard testimony from January 24, to March 1, 1876.49  
The House Committee began its own work, asserting “the statements of 
facts, the accounts of the murders and robberies, must be considered as correct, 
and are corroborated by all that came immediately before your committee.” The 
House Committee drew special attention to the work of their predecessors. They 
explained that they relied heavily on the Robb Commission’s final report of 1872. 
In acknowledging the work of the Robb Commission, they refused any 
amendment or criticism regarding the interpretation of the earlier investigation. 
“No action has ever been taken in regard to the report of that commission,” the 
House committee opined four years later. The House Committee, overwhelmed 
by the extensive documentation and the litany of depredations, chose to exclude 
inquiry into “incursions and raids of Indians.” They focused instead on “the 
district in which the raiding is done by the Mexicans residing on the south bank of 
                                                 
49 U.S. House, Texas Frontier Troubles, 44th Cong. 1st Sess., Report No. 343, p. i. 
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the Rio Grande, from its mouth up some distance above Laredo, altogether about 
300 to 400 miles.”50 
The work found in “Texas Frontier Troubles” was a turning point in the 
series of investigations undertaken by officially sanctioned research teams 
appointed by either state or federal authorities. Once again, the authors of the 
House Committee report presented their recommendations by first providing a 
historical overview highlighting the major turning points in the “border warfare” 
that had occupied previous investigative efforts. Making extensive use of 
“Difficulties on Southwestern Frontier,” the House Committee constructed a 
narrative of “border warfare” which they began in 1859 with the Cortina War.51  
The House Committee divided the border warfare into periods. The 
authors remarked that the US Civil War was a period of “comparative peace on 
that border.” Remarkably, the periodization accepted by the House Committee 
report reveals that they ignored the research efforts of the 1873 Mexican 
Committee of Investigation. Their periodization underscored the House 
Committee, accepting without reservation the interpretive framework of the Robb 
Commission. Rather than “go over the same ground,” they focused their own 
investigative efforts on the conditions affecting the region since 1872, “only 
                                                 
50 Ibid., ii. 
51 U.S. House, Difficulties on Southwestern Frontier, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex Doc. 52. 
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referring back occasionally so as to keep the thread of a connected history 
unbroken.”52 
The House Committee argued that the condition of the frontier 
deteriorated due in part to the negative influence of one man, Juan Cortina. The 
assessment of the unfolding conflict and the emphasis they placed on the critical 
role of Cortina is clearly stated by the House Committee and warrants quoting at 
length: 
But after the close of the war [the French Intervention], and with the return 
of the soldiery, commenced the pillaging on the Texas border. Cortina, the 
old robber chief, had obtained the rank of brigadier-general in the Mexican 
army, and had risen to power and distinction. From that time forth he was 
the central figure of the robbing population which established itself on the 
Mexican side of the Rio Bravo. His power was despotic. The lawless men 
who, through him, enjoyed the advantages of organization and political 
power on their own soil, and unlimited license to plunder on the Texan 
side, supported him with enthusiastic devotion, and in turn gave him the 
power and position which, in such a country, naturally falls to a leader 
who can command the unhesitating services of a large body of warlike 
followers. He became individually far more powerful than any other 
power –national or state. It was known that he had made and unmade 
governors at his pleasure.53 
 
The Committee’s representation of Cortina impugned the communities on the 
other side of the river that allegedly supported him –a “robber population” and a 
“large body of warlike followers.” It highlights the evil influence of Cortina on a 
“robber population,” pointing to the failures of Mexican authorities to fulfill their 
obligations by abandoning control to the nefarious influence of local leaders. The 
                                                 
52 Texas Frontier Troubles, Report No. 343, p. ii. 
53 Ibid., v. 
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Committee also drew special, if limited, attention to the endemic cattle theft, 
which, in their estimation, had “hardly been mentioned as the murders and other 
crimes which have grown out of it overshadow it.”54  
The House Committee’s report provides an ethnographic assessment of 
the Mexican people. Its negative characterization of Mexican officials and their 
communities in the region enabled the House Committee to dismiss any claims 
and arguments that ran counter to the narrative and analysis they put forward, an 
interpretation that remained consistent from 1872 to 1876. Significantly, this 
document represents the convergence of all three elements of colonial violence 
defined by Rabasa, including aesthetics, ethics and epistemology, representing 
metonymically the very process as a whole. 
“Relations of the US with Mexico” 
On November 1, 1877, still compelled by “the troubles” along the US-
Mexico border, Congress adopted a resolution to inquire into “the condition of the 
Mexican border.” Not surprisingly, the investigation, entitled “Relations of the 
United States with Mexico,” undertaken by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
made use of the reports, testimony and evidence collected by the investigations 
that proceeded it. In addition, it made ample use of investigations that had begun 
with the reports of the Secretaries of State and War the previous year. The 
“Relations of the United States with Mexico,” like the others before it, provided a 
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historical overview putting into context the major issues it explored. The report 
reproduced the same interpretation of previous committees and investigations. It 
made extensive use of previous historical overviews that relied on identical 
sources for explaining conflict between Mexico and the United States and its 
peculiar manifestation on the border.55 
Probably the most important document to investigate depredations, 
“Relations of the United States with Mexico” boasted that it would provide all 
available information on the “condition of the Mexican border.” Moreover, the 
House decided to give the Committee added responsibilities. It adopted a 
resolution that the Committee on Foreign Affairs “take into consideration the best 
means of removing the existing and impending causes of difference between 
Mexico and the United States, and of confirming and enlarging the commercial 
relations between the two countries.”56 
In addition to a narrative of “border troubles,” the Foreign Affairs report 
concerned itself with US’ commercial relations with Mexico. The Committee was 
animated by the opportunities of potential markets throughout the southern part of 
the continent. Related to the economic ambitions of the US were extradition, the 
protection of American citizens abroad and the Zona Libre. The Committee also 
                                                 
55 U.S. House, Report and Accompanying Documents of the Committee of Foreign Affairs on the 
Relations of the United States with Mexico, 45th Cong. 2nd Sess., Report 701, p. i. 
56 Ibid. 
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confronted the pressing issue of the recognition of Porfirio Diaz. The rationale 
and motivation of the committee was stated plainly: 
The times seem to demand a full and clear understanding of our relations 
with Mexico; for, on the one hand, the constant border troubles, and the 
evils consequent on them, imperatively call for measures to prevent their 
continuance; while, on the other hand, the productions of our 
manufacturing industries have increased to such an extent that our country 
has become fully alive to the necessity of foreign markets, and among 
them that of Mexico, as also of Brazil and the Central and South American 
Republics, are especially fields into which our commerce should extend, 
and our relations with those countries have, therefore, become, more than 
ever, matters of public interest.57 
 
The combination of topics, their stated importance and their relation with one 
another depicts the full range of issues that affected relations between the US and 
Mexico. The fact that all of these issues were situated in the context of conflict 
along the border is also significant.  
Although the Zona Libre had preoccupied border denizens as well as 
policy makers in Washington before, the interest of the Committee of Foreign 
Affairs in Mexican border trade strategies marked a shift in focus. In particular it 
drew attention to the necessity of opening new markets. The Committee’s report 
made explicit its concern about the US “entering upon a new contest.” “We have 
therefore,” the Committee explained, “passed the time when our home market 
was sufficient for the consumption of the products of our industry. The result is 
that in the absence of foreign markets our surplus products cannot be sold, and 
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their production has had to be restricted, throwing labor out of employment and 
causing wide-spread distress in the cities and manufacturing districts.” The 
economic expansion that new markets to the south promised would minimize the 
labor strife and insure domestic tranquility in urban America. However, in the 
area of trade, the Committee was forced to acknowledge the number of 
disadvantages the US faced compared to England, France and Germany. Thus, 
Mexico and the rest of Latin America became increasingly less an issue as a 
primary source of violence and depredations, and more significant as a potential 
new market.58 
While aware of the “collateral questions” that challenged the US in its 
relations with Mexico, the Committee of Foreign Affairs emphasized specific 
perils that American merchants and men of enterprise faced that were peculiar to 
Mexico. As the Committee systematically reviewed the key issues between the 
two nations, it reinforced the view that “the chief difficulty in our dealings with 
Mexico has always been found in the weakness of her government resulting from 
its uncertain tenure and the constant danger of revolution.” The perils that 
merchants, in particular, and Americans, in general, faced resulted from nothing 
less than the “cancer of revolutions.” “Capital,” the Committee warned, “is timid 
and shrinks from disorder.” The Committee insisted “its introduction into Mexico 
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through the channels of commerce and internal improvements would strengthen 
every conservative element in that country.”59  
Mexico’s own productive and commercial capacity was limited by the 
constant turmoil she endured since her independence and adoption of “a 
republican form of government” in 1824, and more so since 1854 when the “war 
of principle” was replaced by “struggles for personal elevation or ambition.” 
Prominent Americans reportedly made use of ethnographic characterizations that 
emphasized the cuadillismo. The political disruptions were easily explained by 
“the personal ambition of their military chieftans and partisan leaders.” The 
dysfunction of the government, exemplified in the “plundering of foreign 
merchants,” was manifest particularly in the form of forced loans. The Committee 
of Foreign Affairs concluded “that the ordinary mode of exacting these 
contributions, by generals or other military officers, is, in any view of the case, 
illegal, and rests only on force, like robbery or spoliation.”60 Prominent army 
officers such as Ord and Steele agreed that the Mexican government was 
incapable of exerting its influence with local and military officials along Mexico’s 
border. Ford, like the others, believed that Mexicans in the border towns along the 
river possessed a deep hatred for Anglos and would resist any effort to undermine 
their system of brigandage directed against their neighbors across the river. 
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Almost all of those who testified were confident that such a system existed and 
that General Juan Cortina was the mastermind behind the entire operation. These 
witnesses began their narrative of border conflict with the raid on Brownsville in 
1859, citing Cortina’s presence as the inauguration of Anglo-Mexican conflict 
along the border. Thus, according to the Committee, Mexico’s major problem was 
caudillismo and the constant disruptions that resulted from the personal ambitions 
of its leaders. The Committee believed that the expansion of commercial 
relations, including the security of property, had overcome the prejudice against 
US commerce by Mexican elites but that it remained vulnerable to the 
machinations of ambitious caudillos.  
Although the Committee of Foreign Affairs lamented the tenuous hold 
American commerce had in Mexico, they had what they believed to be efficient 
solutions. One solution they proffered was the great “civilizing agency of 
railways,” a method of development the committee concluded already “familiar to 
our people.” The development of the railroad was not without obstacles. Critical 
to American expansion, the Committee believed it was vulnerable to caudillismo. 
“We must admit that development in this respect is for the present prevented by 
that primary cause of all Mexico’s misfortunes –revolution, anarchy, and 
lawlessness.”61 
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The views of Mexican depravity and their predisposition to plunder were 
buttressed by casual comparisons to other “degenerate cultures.” On several 
occasions Ord compared the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande to 
the open seas frequented by pirates. “It seems to me,” Ord opined, “that the 
circumstances of the plunder of the stock-ranches on the Rio Grande are almost 
identical with the piracies committed on our commerce at one time by the 
Algerines [sic], who fled in safety to their own ports with their prizes.”62 Such 
pejorative views were not limited to prominent military personnel. In a memorial 
to Governor Coke, the citizens of Corpus Christi extended the comparison when 
they concluded that  
in the pursuit and capture of robbers who move from point to point with 
the rapidity of Arabs, over a country with which they are perfectly 
familiar, the brief experience of the last six months shows that State 
troops, disciplined and commanded like those of Captain McNally [sic], 
are best adapted to enforce the wholesome terror among the outlaws and 
give security to our people.63  
 
Attitudes that likened the region to North Africa echoed conclusions offered by 
the Special Committee on Frontier Troubles of the House of Representatives, 
which concluded that “the Mexican or south side of the Rio Grande,” far more 
populous than the American side, was comprised of a “robber population.” The 
region itself had become a place where  
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63 Ibid., 177. 
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all vagrant and dangerous elements are congregating to that paradise of 
robbers; a new generation is springing up, knowing no means of livelihood 
but robbing, aptly compared by our commanding general on that border to 
the pirate communities which formerly resided on the northern coast of 
Africa.64  
 
The link of Mexicanos to the image of Arabs, implying their shared disposition to 
robbery, applied to all Mexicans. Gustave Schleicher, for example, described 
Cortina’s power and influence along the border as one in “which he ruled with the 
power of a pasha.”65 
The witnesses summoned before the Military Affairs Committee informed 
Senators of the daily struggles along the border in the frame of a single 
narrative.66 According to these prominent frontier leaders, Anglos were threatened 
by the violent assaults of Indians and Mexicans on two frontiers. The border 
country of the lower Rio Grande Valley, specifically, suffered from an 
intensification of cattle theft, highway robbery, looting of stores and homes, 
arson, and murder. Cattle theft, most agreed, intensified following the end of the 
American Civil War. The violence associated with cattle stealing was on the rise 
because of the limited effectiveness of US military patrols, confirming for many 
the federal government’s failure in fully subsidizing frontier protection. 
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Conclusion 
The ensemble of reports and accompanying documents that comprised the 
fruits of Congressional investigations throughout the period produced a meta-
narrative. The very selection of documents in the investigation, including the 
reports and memos from the field, the orchestration of testimony and depositions 
from key witnesses, the re-circulation of newspaper articles and editorials, many 
already recycled, as was the custom, emerged in the context of a symbolic 
ecology that already exhibited pejorative views regarding Mexico and Mexicanos. 
The distribution of cultural and interpretive assumptions was organized in the 
aesthetics, epistemology, and ethics of colonial violence. In this case, it was a 
project of writing violence extended through the selection of documents that 
sustained a historiography and ethnography made available by the state’s 
investigative efforts.  
Merchants, military men, and local officials portrayed Mexicanos as 
simple, docile and prone to the worst vices and, as a consequence, likely to 
commit violence.67 The documentary material that included such observations 
facilitated an interpretation of border conflict that criminalized all Mexicanos as 
depredators at worst or powerless at best and therefore complicit with the most 
notorious and wicked border “caudillos” who threatened Anglo settlements. 
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The triumphant narrative of Anglo settlement, seemingly undermined by 
Mexican and Indian depravity, appeared inevitable. This complex investigative 
apparatus celebrated the claims and interests of a specific group within the context 
of frontier settlement. The representational machine constructed a meta-narrative 
of expansion and settlement that glorified Anglos while vilifying everyone else. 
The assumptions found in the documentation revealed the sense of entitlement 
associated with manifest destiny, suggesting that Indigenous peoples and 
Mexicanos were unworthy of the land they occupied. 
On the ground, many US citizens made legal claims against the 
government as a result of the losses they claimed at the hands of renegades and 
villains.68 Both governments made claims against one another. The US relied 
heavily on its own investigations. Mexico conducted its own investigation as to 
the legitimacy of certain claims, but they too depended on their investigative 
committees. Claims against each government continued through the early part of 
the twentieth century. The work of each nation provided competing analyses of 
the causes and solutions to the conflict. Although both nations shared the same 
motivation for gathering as much information as possible regarding the extent of 
violence in the border region, the resources the United States to investigate “the 
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troubles” underscored its increasing advantage and Mexico’s waning ability to 
maintain its national influence in the region. 
Each investigation built upon and adhered to an accepted narrative of 
struggle eagerly put forth and claimed by “frontiersman” and policy makers who 
justified their efforts and contributions to nation building in a peripheral zone. 
The discursive strategies that nominated heroes and villains while arranging 
events in a triumphant narrative highlighted those episodes that affirmed the 
legitimacy of US expansion. This body of interpretive work, although internal to 
the investigations undertaken by the state, served as a basis for other official 
documents and, ultimately supported the supposedly learned opinions of state 
officials while endorsing the popular views regarding frontier violence in general 
and frontier defense in particular.69 Subsequent historical interpretations that 
followed long after these investigations were conducted also came to rely on the 
documentation and opinions collected through this critical period of state 
formation. Since the historiography produced through these investigations formed 
the basis for subsequent histories of the region, contemporary historical 
interpretation it was necessarily imbricated in the settler colonial project of 
American expansionism. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
From this follow other criteria of research into folklore: the people themselves are not 
homogenous cultural collectivity but present numerous and variously combined cultural 
stratifications which, in their pure form, cannot always be identified within specific 
historical collectivities. 
Antonio Gramsci1 
 
The Texas legend and the “three cornered conflict” thesis that dominated 
historical interpretation regarding Anglo-Mexican conflict has been burdened 
with ideological entanglements produced as Anglos attempted to remove, pacify, 
or discipline wayward or intractable Indians and Mexicans, while justifying their 
exclusive right to expand in what they believed to be an undeveloped territory. 
They celebrated acts of colonial domination as necessary and legitimate (even 
heroic), representing indigenous inhabitants as degenerate and less than human; 
producing legal and cultural codes that justified their domination. The westward 
trek of Anglos brought with it both a fear of “the other” and an enduring 
arrogance about him. Ultimately, their ability to designate legitimate and 
illegitimate acts of violence underscored the ideological as well as physical 
victories of an expanding settler colonial project. It was the dynamic tension 
between the material violence or physical attacks and the symbolic violence of 
managed representations that facilitated Anglos ability to claim the honorifics of 
frontier defense exclusively for themselves. Throughout the period they and their 
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supporters established a special set of prerogatives as a unique frontier fighting 
force, claiming special talents for frontier defense against Indian “depredators” 
and Mexican “bandits.” As Anglos constructed national myths, claimed the 
conceits of a frontier heritage, and arrogated for themselves the exclusive role, 
and ultimately, the legacy of frontier defense. They erased the vital role of 
rancheros and Indigenous allies on the one hand and criminalized and 
infantalized them on the other.  
One of the most important representative figures in the symbolic ecology 
of border conflict for Anglos remains the Texas Rangers who emerged as 
prominent frontier heroes, claiming the legacy of “taming the frontier.” As the 
central protagonists and ideological lynchpins in the saga of frontier defense, 
rangers have, for the most part, been impervious to in depth criticism. Celebrated 
as key agents of frontier defense or portrayed as the villains in a system of racial 
oppression, in each case rangers appear on the Texas frontier as though 
immaculately conceived. Most Anglo Texans came to trust in the abilities of the 
rangers and were convinced of the vital role they played in minimizing frontier 
violence in this period. Yet numerous ranger companies went well beyond their 
legal and moral mandate to protect frontier communities often exacting harsh 
reprisals, sometimes bordering on criminal activity, on innocents.  
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Anglos attributed illegitimate violence exclusively to “Mexican bandits” 
and “Indian warriors,” constructing them as negative figures and foils for frontier 
institutions such as the Texas Rangers. While the rangers are an indomitable force 
on the frontier, their foes appear almost entirely as natural phenomenon. The 
warrior and bandit, represented as a part of the natural landscape was to be 
managed with the same amount of caution demanded by a difficult and at times 
forbidding environment. The treatment of the Indian warrior and the Mexican 
bandit in Texas historiography, has resulted, to borrow a phrase from Ranajit 
Guha, in excluding “the insurgent as the subject of his own history.”2 In most 
instances, they exhibit the most negative of traits, caricatures that confirmed the 
excellent work of the rangers as a frontier fighting force. 
Anglos did not carry out the project of frontier defense alone. Mexicanos 
who remained in Texas as well as Indigenous peoples who staked their claims 
with Anglo and Mexicano settlers consistently contributed to the security of 
frontier settlements. Throughout the process of settlement and subjugation, 
Anglos were dependent on the assistance of indigenous peoples. There were few 
military expeditions that did not rely on Indigenous peoples as allies, performing 
key roles as scouts, guides, and interpreters. Rancheros rode in Texas Ranger 
companies. Mexicanos on both sides of the river, wittingly or unwittingly, 
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conspired with Anglos in subjugating Indigenous populations and, in some cases, 
putting down rebellions and policing criminal activity. Significantly, Anglo 
prejudices erased the contributions of rancheros.  
The erasure of Mexicano and Indigenous participation in defending and 
sustaining frontier settlements as part of the equation of frontier defense 
underscores how it had become a racial project and a crucial vehicle of racial 
formation. The point here is not to suggest that Native Americans and Mexican 
Americans contributed equally to the military “taming of the frontier.” In that 
case, we would only be inserting Mexicanos and Indigenous peoples into the 
already established discourse of manifest destiny, insisting that they too be 
celebrated as frontier heroes.  
The ranchero exhibited ambivalence in the course of the social 
antagonism of the period, on occasion an enemy and at others a vital ally. 
Mexicanos confronted rebellious elements as organized militia units who, for 
example, came to the aid of the citizens of Brownsville during the Cortina War. 
Prior to and following the arrival of Anglos, Mexicanos worked to subdue 
indigenous populations. They also policed the border of filibusters, 
revolutionaries and thieves originating from both sides of the river. Indeed, in 
many cases they played a critical role in facilitating the incorporation of the 
region into the US economic orbit. Mexicano freighters and laborers were vital in 
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sustaining the local military installations that resulted from the frantic and 
occasionally exaggerated requests for military intervention by local officials. 
The popular image regarding Anglo-Mexican conflict emphasized 
Mexico’s political immaturity. The Mexican government was held responsible for 
failing to eliminate the vices of its northern citizens and subduing the region’s 
hostile indigenous inhabitants. Mexicanos were consistently accused of either 
facilitating or actively participating in depredations against vulnerable Anglo 
settlements. By relying on racialized constructions of Mexicanos as depraved and 
too simple to maintain law and order, scholars solidified long held views of the 
violent nature of the ranchero.  
Not surprisingly popular views disagreed as to the manner in which 
Mexicanos subsisted on the other side of the border. Those with some limited 
familiarity with the border believed that Mexicanos on the right side of the river 
simply lived off of theft and piracy. Little wonder that Anglo elites suspected 
Mexican officials of colluding with border caudillos in elaborate and illegal 
operations to despoil Anglo settlements. They were unable to see Mexicanos as 
anything other than an enemy and therefore capable of possessing social, cultural 
and political refinements. In fact, many thought Mexicanos were in almost every 
respect like Indians, going about simply clad with only thong sandals. More 
importantly, they believed that soldiers stationed in the North were impressed and 
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forcibly relocated to the North where they were likely to desert and join the 
“floating population” of renegades and desperadoes that helped themselves to the 
abundant cattle on the American side. Thus, despite their dependence on 
Mexicano neighbors to sustain fragile frontier communities, Anglo settlers 
interpreted Mexican political instability as confirmation of Mexicanos as lazy, 
degenerate, and easily lead by notorious caudillos for ill-gotten gains. 
Conflicts played out differently in the diverse regions of Texas, each 
region having a unique connection to both Mexico and the advancing economic 
and political forces of the U.S. General Ord distinguished between the people and 
conflicts of West Texas and Chihuahua from the criminality that plagued the 
lower Rio Grande. Despite his own regional bias, the open rebellion in San 
Elizario challenged his as well as other’s narrow regional prejudices. Conflicts 
throughout this period then emerged in the context of particular localities each 
with their own history of commercial and political connection to Mexico and the 
U.S. 
The project of frontier defense was not exclusive to the US or Texas but 
also occupied the Mexican government and local officials in the tier of northern 
states along the newly established international boundary. Mexico had inherited 
the policies and strategies of Spain and while able to claim some early successes 
following independence, the struggling Republic was devastated by Indigenous 
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resistance. The period immediately following the US-Mexico War inaugurated a 
succession of difficulties for maintaining security from “depredations” for both 
governments. In a more elemental sense, Mexicanos simply fled across the newly 
established border following the war, easily taking up residence in Mexican 
territory. A few chose to exploit the boundary while still others simply ignored it, 
maintaining commerce with friends, family, and associates on both sides of the 
river. The constant traffic between the two nations posed a number of problems 
for magistrates, the military, and merchants yet border cities prospered. Each 
nation faced challenges from Indigenous peoples who crossed back and forth 
taking advantage of lucrative markets and the lack of international cooperation. In 
some cases, raiding bands cooperated with one government while taking 
advantage of the other. Once the US relocated a nation or band onto a reservation 
in the US, raiding parties were easily lured to take advantage of vulnerable 
Mexicano communities. 
The alchemy of violence in the US-Mexico borderlands included conflict 
and tensions on a local, regional and national level. Diplomatic disputes regarding 
invasions and policing the boundary more than once threatened to escalate to full-
scale war. Each nation represented the source of the violence as emanating from 
the indifference or, in some cases, the machinations of the opposing government 
and its citizens. Incursions originating from within one country spilled over the 
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recently established boundary prompting the crossing of armed forces across the 
border by both nations. Inextricably linked to issues regarding the integrity of the 
newly formed border was US opposition to trade barriers and unfair competition 
established through the Zona Libre. Throughout the period, each nation nervously 
anticipated an invasion from the other, making war, the threat of war, and the 
representations of conflict a fundamental part of the symbolic ecology of the 
Greater Borderlands. Ultimately, the meanings generated through war conformed 
to popularly held views of frontier defense. 
In each case, sectors in these communities responded differently to 
lengthy processes of enclosure that slowly dismantled community commons.3 
Following the US-Mexico War, they did not simply accommodate themselves to 
Anglo political manipulation, social exclusion and economic dislocation. Nor did 
they consistently resist Anglo presence and the expansion of capitalism into the 
region.  
Most Anglos believed the violence in and around South Texas from the 
brief Cortina War to the Skinning war was masterminded entirely by Cortina. As 
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a representative and pivotal figure for Anglo elites, Cortina dominated the 
bureaucratic communications of Anglo officials. The attention paid to Cortina by 
official sources as a “border cuadillo” obscures a more complex narrative of 
political intrigue, economic competition, and racial strife that convulsed the 
region. Other struggles led by Benito Juárez, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, and 
finally Porfirio Diaz, as well as the resistances orchestrated by lesser-known 
figures against them, have been overshadowed by an obsession with Cortina.  
Yet, Cortina’s career coincides with many of the most significant turning 
points in the conflict between Mexicanos and Anglos during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Cortina’s personal history in the lower Rio Grande Valley 
intersects with the intrigues of Anglo merchants and their legal accomplices, in 
displacing Mexicanos from their land and political office. Cortina’s tenure on the 
border also frames many of the severest diplomatic tensions between the two 
nations. Cortina was, without a doubt, a major element in the equation of the 
social war, prompting an increased military presence along the US-Mexico 
border. 
The “El Paso troubles” narrate armed Mexicano resistance to the brazen 
efforts of Anglo elites to realize material and social enclosure. A well-organized 
community effort that captured a Texas Ranger battalion in response, it was an 
insurgency that unfolded in the context of personal feuds between local elites, 
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growing resentments against the dismantling of commons and decisive opposition 
to the imposition of elite rule. The failure of a small coterie of Anglos to privatize 
the salt lakes transformed the region into a “site of contradiction,” revealing the 
momentary collapse of an incipient hegemonic process due to the excesses of 
brutal processes of enclosure, both social and material.4 Just as in the long Cortina 
War, the legal proceedings that followed the insurgency exposed the porousness 
of the international boundary, the participation of Mexicanos on both sides of the 
conflict, and the limits of Anglo power. Moreover, the shift of the county seat 
away from San Elizario and the subsequent placement of the railroad depot at 
Franklin assured the marginalization of the once dominant rancheros in the valley 
communities of Ysleta, San Elizario and Socorro.  
Once Mexicano insurgents released their captives they were repaid for 
their measured sense of justice with brutal reprisals visited on the entire valley. 
Scholarship on the rangers has, for the most part, opted to view the defeat of the 
ranger company that winter as an aberration. Most emphasize the complications 
resulting from the limited pool of worthy men from which Jones could organize a 
typical ranger company. “It is quite certain,” Webb explains, “that Jones, 
McNelly, Lee Hall, John Armstrong, and many other officers whose names figure 
in the service, could have come out of the El Paso riot unscathed and with 
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honor.”5 Once again, we are reminded of Paredes’ admonition that the Rangers 
“were part of the legend themselves,” figures prominently in the maneuvers to 
efface the unsavory details of ranger history on the frontier.6 
The combined impact of strategies of physical containment and negative 
representations, the prose of counterinsurgency, sought to diminish the 
insurgencies as émeutes, jacqueries, riots, or mob actions. Close attention to the 
“micro history” of these insurgencies, including the events that led up to the street 
battles, the skirmishes, and their brutal aftermath reveal “conscious leadership” in 
each mobilization. More importantly, as insurgencies these events became sites 
where two antagonistic consciousnesses “met for a decisive trial of strength.”7 
The negative portraits of notorious border personages such as Juan Cortina and 
Francisco Barela as the exclusive leaders of “criminal activity” conforms to the 
foundational myths of the degenerate border caudillo, confirming his unchecked 
ambitions as a rogue and petty despot. Ultimately, too much emphasis on notable 
individuals privileges “spontaneity” and overshadows the participation of dfferent 
facets of the entire community.  
While skirmishes, raids, and filibusters, or the material violence 
commonly associated with the region, enabled Anglos to appropriate land, 
                                                 
5 Walter P. Webb, The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1989): 367. 
6 Americo Paredes, With His Pistol in His Hand (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988): 23. 
7 Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1999): 11. 
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dominate the political process, and discipline a neighbor, it was the representation 
of violence, or symbolic violence, facilitated chiefly by the series of 
investigations following each dramatic episode, that allowed Anglos to claim the 
heroic exploits of frontier settlement and defense as their exclusive legacy.  
The series of investigations and inquiries conducted by both the US and 
Mexican governments at the local and federal level collected the myriad 
newspaper accounts, line officer’s reports, local officials’ pleas and testimonies of 
leading citizens. Military officials, local leaders and even officially sanctioned 
investigators conducted numerous fact-finding missions closely examining the 
causes, nature, disposition and repercussions of border violence. These 
investigative projects compiled the testimony of thousands of witnesses in 
depositions taken before local officials, grand juries and investigating boards; the 
proclamations and pleadings of public officials; and “informed” claims by 
concerned citizens and public servants circulated in memorials and newspapers 
accounts.  
The combination of these investigations, including the extensive effort 
carried out in the El Paso region, established a “representational machine.” The 
narrative produced by the representational machine built on the earlier foundation 
provided by previous committees, adding to the ideological sediment that narrated 
Mexicanos and Indigenous people as only criminal and degenerate aspects of the 
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frontier environment. In each document produced by an investigation, as well as 
in the combination of texts taken together, a historiography and ethnography of 
frontier settlement and defense emerged. Interestingly enough, these 
historiographies and ethnographies of border conflict arrived at a moment when 
the disciplines of history and anthropology were just evolving. This body of 
interpretive work, internal to the investigations undertaken by the state, served as 
a basis for other official documents, establishing an apparatus that supported the 
learned opinions of state officials and endorsed the popular views of frontier 
violence and frontier defense.8  
Thus the prose of counterinsurgency, produced through state efforts to 
contain and document “Mexican border troubles,” conflated Mexicanos and 
Indigenous peoples into a static and homogenous group and affirmed dominant 
prejudices. Once viewed as criminals, Mexicanos were largely invisible as agents 
of frontier defense and victims of frontier violence. Although official documents 
record their victimization, they merited little attention. Mexicanos and Indigenous 
peoples not only actively engaged in frontier defense, but they also possessed 
their own visions and investments in settlement and security. In the matrix of 
                                                 
8 “Defined, therefore, more by absence than presence,” explains David Campbell, “America is 
peculiarly dependent on representational practices for its being. Arguably more than any other 
state, the imprecise process of imagination is what constitutes American identity.” David 
Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992, 1998): 91. 
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border conflict Indigenous peoples, Mexicanos, Anglos and, later, Buffalo 
Soldiers all took part in a complex negotiation over frontier defense. 
The specific acts of Anglo violence against Mexicanos after insurgencies 
such as the salt war have been subsumed into the broad category of “outrages.” 
One notable example of Anglo violent excess was the rape of Salomé Telles. 
Although glaringly apparent in the documentation produced after the “El Paso 
Troubles,” the rape has been glossed over in the narrative. An example of the 
“lived experience” of violence for Mexicanos, it exposes a critical element of the 
logic and practice of social war –the systematic subjugation of a population 
through terror. While the resistance of the Mexicano community was erased as a 
result of the criminalization directed against them, women’s roles from within the 
community were doubly erased. In the narrative of Anglo-Mexican social 
antagonism, the focus on domination and resistance emphasize male claims to 
honor and the construction of men’s identities as protectors of the community 
against class and race enemies in a turbulent frontier. This obscured the risks and 
hardships women endured as victims and survivors of border war.  
The brushfire wars, for example, fit into the national imaginary as war, 
revealing how societies organize themselves for and by processes of destruction. 
An examination of the social war of the Greater Borderlands that distinguishes 
between different operations of violence and recognizes the diversity of those 
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agents of frontier defense reveals more clearly how societies organized for 
persistent warfare clash on the periphery of an expanding market economy.  
This study joins recent challenges of American exceptionalism by 
interrogating the ideological impact of the discourse of frontier defense. Anglo 
violence against Indigenous peoples and Mexicanos produced in the course of 
westward expansion has been represented under broader categories of defense, 
settlement and progress. These designations easily rendered Mexicanos and 
Indigenous peoples invisible or when present in the discourse they appear as 
criminal. The violent episodes of the social war punctuate the transformation of 
the US-Mexico Borderlands, revealing much about the struggle for national 
meaning and identity. The very definition of these wars and the ideological uses 
they have been put to underscore how Indigenous peoples and Mexicanos have 
been excluded from national narratives. 
It also suggests social antagonism cannot be fully explained as either 
alienation or accommodation. Previous work on Mexicano-Anglo conflict has 
understood it as either accommodation or alienation. Earlier studies that 
emphasized resistance insist on a dichotomy of opposing forces. An “ethnography 
of resistance” uncovers the complex web of power relations that informed an 
array of interactions by diverse agents, some collaborating, others resisting, while 
still others avoiding conflict all together. Nor did resistance always unfold 
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following a specific script. The social war of the borderlands was composed of 
multiple histories of violence: personal and collective; material, symbolic and 
structural; legal and illegal; “wars,” depredations, police actions, and filibusters. 
The various episodes of violence recounted here operate as “chemical 
catalysts” that refract power relations on the US-Mexico Border.9 Stressing the 
link between historiography and relations of power, Gerald Sider and Gavin 
Smith insist that to distinguish between history and histories view power “as 
engendering chaos and havoc –conceptual, cultural, and social-relational- as much 
as it does order.” “It is only when we leave the terrain of ‘history’ and read this 
small story through the eyes of its ‘inhabitants,’” they explain, “that we begin to 
understand that power creates both order and chaos simultaneously, and that 
people must struggle against both.”10 
An approach that refuses a manichaen framework of domination and 
resistance, alienation and accommodation, complicates previous interpretations of 
identity formation, seeking to move beyond essential representations of the 
Mexican, the Indian and the Anglo. Processes of identity formation linked with 
equally complex processes of capitalist and state formation produced an array of 
identities, including market, political and cultural, operating at any given 
                                                 
9 Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance” pp. 41-55.  
10 Gerald Sider and Gavin Smith, eds., Between History and Histories: The Making of Silences 
and Commemorations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997): 10-11. 
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moment.11 The violent episodes examined in this study exposes the constant 
negotiation of Mexicanos strategic claims to political and cultural citizenship that 
took place in social, political and economic contexts they had previously 
dominated. An examination of frontier defense that makes explicit the discursive 
processes associated with material conflict exposes the mixed strategies of 
differentiated communities.  
While this study focuses on the variety of violent episodes immediately 
following the US-Mexican War until the beginning of the Porfiriato, it has also 
argued that the conflict between Anglos and Mexicanos is permanent. Taking a 
cue from Michel-Rolph Trouillot, the application of a heuristic device that divides 
the history of border conflict into four historical contexts and associated tropes 
better represents the social war of the Greater Borderlands.12 Not necessarily 
corresponding to rigid time periods but constructed for analytical purposes only, 
each historical contexts suggests different degrees of intensity of struggle. Four 
historical contexts, including the contested border, 1848-1877; the revolutionary 
border, 1878-1924; the policed border, 1925-1965; and the militarized border, 
1966 to the present, expands the argument beyond the period following the war. 
                                                 
11 See, …. 
12 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Culture on the Edges: Carribean Creolization in Historical Context” in 
Brian Keith Axel, From the Margins: Historical Anthropology and Its Futures (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002): 189-190.  
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This study has focused on the first historical context, from 1848 to the 
beginning of the Porfiriato, or the contested border, an era dominated by the 
representative figures of the ranger, “bandit,” and “Indian savage.” The second 
historical context coincides roughly with the period leading up to and during the 
Mexican Revolution, a historical moment in which waves of opposition to the 
Diaz regime convulsed the border. The Porfiriato was plagued by short-lived 
rebellions such as the one lead by Catarino Garza during the Tin Horn War 
(1892), prefiguring the political turmoil of the Mexican Revolution.13 Even in the 
course of the political turmoil created by the Mexican Revolution, which arguably 
was against US economic and political dominance as much as it was against the 
authoritarian and racist regime of Diaz and his cientificos, Mexicanos living on 
the US side of the border continued to be targets of Anglo racial violence. Two 
notable examples of racially motivated attacks against Mexicanos were the violent 
arrest of Jesús María Rangel and thirteen other Magonistas while en route to 
Mexico and the brutal repression that followed the discovery of the Plan de San 
Diego, a blueprint for a prolonged anti-colonial struggle of people of color against 
Anglo rule in the region.14 The establishment of the US Border Patrol in 1924 to 
the beginning of the Border Industrial Program (BIP) in 1965, or the policed 
                                                 
13 For work on Garza see Elliot Young, “Twilight on the Texas-Mexico Border: Catarino Garza 
and Identity at the Cross-roads, 1880-1915” (Ph. D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1997).  
14 For work on the Plan de San Diego, see James A. Sandos, Rebellion in the Borderlands: 
Anarchism and the Plan of San Diego, 1904-1923 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992). 
Sandos also briefly touches upon the case of Rangel-Cline in 1913. 
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border, with the key figure of the border patrol agent and the “wetback,” also 
witnessed institutionally organized violence notably during the round-ups of 
Operation Wetback.15 The fourth and current context, from the establishment of 
the BIP to the present day, marks the series of turning points that have further 
militarized the border. The dominant figure of the militarized border has become 
the illegal alien, made the target of increasingly sophisticated repression resulting 
from the intersection of the “war on drugs” and the “war on immigrants.”16 
The narrative of the social war of the Greater Borderlands is notable for its 
silences.17 “Any historical narrative,” Michel-Rolph Trouillot reminds us, “is a 
particular bundle of silences.” For Trouillot silences are produced or “enter the 
process of historical production” at any one of four stages or “moments.” The 
                                                 
15  
16 The persecution of LIC in the US-Mexico Borderlands has had two interdependent components: 
the War on Drugs and the War on Immigrants. The War on Drugs has its origins during the 
Reagan-Bush years. The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), established 
under the direction of Vice President George Bush in 1983, coordinated efforts between the 
Department of Defense and civilian law enforcement agencies. President Reagan’s signing of a 
secret directive formally establishing drug trafficking as a threat to national security in 1986 
significantly advanced the War on Drugs. That same year the establishment of Operation Alliance 
further advanced the goals of the NNBIS by coordinating interagency efforts to prevent the flow 
of drugs, weapons, immigrants, and currency across the border. In late 1989 JTF-6 sought to 
achieve “total integration” between the Department of Defense and other federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies. Later in 1993, Silvestre Reyes, Texas by Border Patrol Chief for the El 
Paso Sector, introduced Operation Blockade/Hold the Line, an effort designed to better coordinate 
border patrol resources to consistently demonstrate sufficient force. In 1994 the Pentagon’s Center 
for the Study of Low Intensity Conflict assisted in the design of “Strategic Plan: 1994 and 
Beyond” for the Border Patrol. Subsequent efforts following the Hold the Line model included: 
Operation Gatekeeper, 1994 (San Diego), Operation Safeguard, 1995 (Arizona), and Operation 
Rio Grande, 1997 (Brownsville). In 1997 and 1998, criminalization of immigrants began to reach 
into the interior with Operation Clean Sheets, 1997, Operation Last Call, September 1998 (Texas), 
and Operation Prime Beef, September 1998 (Nebraska). See, the following…. 
17 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1995): 26-7. 
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most critical silence has been that of the Mexicano. The chorus of conflict 
included Mexicanos playing different parts. Some jointed the fray by 
collaborating with ambitious Anglos. Others were part of the strident voices in 
opposition to Anglo domination. Still other less dominant parts were played by 
spectators who refused to participate in any meaningful way other than to closely 
watch the battle unfold. Other strategies of protest also added to the chorale. 
Against the din of Anglo recriminations of Mexican criminality and imbecility as 
well as the national uproar celebrating the Texas Rangers has been the drum beat 
of insurgencies, short-lived poblador victories against Anglo domination. Both 
the Cortina War and the San Elizario Salt War are prominent Mexicano successes 
against a paramilitary frontier force and major agent of racial and class 
domination. Finally, the ignominious defeat and capture of the Texas Ranger 
company during the Salt War, widely considered not to be the stuff of ranger 
legend, severely undermined the image of “Lonestar justice.”18 
                                                 
18 See Robert Utley, Lone Star Justice: The First Century of the Texas Rangers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
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Appendix A 
Carvajal Proclamation1 
Carvajal, on the 25th October, addressed a proclamation to the people of 
Matamoros, of which the following is a hasty translation: 
 
Fellow citizens—The “plan” of the 16th of September last which I and my 
companions have sworn to defend, was made for your benefit, and you have a co-
operative part in the principles which formed it. Thus it is, that in order to secure 
its object, and after having overcome a thousand obstacles, full of joy, I come to 
unite with you in order to expel the tyrant from your midst. A proof of this is the 
fact of the meeting with me, at the rancho of Las Rusias, of a committee of your 
representatives headed by the political chief of this department. From him I 
learned with profound grief that you were fascinated by that same military power 
which is plunging you into the most frightful abyss. 
You were deceived by tyranny, which, united with the low pretences and 
vile interests of two or three smugglers, overcame your reason by telling you that 
foreigners were my followers, that my object is to secure the independence of the 
frontier states and afterwards annex them to the Untied States of the North. 
Atrocious calumny! Am I not a Mexican like yourselves? Have I not proved a 
thousand times, in periods of danger, that I was faithful to my country, which I 
never have betrayed, and never will betray? Have you not seen that is secured by 
one article of my plan, and that the foreign auxiliaries who accompany me are 
united with the squadrons of Reynosa, Mier and Guerrero, your brothers, relations 
and friends, in a contract which binds them to sustain the same cause. 
I do not know, gentlemen, why you give more credit to the infamous 
falsehoods of the very tyranny which oppressers [sic] you than to the faithful 
promises and vows of your brother and friend, and even than to our own 
convictions. 
Tyranny has fascinated you. I repeat. Tyranny profited by your candor, so 
as to cause you to annihilate yourselves, and to take part in its frauds and crimes. 
For this I have found myself received in a hostile manner, and for this it happens 
that they sacrifice you like automatons, while the real enemy lies hidden behind 
his parapets. 
See, my friends, the first act of the troops on going out to the contest. See 
how far the black designs of despotism have been carried. Last night! yes! That 
night which you will never forget, they set fire to your houses, and not content 
                                                 
1 St. Louis, The Daily Picayune, (Tuesday, November 4, 1851). 
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with this atrocious act, they received pleasure in seeing you blood flow by the 
light of the flames which they had kindled. And what will you say, fellow 
citizens? I have desired your support, because thus I would be secured; because 
you are my brothers, because the cause is holy, and because I long for your 
preservation. 
My friends! some moments remain to you in which you may reflect, and 
rid yourselves of the false impressions which have been created in your minds by 
some vile hypocrites and calumniators, who pretend to be your friends. Reflect, 
for God’s sake reflect on the evils which await you if you persist in your error. 
What! Do you not clearly see the deceit? Decide against whom you will direct 
your fire, against the true liberals—against your relatives and friends, against the 
liberators who wish to rescue you from the oppression beneath which you groan? 
What infatuation!  
Open your eyes. Will you continue shedding your blood for the benefit of 
interested agents? I cannot think it. Abandon the ranks of tyranny; leave them, 
with all that belongs to you, and do not continue blind instruments of the blackest 
pretensions. Observe that I, firm in the principles which I have sworn to defend, 
will give up everything before yielding to any vain consideration. 
 
JOSE MARIA CARVAJAL 
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Appendix B 
Cortina Proclamation.2 
Juan Nepomuceno Cortinas to the inhabitants of the State of Texas, and especially 
to those of the city of Brownsville. 
 
An event of grave importance, in which it has fallen to my lot to figure as 
the principal actor since the morning of the 28th instant, doubtless keeps you in 
suspense with regard to the progress of its consequences. There is no need to fear. 
Orderly people and honest citizens are inviolable to us in their persons and 
interests. Our object, as you have seen, has been to chastise the villainy of our 
enemies, which heretofore has gone unpunished. These have connived with each 
other, and form, so to speak, a perfidious inquisitorial lodge to persecute and rob 
us, without any cause, and for no other crime on our part than that of being of 
Mexican origin, considering us, doubtless, destitute of those gifts which they 
themselves do not possess. 
To defend ourselves, and making use of the sacred right of self-
preservation, we have assembled in a popular meeting with a view of discussing a 
means by which to put an end to our misfortunes. 
Our identity of origin, our relationship, and the community of our 
sufferings, has been, as it appears, the cause of our embracing, directly, the 
proposed object which led us to enter your beautiful city, clothed with the 
imposing aspect of our exasperation. 
The assembly organized, and headed by your humble servant, (thanks to 
the confidence which he inspired as one of the most aggrieved,) we have careered 
over the streets of the city in search of our adversaries, inasmuch as justice, being 
administered by their own hands, the supremacy of the law has failed to 
accomplish its object. 
Some of them, rashly remiss in complying with our demand, have 
perished for having sought to carry their animosity beyond the limits allowed by 
their precarious position. Three of them have died –all criminal, wicked men, 
notorious among the people for their misdeeds. The others, still more unworthy 
and wretched, dragged themselves through the mire to escape our anger, and now, 
perhaps, with their usual bravado, pretend to be the cause of an infinity of evils, 
which might have been avoided but for their cowardice. 
They concealed themselves, and we were loth to attack them within the 
dwellings of others, fearing that their cause might be confounded with that of 
                                                 
2 U.S. House, Difficulties on Southwestern Frontier, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 52, pp. 70-72. 
 335
respectable persons, as at last, to our sorrow, did happen. On the other hand, it 
behooves us to maintain that it was unjust to give the affair such a terrible aspect, 
and to represent it as of a character foreboding evil; some having carried their 
blindness so far as to implore the aid of Mexico, alleging as a reason that their 
persons and property were exposed to vandalism. Were any outrages committed 
by us during the time we had possession of the city, when we had it in our power 
to become the arbiters of its fate? Will our enemies be so blind, base, or 
unthinking, as to deny the evidence of facts? Will there be one to say that he was 
molested, or that his house was robbed or burned down. 
The unfortunate Viviano Garcia fell victim to his generous behavior; and 
with such a lamentable occurrence before us on our very outset, we abstained 
from our purpose, horrified at the thought of having to shed innocent blood 
without even the assurance that the vile men whom we sought would put aside 
their cowardice to accept our defiance. 
These, as we have said, form, with a multitude of lawyers, a secret 
conclave, with all its ramifications, for the sole purpose of despoiling the 
Mexicans of their lands and usurp them afterwards. This is clearly proven by the 
conduct of one Adolph Glavecke, who, invested with the character of deputy 
sheriff, and in collusion with the said lawyers, has spread terror among the 
unwary, making them believe that he will hang the Mexicans and burn their 
ranches, &c., that by this means he might compel them to abandon the country, 
and thus accomplish their object. This is not a supposition –it is a reality; and 
notwithstanding the want of better proof, if this threat were not publicly known, 
all would feel persuaded that of this, and even more, are capable such criminal 
men as the one last mentioned, the marshal, the jailer, Morris, Neal, &c. 
The first of these, in his history and behavior, has ever been infamous and 
traitorous. He is the assassin of the ill-starred Colonel Cross, Captain Woolsey, 
and Antonia Mireles, murdered by him at the rancho de las Prietas, the theatre of 
all his assassinations. It is he who instigated some, and aiding others, has been the 
author of a thousand misdeeds; and to put down the finger of scorn that ever 
points at him, and do away with the witnesses of his crimes, he has been foremost 
in persecuting us to death. The others are more or less stamped with ignominy, 
and we will tolerate them no longer in our midst, because they are obnoxious to 
tranquility and to our own welfare. 
All truce between them and us is at an end, from the fact alone of our 
holding upon this soil our interests and property. And how can it be otherwise, 
when the ills that weigh upon the unfortunate republic of Mexico have obliged us 
for many heart-touching causes to abandon it and our possessions in it, or else 
become the victims of our principles or of the indigence to which its intestine 
disturbances had reduced us since the treaty of Guadalupe? when, ever diligent 
and industrious, and desirous of enjoying the longed-for boon of liberty within the 
classic country of its origin, we were induced to naturalize ourselves in it and 
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form a part of the confederacy, flattered by the bright and peaceful prospect of 
living therein and inculcating in the bosoms of our children a feeling of gratitude 
towards a country beneath whose aegis we would have wrought their felicity and 
contributed with our conduct to give evidence to the whole world that all the 
aspirations of the Mexicans are confined to one only, that of being freemen; and 
that having secured this ourselves, those of the old country, notwithstanding their 
misfortunes, might have nothing to regret save the loss of a section of territory, 
but with the sweet satisfaction that their old fellow citizens lived therein, enjoying 
tranquility, as if Providence had so ordained to set them an example of the 
advantages to be derived from public peace and quietude; when, in fine, all has 
been but the baseless fabric of dream, and our hopes having been defrauded in the 
most cruel manner in which disappointment can strike, there can be found no 
other solution to our problem than to make one effort, and at one blow destroy the 
obstacles to our prosperity. 
It is necessary. The hour has arrived. Our oppressors number but six or 
eight. Hospitality and other noble sentiments shield them at present from our 
wrath, and such, as you have seen, are inviolable to us. 
Innocent persons shall not suffer –no. But, if necessary, we will lead a 
wandering life, awaiting our opportunity to purge society of men so base that they 
degrade it with their opprobrium. Our families have returned as strangers to their 
old country to beg for an asylum. Our lands, if they are to be sacrificed to the 
avaricious covetousness of our enemies, will be rather so on account of our own 
vicissitudes. As to land, Nature will always grant us sufficient to support our 
frames, and we accept the consequences that may arise. Further, our personal 
enemies shall not possess our lands until they have fattened it with their own 
gore. 
We cherish the hope, however, that the government, for the sake of its 
own dignity, and in obsequiousness to justice, will accede to our demand, by 
prosecuting those men and bringing them to trial, or leave them to become subject 
to the consequences of our immutable resolve. 
It remains for me to say that, separated as we are, by accident alone, from 
the other citizens of the city, and not having renounced our rights as North 
American citizens, we disapprove and energetically protest against the act of 
having caused a force of the national guards from Mexico to cross unto this side 
to ingraft themselves in a question so foreign to their country that there is no 
excusing such weakness on the part of those who implored their aid. 
 
JUAN NEPOMUCENO CORTINAS 
RANCHO DEL CARMEN, 
County of Cameron, 
September 30, 1859. 
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Appendix C 
Memorial by the People of El Paso County3 
Believing, as we do, in the justice and right of free people being heard by petition 
or memorial; at the request of many persons we publish the following which fully 
explains itself. 
 
A MEMORIAL 
Addressed to the Governor of Texas on the Question of the Salt Lakes by the 
People of El Paso County. 
 
To His Excellency Hon. R. B. Hubbard, Governor of the State of Texas: 
The undersigned citizens of the towns of Isleta, Socorro and San Elezario 
in the county of El Paso, Texas would most respectfully represent that one 
Charles H. Howard appeared in this county and stated verbally (and without any 
further evidence on the subject) that he was the proprietor of the salt mines 
situated in said county known for many years as “the Guadalupe Salt Lakes” and 
by notices posted in public places he informed the people that he prohibited them 
from taking salt from said lakes without his consent under the severe penalty of 
the law. 
The people generally could not believe that such authority was vested in 
Howard because he did not present any authentic evidence sustaining such claim 
and had they seen any document purporting to establish such a title they would 
have doubted their genuineness, confiding in the rectitude and sense of justice of 
the worthy chief magistrate who has in his keeping the welfare of the State of 
Texas. 
Such a grant without any notification or the knowledge of the inhabitants 
of this county would be equivalent to the unlawful spoliation of the possession of 
the “Guadalupe Salt Lakes” which these people have enjoyed from time 
immemorial and since the establishment of said towns under the Spanish 
government and by the use and benefit of which almost solely, we may say, they 
have gained their subsistence; and without which common right they would have 
been compelled to abandon the homes and fields of their ancestors, or die with 
hunger together with their families. 
Again; Such a spoliation of these pacific and industrious people, and the 
transfer of this title to a single individual would prove that the supreme authority 
of the State disregards entirely the first principle of universal justice, and 
sanctioned by all civilized countries, viz: that the welfare of the many must be 
                                                 
3 The Mesilla News, February 16, 1878. 
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preferred to the benefit of the few; and in the present instance it would prove that 
one solitary individual should be the favored one to the detriment of thousands of 
others born and raised on the soil; it would authorize a monopoly, which is 
prohibited by our laws, and not founded in the slightest shadow of justice, and 
still less in the public interest and convenience. 
As such hypothesis is inconsistent with our ideas of the personal rectitude 
and integrity of the Governor of this State; we decline to believe the assertion of 
Mr. Howard that he is the favored one. 
Now as this affair dates some months back and has caused much alarm in 
this community; it having produced an armed conflict, and caused the horrible 
murder of Louis Cardis, a respected and good citizen, and our worthy 
representative in the State Legislature; and as Attorney Howard by his wiles has 
succeeded in producing division and discord among some of our friends and 
neighbors; we consider it indispensable for the purpose of terminating the 
difficulty (which is causing great evil) and to know positively how this (to us) 
very important business stands; to appeal to the supreme government, begging it 
to inform us, the undersigned citizens who with our families represent about two 
thousand inhabitants of this County and State; what it has decreed regarding the 
Guadalupe salt lakes whether they have been granted to a private individual; or 
whatever else may have been done, so that knowing the disposition thereof by the 
authorities; if it be adverse to us, we may have recourse to the legitimate appeal 
permitted us by the general laws of the United States and of our own State; to ask 
the revocation of said title by law, inasmuch as we are peaceable citizens obedient 
to the authorities and the laws emanating from them; and if this cannot be done 
we ask that some means may be devised to regulate the matter so as to 
acknowledge the demands of the State and at the same time recognize the 
indisputable necessity of this county to have the salt lakes continued as a common 
benefit to the settlements as indeed they have been since their foundation. 
If on the other hand our petition as above set forth should not be granted 
for some reason not understood by us; then Your Excellency, the imperious law of 
self defense, will force us to the painful necessity of abandoning the homes where 
we, and our fathers were born; to leave the dwellings erected by our labor and 
expense, to lose all our real estate, and to seek an asylum in foreign land, where 
we may exist with out degenerating into slaves. 
We are firmly persuaded that if Howard has obtained this grant, as he 
asserts that he must have accomplished that end by illegal means, such as are 
commonly employed by those who seek unjust measures, that i ; [sic] by alleging 
falsehood and suppressing truth truth- which if exposed would thwart the 
execution of their insidious designs. Howard doubtless did not inform the 
government that the Guadalupe salt lakes have always belonged to the people of 
these towns and that their products are essential to the maintenance and support of 
the entire community; and should they become the property of a single individual 
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they would be a mine of wealth worked by slaves subject to one master; and that 
this population of free men would rapidly disappear- free men as they are and 
should be as citizens of the great nation to which they belong. 
This grant if secured at all must have been obtained through fraud, and the 
principle that no right can accrue through fraud has been established ever since 
there existed on earth any idea of justice and morality. 
All legislation in civilized countries has recognized prescription as a 
means of acquiring and protecting the rights of property, and no prescription is 
more complete and conclusive than the rights of property based upon possession 
from time immemorial, or for more than one hundred years continuously and with 
the consent of the sovereign of the country, and exercised by thousands of 
persons. This is the relation which the people of El Paso county [sic] bear to the 
Guadalupe salt lakes. This right was guaranteed by article 9 of the treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2nd, 1848, and was confirmed by article 5th [sic] of 
the treaty of December 30, 1853. 
Finally; Your Excellency, the free use in common of the Guadalupe salt 
lakes is as essential and necessary to the inhabitants of this county as much so as 
is the common and free use of the waters of rivers and springs, of air and light, or 
the warmth of the sun. These rights are necessary for their existence and a 
monopoly of such things is in contravention of natural law. 
We have already shown to the best of our understanding that the granting 
of these lakes to a single person (no matter how meritorious he may be) would 
result in great prejudice to the interest of these towns, would threaten their very 
existence, and would be a crime against the well set led [sic] principle, that the 
public authority in the exercise of its functions should prefer to benefit the many 
rather than the few. It is moreover a manifest infraction of our fundamental law 
which prohibits monopolies. 
It remains yet to set forth the character of the individual who is the object 
of such extraordinary and unprecedented preference, for then the disastrous 
consequences which would inevitably result from such a concession, (if true) will 
more fully appear. 
Attorney Howard has shown himself by his acts in this county to be 
possessed of the following characteristics. He is an insolent and quarrelsome 
person even toward public functionaries; having insulted the District Court while 
in session in such a public and offensive manner that it had to suspend its session 
and adjourn. He is a man of fierce passions even to the desperate extremity of 
provoking assassination, for on the 10th of October last at El Paso, he murdered 
our distinguished and honored citizen Louis Cardis; whereby he has created the 
greatest confusion, and disturbed the peace and tranquility of this community to 
such an extent that if our worthy Governor does not interpose his opportune and 
wise decrees, he (Howard) will realize his ignoble desire that a conflict of arms 
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should take place in this county, which would cause the blood of our citizens to be 
shed. 
All these facts are as well known to the people here as is the fact that in 
the assassination of Cardis others are culpable from different motives one of 
whom is connected with the public authority. If necessary we are ready to prove 
before impartial authority what we have here affirmed. 
In view of what of what we have above stated to the government of our 
State in regard to the individual who calls himself the grantee of the Guadalupe 
salt lakes. Can it be possible that in the hands of such a man is placed the fate of 
the people of this county? Shall the inhuman and quarrelsome Howard become 
the feudal Lord of these people, naturally free and independent for they know how 
to earn the necessaries of life by their labor, and they have been educated under 
our free and liberal institutions? He who becomes master of the salt lakes will also 
pretend to be master of the people, for it being optional with him to give them 
employment or to deprive them of it, he will virtually hold in his hand their living, 
while he holds said right, for they will be compelled to subject themselves to 
whatever degrading conditions he might see fit to impose, which must be 
expected from a man with the heart of a hyena. 
On the other hand becoming exasperated they will be compelled to drive 
out the oppressor, thus becoming rebels, disobeying the orders of the legitimate 
authorities, or they must have recourse to some other expedient. That we may not 
be driven into such a desperate situation is the object of this petition which we 
hope will be in good will received. 
We suspect that Attorney Howard and those with him who have conspired 
to commit this spoliation have given the government under your charge false and 
calumnious reports against ourselves, and although we are confident that we have 
proceeded only in a legal manner to defend ourselves we are ready, nevertheless, 
to respond to any charges which may be made against us before any competent 
and impartial authority. 
In view of the foregoing statements which are of public interest, together 
with the legal principles upon which our petition is based; we supplicate Your 
Excellency to revoke the grant made (if made) to Attorney Howard of the 
Guadalupe salt lakes situated in El Paso County, Texas, as he asserts, and if the 
grant be not yet confirmed that you will reject the petition, declaring that the 
aforesaid salt lakes shall continue to be as they always have been for the common 
use and benefit of the people and residents of El Paso County. And, moreover we 
pray that if in accord with your views, and in order to reestablish order and 
tranquility in this county, now disturbed by the malevolent desires of Howard in 
regard to the salt lakes, the supreme government will cause an investigation by 
persons of integrity and impartiality to discover who may have cooperated 
directly in causing this disorder, and who might have prevented it by their 
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authority and did not do so, to the end that they may be punished according to 
law. 
If our worthy Chief Magistrate shall consider the just and substantial 
reasons that we have herein set forth, why we ought not to be despoiled of the salt 
lakes in such an unjustifiable manner as Mr. Howard intends, he will attend to our 
petition and do us justice which our claims deserve and for which the people of El 
Paso County will ever be thankful. 
 
San Elizario, Texas, Dec. 4th, 1877. 
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Appendix D 
Names of persons indicted by the County of El Paso4 
March 20th 1878 
Higinio Loya      Bernavel Candelario 
Desiderio Apodaca     Jesus Garcia 
Antonio Garcia     Agaton Porras 
Francisco Tapio     Fermin Oporto 
Antonio Salazar      Jose Hernandez 
Manuel Lopez      Pedro Olguin 
Antonio Olguin     Ambrosia Arias 
Rosalio Carpio     Juan Olguin 
Pedro Olguin      Lazaro Arroya 
Omogon Rodela     Militon Apodaca 
Jose Sierra      Gavino Arias 
Dolores Telles      Guadalupe Lopez 
Jesus Ma Olguin     Guillermo Gandera 
Tomas Gonzales     Macedonia Gandera 
Ramon Zambrano     Pantalion Garcia 
Benito Caballera     Leon Granilla 
Guadalupe Apodaca     Teburcia Oporto 
Jesus Arroyas      Jose Ma Juarez 
Jose Angel Bernel     Juan Madrid 
Ricardo Cordero     Juan Cordero 
Antonio Cordero     Romano Cordero 
Alvino Arias      Benito Zambrano 
Jose Perez 3d      Sosteno Beltram 
Antonio Beltram     Manuel Corasco 
Feliz Medino      Nicolas Sierra 
Eleno Sierra      Pedro Sierra 
Ysidro Scierra      Bernardino Lopez 
Santa Cruz Estradaja     Narsario Gomez 
Luis Guerra       Guadalupe Lucerro 
Alcario Villa      Pomposo Paz 
Luciano Frescos     Higinio Zuniga 
                                                 
4 Request for extradition directed to Jesus Padilla, “Motin de Mexicanos” Legajo L-E-64, 
Secretaria Relaciones Exteriores. 
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Santos Gonzales     Justo Valensuela 
Jesus Montoya     Narciso Orteaga 
Nagro Jurando      Andres Provencia 
Sostino Provencia     Jesus Maria Apodaca 
Dionicio Guerra     Cisto Castelo 
Torivio Lucerro     Vidal Garcia 
Antonio Olguin     Pedro Juarez 
Phillippe Sanchez     Monica Sanchez 
Brazillia Lopez     Antonio Silvas 
Santa Cruz Silvas     Julian Dominguez 
Juan Domingo Trujillo    Ysabel Solis 
Nacario Solis      Alvino Acre 
Carlos Telles      Jose Gonzales 
Andrés Colmeneros     Tomas Pedrasa 
Francisco Barela     Victoriana Medino 
Seriaco Maise      Faustina Carrabajal 
Pascual Perote      Fabian Granillo 
Benselado Granillo     Jose Maria Montoya 
Luciano Barela     Juan Jose Alderete 
Jesus Olguin      Pancho Tapia 
Jose Barela no. 1     Jose Barela no. 2 
Cristobal Brisano     Benito Apodaca 
Manuel Ortega     Crisostino Renteria 
Francisco Zambrano     Juan Naranjo 
Jose Hernandez     Irino Olguin 
Pedro Almengon     Torivio Traviz [?] 
Teodosia Alvarez     Juan Roderiguez 
Seveno Gomez     Vicente Medina 
Estaven Chavez     Jesus Chavez 
Estaven Carada     Santa Cruz Estrada 
Pomfilio Lucerro     Severiano Valdenado 
Tomas Gonzales No. 2    Cristoval Marquez 
Gregoria Zuniga     Alfonso Zuniga 
Dionicio Borigo     Ventura Pacheco 
Crispin Maños     Tedofilo Estrada 
Nestor Valles      Juan Valles 
Cisaro Perez      Cisto Gomez 
Beneficio Madrid     Caterino Villegas 
Bernardo Trujillo     Benito Caballera 
Mariano Polanco     Leogarde Salinas 
Cruz Pangagua     Patricio Loya 
Ruperto Guerra     Ylario Guerra 
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Pomposo Nescos     Urbano Montoya 
Crispin Maise      Juan Nuñez 
Ermajildo Orcacitas     Margona Almanza 
Mariano Arias      Saturnino Carrabajal 
Tomas Gonzales     Selferino Lujan 
Cleto Romero      Gregoria Garcia 
Mauro Lujan 
(one hundred and fifty nine) 
HIDDEN TEXT: Optional—must be placed in this order if it is 
included in the dissertation. If you don’t want to include a 
glossary, then delete the entire page and the following page break.
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